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ABSTRACT

This document is part of a series that seeks to help people think constructively about foreign policy issues, to improve citizen involvement, and to encourage debate on public issues. "Europe in Turmoil: 1914-1945"; "The Search for Security: 1945-1985"; and "Revolutionary Changes in Europe: 1985-1993" are the issues for discussion. Options that the document suggests for debate appear under the headings "Promote Western Values"; "Protect Our Interests"; "Beyond Europe"; and "Reduce Our Obligations." There is also a discussion of "Europe's Uncertain Future." The document includes a note to teachers, a lesson plan and student activities, supplementary documents for the teacher, and a listing of suggested readings. (SG)

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CHOICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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After The Cold War: The U.S. Role In Europe's Transition

SO 023 688

ALTERNATIVES FOR PUBLIC DEBATE
AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

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THE CHOICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY EDUCATION PROJECT was established at the Center for Foreign Policy Development to help citizens think constructively about foreign policy issues, to improve participatory citizenship skills, and to encourage public judgment on policy priorities.

THE CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University is a non-profit research organization. Its mandate is to bring together scholars, policymakers, and the public in a search for policy choices that can lead to a consensus on U.S. national security and foreign policy.

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for the 21st Century Education Project

October 1993

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The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project develops curricula for high schools and colleges on current foreign policy issues and offers workshops, institutes, and in-service programs for high school teachers. Course materials place special emphasis on the importance of educating students in their participatory role as citizens.

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Note to Teachers

In his farewell address in 1796, President George Washington warned his countrymen not to "implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her [Europe's] politics." For nearly 150 years, U.S. leaders adhered to Washington's advice. With the advent of the Cold War, however, U.S. policymakers dramatically expanded their horizons, and our country's relationship with Europe was seen as a leading concern of national security.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union swept away the assumptions that had formed the basis of U.S. policy toward Europe for more than four decades. As Americans re-evaluate the U.S. role in the world, our country's relationship with Europe is at the center of the discussion.

After the Cold War: The U.S. Role in Europe's Transition introduces students to the historical antecedents, current issues, and deeply felt values that have entered into the national debate on U.S. policy toward Europe. A fast-paced survey of European history from 1914 constitutes much of the unit. The first two parts of the background readings focus on the interwar years and the Cold War respectively, while the third part examines the remarkable changes that have occurred since 1985. Special attention is given to what were once the communist countries of Eastern Europe — a region long neglected in high school history textbooks.

At the core of the unit are four distinct options that allow students to consider a range of alternatives for U.S. policy toward Europe. Using the options, students are compelled to ponder a wide variety of worldviews and policy recommendations. Ultimately, students are called upon to go beyond the options presented and to develop their own proposals for the U.S. role in Europe. The reading that follows the options outlines the issues that are most likely to dominate the U.S. policy agenda in Europe and provides students a context to apply their options.

After the Cold War: The U.S. Role in Europe's Transition includes a ten-day lesson plan and student activities. The first six days of the lesson plan are meant to reinforce the key concepts raised in the background readings. In days seven and eight, students take part in a simulation based on the four options. The final two days of the lesson plan engage students in clarifying their own views on the U.S. role in Europe.

Below is an outline of the "Ten-Day Lesson Plan" (pages 65-69). You may also find the "Alternative Five-Day Lesson Plan" useful. The "Student Text" (pages 1-63) contains the background readings and the four options. Student handouts follow the lesson plan. The lesson plan offered in this unit is a guide. Many teachers choose to devote additional time to certain activities. We hope that these suggestions help you in tailoring the unit to fit the needs of your classroom.

Homework: Reading from Part I of the background readings

Day One: Crisis in Eastern Europe: discussion
Homework: Reading from Part I of the background readings

Day Two: Crisis in Eastern Europe: presentation and review
Homework: Reading from Part II of the background readings

Day Three: The United States as global superpower
Homework: Reading from Part II of the background readings

Day Four: Europe in the Cold War
Homework: Reading from Part III of the background readings

Day Five: Europe in transition: preparation
Homework: Reading from Part III of the background readings

Day Six: Europe in transition: presentation

Day Seven: The options before the U.S. Senate: organization and preparation
Homework: Preparation for the simulation

Day Eight: The options before the U.S. Senate: debate and discussion
Homework: "Focusing Your Thoughts"

Day Nine: Crafting student options
Homework: "Europe's Uncertain Future"

Day Ten: Putting options into practice
Extra Challenge: Letter based on student options

Europe in 1915


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LAND
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
RUMANIA
Black
Sea
SPAIN
ITALY
Adriatic
Sea
MONTENEGRO
SERBIA
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
Corsica
Sardinia
Tyrrhenian
Sea
GREECE
Aegean Sea
TURKEY
Mediterranean
Sea
SCALE
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0 100 200 Kms
Crete
AFRICA
The Allies
The Central Powers
Neutral nations

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Part I: Europe in Turmoil — 1914-1945

THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR I

In August 1914, Europe was caught up in a wave of patriotism. After nearly a century without a major war on the continent, the old diplomatic order had broken down and left Europe divided by hostile alliances. European leaders were mobilizing their armies and calling on young men to volunteer for service. Exuberant crowds gathered to send off fresh recruits to battle. At the time, leaders on both sides of the conflict confidently predicted quick victory. Europeans from Moscow to London expected the troops to be home by Christmas.

The patriotic fervor of August 1914, however, soon gave way to a grim understanding of modern warfare. World War I would drag on for more than four years. During that time, 10 million soldiers would be killed on the battlefield, while at least 5 million civilians would die from disease and starvation. The war would also change Europe's political map. Four imperial states — Austria-Hungary, Germany, the Ottoman Turkish empire, and Russia — would crumble as a result of World War I. Europe's two leading democracies — Britain and France — would emerge from the fighting victorious but battered.

In contrast to the European experience, World War I had a very different impact on the United States. The war affirmed the rising power of the United States. Although Americans did not enter the fighting until April 1917, the enormous economic power and growing military might of the United States was decisive in tipping the balance of forces against Germany and its allies. U.S. troops played an especially important role in turning back the German offensive in the summer of 1918 and forcing Germany to surrender.

Note to Students

The past five years have marked a turning point in world history. The division of Europe into two hostile camps has drawn to a close. The countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have broken with their communist past.

While Americans have reason to applaud the changes, we may also have cause to worry. For the first time in nearly fifty years, borders are being redrawn. In Germany, a people separated by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union has been reunited. In the former Soviet Union and what was once Yugoslavia, territorial disputes and minority problems have sparked conflicts among and within newly independent states. Moreover, huge nuclear arsenals remain in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Even as the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union grope along the path toward democracy and free-market economics, some observers yearn for the stability and predictability that prevailed in Europe during the Cold War.

While experts continue to argue over what the future of Europe holds, the questions facing the American public primarily concern values. Should the United States remain committed to its Western European allies? How should we respond to conflict in the region? What is the U.S. role in the world now that Soviet communism is no more? These are decisions of a national scope that all Americans must make together.

The Choices approach offers a framework for considering such issues. The four policy choices, or options, presented on pages 49-56 lay out distinct viewpoints about what U.S. policy toward Europe should be. The options have been designed to promote discussion in your class about the direction of our country's role in the world, and ultimately help you articulate your own views regarding U.S. policy toward Europe. Before you deal with policy options, you will need to understand how history has shaped the questions we face today. The following three chapters cover the period from World War I to the present. Special attention has been given to what were once the communist countries of Eastern Europe — a region often neglected in history textbooks. As you read, keep in mind that the background readings are meant to help you clarify your own ideas about the U.S. role in Europe.

Wilson's peace plan

The outcome of the war left the United States at the center of the world stage. Both victors and vanquished looked to President Woodrow Wilson to press for a just peace settlement. Even while World War I was still raging, Wilson drafted a plan for peace. In January 1918, he unveiled his fourteen-point proposal to reshape international relations. Central to Wilson's plan were the principles of self-determination, open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, free trade, and arms limitation. Wilson also called for the creation of an association of nations that would guarantee the political independence and territorial integrity of all countries.

The announcement of Wilson's Fourteen Points, as they came to be known, raised expectations throughout the world. Germany surrendered on the basis of the Fourteen Points. Small nations in Europe that had been denied political independence saw in the Fourteen Points an opportunity to gain statehood. In Asia and Africa, peoples living under the rule of Britain, France, and other European colonial powers viewed the Fourteen Points as a right to govern their own affairs. All of these expectations rested on the assumption that the United States would assume a whole new set of international responsibilities.

Historically, Americans had kept their distance from affairs outside of the Western Hemisphere. When World War I started, most Americans saw no reason for their country to become involved. For them, the war embodied the worst features of European politics: imperial ambitions, secret diplomacy, complex alliances, and war-mongering military leaders. Wilson was re-elected president in 1916 with the slogan, "He kept us out of war." After the election, however, Germany's stepped-up campaign of submarine warfare against neutral countries helped persuade Wilson that the United States must get involved in the conflict. When German submarines sank three U.S. merchant ships in March 1917, Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war.

> *If you look back upon the history of the world you will see how helpless peoples have too often been a prey to powers that had no conscience in the matter.*
>
> —*Woodrow Wilson*



"Tremble, boys. Here's the author of all those notes!"

Once the fighting ended, Wilson's efforts to shape a new international order were greeted with mixed feelings. Most Americans shared Wilson's conviction that the United States had a special mission in the world. They were worried, however, that Wilson's vision could entangle their country in messy problems far from America's shores.

The United States turns away from Europe

In the end, the United States turned away from the course Wilson had championed. In 1920, the U.S. Senate soundly rejected the Versailles Treaty that Wilson had helped negotiate with the other victorious allies of World War I. Opponents of the treaty objected most strongly to U.S. membership in the League of Nations, an international body that was largely Wilson's creation. According to the treaty, League members would be required to come to the defense of any member under attack. Critics of the treaty raised the possibility that U.S. troops could be called upon to defend the borders of a French colony in Africa or protect British imperial interests in India.

> *[President Wilson's] treaty means injustice. It means slavery. It means war.*
>
> *—Sen. William Borah*

The 1920 presidential election signified a final defeat for Wilson's goals. Warren G. Harding, a Republican senator who had opposed U.S. membership in the League of Nations, won a solid majority against a Democratic candidate supporting the League. Harding pledged to return the country to "normalcy." Indeed, many Americans were eager to isolate themselves from the turmoil in Europe. Change, however, was in fact drawing the nations of the world closer together. Advances in communication and transportation, along with an increase in trade, meant that the United States and the countries of Europe were more tightly linked than ever before.

A NEW EUROPE ARISES

The Europe that emerged from World War I scarcely resembled the Europe of 1914. Not only had the Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman Turkish, and Russian empires collapsed, but new states had been created by the brokers of the Versailles Treaty. New political ideas gained strength in the years following the war. The victory of communism in Russia was the most important development in the immediate postwar years. In the newly independent countries of eastern and central Europe, nationalism shaped the policies of untested leaders. In Italy, Germany, and elsewhere, a particularly aggressive form of nationalism, known as fascism, began attracting followers.

Europe between 1918 and 1939 was a region in crisis, which culminated in the unprecedented death and destruction of World War II. The Versailles Treaty crafted by the victorious Allies after World War I failed to serve as the foundation of lasting peace. Old wounds sharpened divisions on the continent, while new disputes contributed to the deepening mood of tension. Historians looking back on this era often blame shortsighted and narrow-minded European statesmen for the course of events. U.S. leaders are a target of criticism too. For students of Europe, the interwar period is especially crucial to understanding the situation in many of the states emerging from communism.

The Versailles Treaty

The peace conference that concluded World War I was convened in a spirit of hope. A blueprint for a secure, peaceful Europe was expected. Once the Allied leaders began their negotiations in Paris in January 1919, however, less noble goals entered the picture. The leading European Allies — Britain and France — had little interest in Wilson's ideals. Rather, they were primarily occupied with devising a plan to restrain Germany. British leaders hoped that Germany could be brought into the ranks of the prosperous, democratic states. In contrast, the French sought to break German power. French Premier Georges Clemenceau proposed that German territory west of the Rhine River be made into a buffer state. He also wanted permanent limitations on Germany's military power. Along with the British, the French demanded that Germany be required to pay for the cost of the war.

President Wilson insisted that Germany should pay for the damage it had inflicted on civilians — not

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
IF ANY MAN CAN SHOW JUST CAUSE, WHY THEY MAY NOT LAWFULLY BE JOINED TOGETHER, LET HIM NOW SPEAK, ——
FOREIGN ENTANGLEMENTS
U.S. SENATE
PEACE PROCEEDINGS

the entire cost of the war. Wilson's priority, however, was to maintain unity among the Allies and incorporate the League of Nations into the peace agreement. Consequently, he did not vigorously resist French and British efforts to weaken Germany.

> *My program, as you well know, is to put Germany in such a condition that she cannot again prepare for war.*
>
> *—Georges Clemenceau*

Wilson's hope was that the treaty would serve as a first step toward international harmony. For example, Wilson gave in to French and British pressure to strip Germany of its military forces. In exchange, he won support for inserting a statement in the treaty that presented German disarmament as making "possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations."

With the decision of the U.S. Senate not to join the League of Nations, many of the early hopes attached to the organization evaporated. For the most part, the League served as an instrument of British and French foreign policy. Germany was not allowed to join until 1926, while the Soviet Union was excluded until 1934. Confronted with its first major challenge in 1931, the League failed to stop a Japanese invasion of the Chinese province of Manchuria. Later in the 1930s, the League proved powerless in the face of Italian and German aggression.

DEMOCRACY FOUNDERS IN GERMANY

The Allies continued to see Germany as the chief threat to peace in Europe during the interwar years. In the decades preceding World War I, Germany had overtaken Britain as the leading industrial power in Europe. The Germans also had built an army that was the best in Europe and were rapidly catching up with Britain's naval strength. Even in defeat, Germany's scientific talent, industrious work force, and natural resources made the country's economic recovery inevitable. Germany's political direction, however, was more difficult to foresee.

In 1919, elections in Germany resulted in victory for moderate, democratic parties. The newly elected political leaders assembled in the German town of Weimar to draft a constitution that established a democratic republic and guaranteed civil liberties in a detailed bill of rights. Many of the same political figures who framed the Weimar constitution, however, were soon called upon to sign the Versailles Treaty. Since Germany had not been present at the negotiations, the final document came as a stunning blow to German leaders. Many denounced the treaty as unduly harsh. The chairman of the national assembly warned that the treaty would infuse a generation of Germans with "the will to break the chains of slavery."

When the Allies refused to revise the treaty substantially, German leaders were confronted with a dilemma. If they refused to sign, the Allies could be expected to impose the treaty by force. If they accepted the treaty, they risked being branded as accomplices to Germany's humiliation. In the end, Germany signed the treaty. World War I was officially over, but new seeds of conflict had been planted.

Conservative opponents of democracy in Germany promoted the view that the country had been stabbed in the back by traitors and cowards at home. They continued to reject the Versailles Treaty, arguing that it would cripple the German economy and leave Germany's military powerless. At the same time, communists and other radicals attacked the Weimar Republic as a sham. They blamed Germany's troubles on the industrialists and generals who had dominated German policy before 1918, and advocated the creation of a new society through revolution.

The democratic center of German politics was hit hard by the economic chaos of the early 1920s. The payments, or reparations, that Germany was required to make under the Versailles Treaty were seen by most Germans as the source of the country's raging inflation. Germany's finances, however, had been facing a crisis even before the treaty was signed. During World War I, the government had piled up huge debts to finance the war. To pay off borrowers after the fighting ended, German officials printed money with little regard for the future. The value of the German mark plummeted. An American congressman visiting Germany in 1923 noted that a meal for two in a restaurant cost 1.5 billion marks. Although the hyperinflation wiped out the debts of landowners and industrialists, most Germans suffered from the financial instability. Many saw the value of their life savings dwindle to practically nothing in a few months.

Adolf Hitler

Political extremists sought to take advantage of the misery gripping Germany. Among them was Adolf Hitler. Hitler had served with the German army in France during World War I. At the time of Germany's surrender, he was in a hospital recovering from a poison gas attack. As Hitler later wrote, news of Germany's surrender left him stunned and confused. Hitler sought out scapegoats for Germany's defeat, compiling his own list of Germany's enemies. Included were communists, liberal democrats, and, above all, Jews. Hitler's hatred of Jews formed the fundamental ideology of his National Socialist, or Nazi, Party. Hitler held that the Germans were the "master race," entitled to rule the world. He looked toward the lands of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as an area destined for German conquest and colonization.

Hitler drew inspiration from the success of Benito Mussolini in Italy. Like Hitler, Mussolini worshiped power. In 1919, he formed the Fascist Party. The term fascist was derived from *fasces*, a Latin word for the bundle of rods wrapped around an ax that symbolized power in ancient Rome. The fascist program in Italy aimed at reviving the glory of the Roman empire. Mussolini believed that the interests of individuals should be subordinate to the goals of the state. According to his philosophy, no other institutions in society — not religion, not business, not community groups — should compete with the government for power. Mussolini came to power in 1922 after organizing a march on Rome of 40,000 black-shirted fascists. By the mid-1920s, he had crushed opposition to his rule and established a fascist dictatorship in Italy.

> *Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state.*
>
> *—Benito Mussolini*

Hitler would not gain power until 1933. In 1923, he was arrested after trying to seize control of the government in Bavaria, in southern Germany. Hitler served only one year of a five-year prison term. His next opportunity to advance his cause came in the early 1930s, when Germany's economy was devastated by a worldwide depression. By 1931, one-third of German workers were unemployed. Germany's government imposed controls on wages and prices to avoid another round of hyperinflation. Meanwhile, rising support for the German Communist Party raised fears within the middle class. Many Germans saw in Hitler a leader to prevent the collapse of Germany.

In 1932, the Nazis captured more than 37 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections — their best showing ever in legitimate elections. The next year, Hitler emerged as the head of a coalition government after lengthy negotiations. With his hands on the levers

Europe between World Wars I and II


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of government, Hitler acted decisively to end democracy and make Germany a one-party state. Within five months, he had destroyed the foundations of democracy. Emergency rule was declared. The legislature, courts, and other institutions of government were systematically stripped of their power. Political parties other than the Nazis were outlawed.

The state fashioned by Hitler far surpassed fascist Italy in its brutality and organization. Terror was the glue holding together Nazi Germany. The key elements were a secret police network and a system of concentration camps. Hitler struck not only at his political enemies, but by the late 1930s unleashed a violent campaign of intimidation against the country's Jewish minority.

> *The broad mass of a nation...will more easily fall victim to a big lie than a small one.*
>
> *—Adolf Hitler*

In foreign policy, Hitler considered Germany's rearmament central to his plans. Although the Versailles Treaty set limits on Germany's military, Hitler quietly went about rebuilding his country's defense industry. By 1935, with rearmament in full swing, he openly rejected the provisions of the treaty meant to contain Germany's military. Rearmament also fueled Germany's economic recovery. Between 1933 and 1939, industrial production more than doubled, while the number of unemployed fell from than 6 million workers to almost zero.

EASTERN EUROPE'S NEW NATION-STATES

At the time that Napoleon was finally defeated in 1815, the countries of Eastern Europe — Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia — were not present on the political map of Europe. Rather, their lands were under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman Turkish, and Russian empires, and the Prussian kingdom.

In the 19th century, nationalism inspired the peoples of Eastern Europe to challenge the imperial system. Nationalists strove to achieve political independence for the people of their respective nationalities. They looked for models toward the states of Western and Central Europe that united a single nationality within their borders. Some of these nation-states — including Britain, France, and Spain — traced their origins back to the end of the Middle Ages. Others — such as Germany and Italy — were created in the 19th century. In Eastern Europe, where history and culture had created a complicated patchwork of nationalities, the spirit of nationalism threatened to tear apart the large empires. Even before World War I, nationalists had succeeded in breaking free from Ottoman Turkish rule to create the states of Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia.

The outcome of World War I seemed to represent the fulfillment of nationalist dreams in Eastern Europe. The empires that had long controlled the region lay in defeat. Meanwhile, President Wilson had declared that self-determination — the right of each nation to govern its own affairs — should be a guiding principle in framing the peace settlement.

The authors of the Versailles Treaty had redrawn the map of Eastern Europe following World War I. Land was carved from Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany to create new states. Some of the new countries, like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, brought together two or more nationalities that had no history of sharing political power. Others, like Austria and Hungary, had previously been at the center of large empires.

Although the countries of Eastern Europe were divided by nationality, religion, and language, they had common problems during the interwar period. Statehood itself put new demands on the leaders of the region. The extreme nationalism and dictatorial methods employed by both Hitler and Mussolini served as models for the leaders of Eastern Europe. At the same time, the rise of the fascist power posed an immediate threat to the security of the region.

Even with the best of intentions, the Allies faced an enormously complex task with respect to Eastern Europe World War I. In fact, the fate of Eastern Europe was a backdrop to the main interests of the Allies at the Paris peace conference. France's desire to weaken Germany, for example, led to the creation of a large Polish state that split East Prussia from the rest of Germany. At the same time, fear of communism led British leaders to support Poland's territorial acquisitions from Soviet Russia in 1920.

Minority problems

In addition to their own security interests, Allied leaders were forced to address a range of conflicting claims when establishing new states in the region. Borders were expected to be militarily defensible, meaning that mountain ranges and rivers had to be taken into account. Economics was an important consideration too. Steel factories, for example, needed access to iron ore, coal, and other minerals. These goals were often achieved at the expense of national self-determination. As a result, the Versailles Treaty created a new set of national minorities in Eastern Europe.

In particular, minority communities of Germans and Magyars (the main group in Hungary) were scattered throughout much of Eastern Europe in connection with the peace settlement. Czechoslovakia contained more than 3 million Germans, while Poland was home to a German minority of more than 1 million. Among the Magyars, more than 3 million people — one-third of their total population — became subject to the rule of other countries, primarily Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. As the former rulers of powerful empires, the German and Magyar peoples did not easily accept their minority status. They saw themselves as victims of Allied efforts to punish Germany and Austria-Hungary for their role in World War I.

The Germans and Magyars were at the heart of the minority problems that plagued Eastern Europe during the interwar period. The experience of the Magyars in Transylvania serves as a good illustration of the relationship between nationality and political power in the region. Before World War I, Transylvania had been part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The Magyars maintained a tight grip on the area's political system, despite the fact that they were outnumbered by Romanians. After the war, Transylvania was transferred to Romania. Suddenly, the tables were turned. Transylvania's government was in the hands of the Romanians, and the Magyars lost their privileged status.

Like rulers in the other newly independent states of Eastern Europe, Romanian leaders sought to centralize power in their capital of Bucharest. Magyars were given little opportunity to participate in government. Romanian bureaucrats were appointed to replace Magyars in Transylvania. At the same time, efforts were made to redirect the province's economy away from central Europe and toward Bucharest. Taxes on exports were imposed to discourage trade between Transylvania and Hungary. As a further blow to the Magyar community, the government divided up the estates of big Magyar landowners among Romanian peasants. In addition, the government sought to pit minority groups against one another. Germans and Jews in Transylvania, for example, were encouraged to throw off Magyar cultural influences and revive their own traditions.

Another area torn by minority problems in the interwar period was Yugoslavia. The country's name means

Nothing left but the howl



J.H. Donahey in *The Plain Dealer* (Cleveland), 1919. Used with permission.

land of the South Slavs. In fact, the peoples of Yugoslavia had never been united by a single national identity. The Serbs, who had established an independent kingdom before World War I, were the largest nationality. They were Eastern Orthodox Christians who looked toward Russia as their natural ally. Croats, the second largest group, were Roman Catholics. The Croats, along with the Slovenes, considered themselves closely tied to the civilization of central Europe. In addition, more than 11 percent of Yugoslavia's population was Muslim, consisting mostly of Bosnians and Albanians.

Yugoslavia's Serbian leaders believed that they were justified in dominating the new state. Not only had the Serbs gained experience in self-government before the war, but their small army had fought fiercely against Austro-Hungarian forces during World War I. The Croats and Slovenes, however, resented Serbian control of Yugoslavia. Closer to the heart of Europe, the Croats and Slovenes viewed themselves as more advanced than their neighbors to the south. During the interwar period, Yugoslav politics was marked by a tug of war between Serbs and Croats. The Yugoslav army was led almost exclusively by Serbian officers, and Serbs comprised the great majority of the top officials in the government. Among the Croats, the fascist *Ustasha* movement gained strength during the 1930s. The group was dedicated to achieving Croatian independence through insurrection and terror. Little progress was made toward forging a national Yugoslav identity.

Border disputes

In addition to aggravating tensions within the countries of Eastern Europe, minority problems also contributed to conflict between the states of the region. The boundaries that had been drawn at the Paris peace conference in 1919 were bound to leave some national leaders dissatisfied. Long before World War I, the Germans and French had butted heads over the

Breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire


GERMANY
POLAND
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Budapest
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Bolzano
Danube River
RUMANIA
Zagreb
Trieste
Fiume
Bucharest
Belgrade
YUGOSLAVIA
SERBIA
MONTE-NEGRO
BULGARIA
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Black Sea
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Cessions to Italy
Cessions to Rumania
Cessions to Czechoslovakia
Cessions to Yugoslavia
Cessions to Poland

Reproduced from Historical Maps on File

Alsace-Lorraine region that is located along the common border of the two countries. In the Alps as well, Austria-Hungary and Italy had staked competing claims to the area known as the South Tyrol.

The border disputes that arose in Eastern Europe during the interwar years made the problems of Western and Central Europe seem minor. Not only were the nationalities of Eastern Europe more intermingled than in other areas of the continent, but many of them had little experience in conducting foreign relations. For many countries of the region, foreign policy during the interwar period was marked by confrontation after confrontation.

Relations between Bulgaria and its neighbors were especially tangled. Bulgaria had sided with Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Turkish empire in World War I. As a result of the peace settlement, Bulgaria was required to make reparation payments to the Allies and it lost about 8 percent of its territory. Although the territorial losses did not compare to those suffered by Hungary, they nonetheless sparked resentment. Bulgaria's agricultural breadbasket was turned over to Romania. Bulgaria also lost parts of the Macedonian region to Yugoslavia and Greece. The transfer of Macedonia especially enraged Bulgarian nationalists, who considered the Slavic people of Macedonia to be Bulgarian. Finally, Bulgaria was forced to cede land in the Thrace region to Greece, thus losing access to the Mediterranean Sea.

Macedonia proved to be the most explosive issue in Bulgaria's foreign relations. Shortly after the war, a terrorist group known as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) formed to fight for Bulgaria's claim to the region. IMRO assassinated officials and conducted raids in Yugoslavia and Greece until the Bulgarian government stamped it out in the mid-1930s. Bulgaria's relations with Romania were worsened by Romania's decision to award Romanian war veterans land in what had been Bulgarian territory. Bulgaria continued to press its claims against Romania throughout the interwar period. In 1940, Nazi Germany pressured Romania to return the lands it had gained from Bulgaria.

In addition to border disputes among themselves, the countries of Eastern Europe faced territorial claims from Germany and the Soviet Union. The Versailles Treaty had left many Germans bitter toward their neighbors in Eastern Europe. As a result of the agreement, Poland received from Germany the industrial region of southeastern Silesia, as well as a corridor of land that cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany. In Czechoslovakia after the war, Germans constituted 23 percent of the population. This community had earlier counted its members among the ruling elite of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Nationalist politicians in Germany, particularly Hitler, insisted that the concentration of Germans around the Sudeten Mountains in northwestern Czechoslovakia be united with Germany.

> *We must always demand so much that we never can be satisfied.*
> *—Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudeten Germans*

The Soviet Union's grievances encompassed a still wider swath of Eastern European territory. In order to strengthen their grip on power at home, the leaders of Soviet Russia had signed a separate peace treaty with Germany in 1918. According to the agreement signed at Brest-Litovsk in March, Russia gave up huge tracts of land along its western border, as well as 40 percent of its industry. Although Soviet troops took back much of the territory that had been ceded in the treaty after Germany's surrender, they were not able to reclaim all of the lands belonging to the old Russian empire. At the Paris peace conference, the Allies redrew Russia's frontier without inviting Soviet participation. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Finland, were created from the empire's lands. Most of Poland was formed from the territory of the Russian empire, while Romania received the province of Bessarabia. As the Soviet Union gained strength in the 1930s, the Soviets increasingly challenged the validity of the postwar settlement.

THE SOVIET UNION

The communist revolution that took place in Russia in 1917 marked a watershed in European politics. In the decades before World War I, European rulers had struggled to block the growth of revolutionary movements. At the time, the communists were one of many groups promising to overturn the existing social order. In the countries of Western Europe, their appeal was undercut by a gradual improvement in economic conditions for workers and steady progress toward a more open political system. In Russia, however, revolutionaries found fertile ground.

The Russian empire lagged behind the other major states of Europe both politically and economically. The vast majority of its people were peasants, and the gap between rich and poor was enormous. Reform efforts undertaken in the early 1900s were interrupted by World War I. The war exposed the weaknesses of the Russian empire. Military setbacks against the Germans and increasing misery on the home front eroded public confidence in Russia's ruler, Tsar Nicholas II. In March 1917, Tsar Nicholas was forced to step down and a provisional government was formed. Eight months later, the communists seized power and proclaimed a workers state.

The communist revolution deeply worried Allied leaders. In the short term, they were upset by the decision of the communists to pull Russia out of the war. Still more troubling was the prospect that the communist takeover would ignite revolution elsewhere in Europe. The Allies sent small contingents of troops to Russia to aid forces opposing the communists. By 1921, however, the communists had established control over much of the old Russian empire. The following year, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or Soviet Union, was officially organized.

V. I. Lenin, the first leader of the Soviet Union, believed that the communist revolution would spread throughout the world. Except for the existence of a communist government in Hungary for a few months in 1919, however, communism failed to take root outside the borders of the old Russian empire. Lenin's death in 1924 was followed by a power struggle within the Soviet Union. The eventual winner, Josef Stalin, turned the country's attention away from pursuing worldwide revolution and toward industrializing the backward Soviet economy. Nonetheless, leaders in Europe and the United States viewed the Soviet system as a direct challenge to their societies.

In the Soviet Union under Stalin, the state owned the factories, farms, and all other means of production. Government planners managed every aspect of the economy, from how much wheat would be grown to how many shoes would be manufactured. Soviet communism represented a complete rejection of the capitalist system of the United States, Britain, and other countries, where most economic decisions were made by individual producers and consumers.

The Soviet economic experiment won considerable admiration in the United States and Europe. Some were attracted to the concept of government control over the economy. Others supported the emphasis on equality that was central to communist ideology. Meanwhile, the closed nature of Soviet society blocked news about Stalin's reign of terror and network of prison camps that would ultimately take more than 10 million lives.

> *A single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic.*
>
> *—Josef Stalin*

The suffering caused by the economic depression that began in 1929 added to the appeal of Soviet communism. In the early 1930s, when one-quarter of the labor force in the United States was unemployed, Stalin could claim that the state provided everyone with a job in the Soviet Union. With help from Moscow, communist parties throughout Europe gained new followers. British and French leaders were also concerned that communists would make inroads among the peoples of their colonies in Asia and Africa.

Communism vs. fascism

Like Stalin, Adolf Hitler and other fascist rulers believed that the economy should serve the state, although they allowed most industries to remain in private hands. They also despised the principles of democracy and trampled individual liberties. Despite their similarities in practice, the ideologies of communism and fascism were diametrically opposed.

Communists held that the conflict among competing economic classes — between factory owners and factory workers — was the driving force

Vaughn Shoemaker in the Chicago *Daily News*, 1939.



of history. They believed that nationalism was a product of the capitalist era and looked forward to a world in which all people would be equal and national boundaries would be obsolete. In contrast, fascists saw a world in which nations struggled for power and only the strong survived. Rather than desiring equality, fascists stressed the importance of bolstering the military and economic strength of their own nation.

Hitler and Stalin agreed that war between fascism and communism was inevitable. During the 1930s, both leaders pressed forward with plans for a rapid military buildup. Between 1933 and 1938, German defense spending increased ninefold, while the Soviets raised their military expenditures by fifteen times. By 1938, Nazi Germany's defense budget was the largest in the world — five times higher than U.S. levels.

Nazi Germany's advances in weapons technology, as well as Hitler's aggressive rhetoric, forced the leaders of Britain, France, and the United States to reconsider the balance of power in Europe. Containing Germany became the chief foreign policy goal of the democratic states. The shift in priorities changed perceptions toward the Soviet Union as well. Democratic leaders now saw the Soviets as a potential counterweight to the rising power of Nazi Germany.

In 1933, the United States established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The following year, the Soviets were admitted to the League of Nations. In 1935, Stalin directed communist parties outside of the Soviet Union to join with other political parties in forming a "united front" against fascism. During the Spanish civil war of 1936 to 1939, the Soviets and the democratic states found themselves on the same side in their opposition to fascist forces.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

U.S. foreign policy during the interwar period was driven mainly by a desire to avoid foreign entanglements. By the 1920s, the aftermath of World War I had left many Americans disillusioned. The results of the Versailles Treaty, chaos in Germany, and the triumph of communism in Russia seemed to contradict Wilson's commitment that "the world must be made safe for democracy."

Nonetheless, the United States remained closely tied to events in Europe. Among the most important links was the huge debt that the European Allies owed the United States. As a result of World War I, the United States replaced Britain as the world's leading financial power. Before the war, the United States owed Europe (primarily Britain) $3 billion. After the war, Europe owed the United States $13 billion. The British and French originally hoped to pay off their debt with German reparations.

By 1922, Germany was unable to make its reparations payments. To force German compliance, French troops entered Germany's industrial heartland, the Ruhr Valley. German workers went on strike to protest the French occupation. The showdown between France and Germany only aggravated the debt crisis. Although U.S. leaders at first insisted that the British and French meet their financial obligations, in the end they forgave or cancelled about half the Allied debts.

With the depression of the 1930s, the international financial system was further weakened. Most countries defaulted on their debts, and Hitler stopped paying reparations. In an attempt to protect American industries by keeping out foreign imports, Congress in 1930 raised tariffs to their highest levels in U.S. history through the Smoot-Hartley act. The increase prompted European countries to raise their tariff rates. In the years that followed, U.S. imports and exports plunged, and the depression deepened.

On the diplomatic front, the determination to avoid another general European war produced new efforts to preserve world peace. Although the United States did not join in the League of Nations, it did participate in international conferences in the 1920s and 1930s meant to halt the buildup of naval armaments, poison gas, and other weapons. Along these same lines, the United States signed a treaty with France in 1928 to outlaw war. The Kellogg-Briand Pact grew out of French efforts to forge a military alliance with the United States. Eventually, the treaty gained the signatures of sixty-four countries, calling on them to "condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy."

> *I know that national jealousies and ambitions and racial animosities often are the causes of war. These causes of conflict can be eliminated through education, through the development of tolerance, and through the creation of an effective desire for peace.*
>
> *—Frank Kellogg, secretary of state*

The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the conferences on arms control lacked effective enforcement mechanisms. Hitler and Mussolini, as well as the militaristic leaders of Japan, virtually ignored them. Like the League of Nations itself, the diplomatic efforts to keep the peace did little to stop dictators bent on aggression.

HITLER LOOKS EAST

Nazi Germany was at the forefront of Europe's slide toward war in the 1930s. Hitler wanted to avoid a repeat of the long, exhaustive struggle of World War I. Instead, he planned to overcome his enemies with a series of quick, knock-out blows. The most important element of Hitler's strategy was to be a lightning invasion of the Soviet Union.

To prepare Germany for a decisive war against the Soviet Union, Hitler sought to extend German influence in Eastern Europe. In economic and diplomatic terms, the region was open to German domination in the 1930s. The depression had struck the agricultural economies of Eastern Europe particularly hard. World prices for the region's products had plummeted with the slowdown in international trade. Under Hitler, Germany provided a reliable market for Eastern Europe's grain, minerals, timber, oil, and other commodities. In exchange, Germany sold manufactured products to the Eastern Europeans. By the late 1930s, all of the countries of the region,



David Low in the London *Evening Standard*, 1936

Comparing the Great Powers in 1938



From *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*

From *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*

aside from Poland and Czechoslovakia, were dependent on German trade. Meanwhile, Eastern European leaders increasingly came to doubt the commitment of the democratic states to their independence. After World War I, France had hoped to create a barrier of strong buffer states between Germany and the Soviet Union. The French, however, failed to back up their diplomacy with strong trade relations in Eastern Europe. Britain and the United States proved more reluctant to become involved in the region.

Democracy was also losing ground in Eastern Europe during the 1930s. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, nationalism and militarism came to dominate politics in the region. One of the first iron-fisted dictators to arrive on the scene was Jozef Pilsudski of Poland. Pilsudski emerged from World War I as a national hero. He served as Poland's head of state from 1918 to 1922, carving out the country's borders with a series of military campaigns against Russia, Lithuania, and Czechoslovakia. After parliamentary democracy produced a succession of weak governments, Pilsudski seized power in 1926 and ruled until his death in 1935. Pilsudski believed that military strength was essential to Poland's survival. To counter German and Russian power, he developed an alliance with France. With the revival of Germany's military, however, he signed a non-aggression treaty with Hitler in 1934.

> *...I stand in opposition, as before, to the greatest evil in the country: the rule of unrestrained and undisciplined political parties over Poland, with no thought to the imponderables, with an eye only to profits and monetary gain.*
>
> *—Jozef Pilsudski*

Europe heads toward war

Hitler assumed that the democratic countries would not go to war to stop his expansion in Eastern Europe. His belief grew stronger in 1935, when Italy invaded Ethiopia. The League of Nations officially responded to the attack by imposing sanctions on Mussolini's government. In fact, Italy's international trade was hardly affected. In less than a year, Mussolini's forces overwhelmed the brave but poorly equipped Ethiopian army. In the United States, the response to rising militarism in Europe was to pass the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1936. The measures were designed to ensure that the United States would not become involved in a war overseas. According to the acts, the United States would not sell arms or provide loans to nations at war.

Fred O. Seibel in the *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 1939. Used with permission.



Hitler's plans for expansion got underway in 1938. In March, his forces entered Austria and annexed the country to Germany. Later that year, Hitler insisted that Czechoslovakia turn over the Sudeten region to Germany. At a conference in Munich, he told British and French leaders that Germany would have no other territorial ambitions. The British and French agreed to Hitler's demand, and German troops immediately occupied the Sudeten region. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hailed the Munich agreement as an important step toward "peace in our time."


" STAY OUT! STAY OUT FOR MY SAKE, AS WELL AS YOUR OWN!"
WAR MAD EUROPE
DEMOCRACY
AMERICA THE LAST REFUGE OF DEMOCRACY
ORR

Carey Orr. © Copyrighted (1939), Chicago Tribune Company. All rights reserved. Used with permission.

For Hitler, however, the Munich conference confirmed his conviction that the democratic powers would not resist his plans for expansion. Six months later, he broke the promise he had made in Munich and took control of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. He also seized Memel, an important port on the Baltic Sea, from Lithuania. At about the same time, Italy invaded Albania. Still more stunning was the non-aggression treaty signed between Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1939. At the time, the world did not know that Hitler and Stalin had secretly agreed to divide Eastern Europe between their two countries.

> *How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.*
>
> *—Neville Chamberlain*

C.C. Batchelor.



"Come on in, I'll treat you right. I used to know your daddy."

World War II in Eastern Europe

World War II began in Europe with Hitler's invasion of Poland in September 1939. The German *blitzkrieg* crushed the Polish army. To Hitler's surprise, however, the attack prompted Britain and France to declare war on Germany. Even after signing the non-aggression pact with the Soviets, Hitler had hoped to avoid war with the Western European democracies. Now, a large-scale European conflict seemed inevitable.

From 1939 until its conclusion in 1945, World War II spread far beyond the boundaries of Europe. Ultimately, the war was a struggle between a few military giants: the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain on one side; Germany and Japan on the other. In Europe, the triumph of the Soviet Union over the German invasion proved most decisive, while in the Pacific the United States led Allied efforts to defeat the Japanese. Less well-known is the impact of World War II on Eastern Europe. Although events in the region may not have determined the outcome of the war, they nonetheless greatly affected the future course of developments in Eastern Europe.

> *A good society is able to face schemes of world domination and foreign revolutions alike without fear.*
>
> *—Franklin Roosevelt*

Poland was World War II's first victim. Less than three weeks after the Nazis attacked Poland from the west, Soviet troops invaded from the east. Poland was forced to surrender by the end of September. Over the next year, Stalin collected on his secret agreement with Hitler. In addition to moving into eastern Poland, Soviet troops occupied the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the Romanian province of Bessarabia.

Eastern Europe under the Nazis

In 1941, the map of Eastern Europe was again redrawn when Hitler invaded Russia. The initial German thrust pushed Soviet forces out of Eastern Europe. By the fall of 1941, the Nazis were within striking distance of Moscow and Leningrad. Without the Soviets to contend with, Germany extended its eastern border into Lithuania and incorporated the other Baltic countries into the satellite state of *Ostland*. Hungary and Bulgaria were awarded territories they had sought during the interwar period, while the province of Bessarabia was restored to Romania. Earlier, an independent republic had been formed in Slovakia after German troops occupied the western part of Czechoslovakia.

In the months before Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler used Eastern Europe as a staging ground. Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria were pressured to ally themselves with Germany. In early 1941, Hitler insisted that Yugoslavia likewise join the alliance, and demanded that German troops be permitted to march through the country to Greece. With no hope of British support, Yugoslavia's Prince Paul reluctantly signed the alliance. Within days, however, Serbian nationalists led a bloodless coup to overthrow him.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

The Yugoslav coup brought together the elements for a broad coalition government. But the new regime proved short-lived. Hitler flatly rejected compromise, and on April 6, 1941, the Nazis invaded without issuing a declaration of war. In less than two weeks, the Yugoslav army was forced to surrender. Nonetheless, the German army had lost a critical month in launching its attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler would later blame the delay for Germany's defeat.

Hitler viewed Yugoslavia as a vehicle for Serbian ambitions and quickly moved to dismember the country. Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania all annexed parts of Yugoslavia. At the same time, the Nazis created a separate Croatian state. Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia opened a period of particular brutality. More than 1 million people died in Yugoslavia during the war. Roughly half of them were Serbs, many of whom were killed at the hands of the *Ustasha* in Croatia. In addition, two major guerrilla movements emerged to resist the Nazis — the Serbian-dominated *chetniks* and communist partisans that included all nationalities.

The communists and the *chetniks* battled with each other for control of Yugoslavia even as they struggled against the Nazis. By 1943, the communist partisans had distinguished themselves as the most effective guerrilla group and had established a provisional government. After the Germans withdrew from Yugoslavia in 1944, fighting between the two groups intensified. The communists, led by Marshal Tito, ultimately emerged as the stronger force.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the fate of individual countries rested largely on the outcome of the German-Soviet struggle. Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia participated in the German invasion of the Soviet Union. About 300,000 Romanian troops died in the war against the Soviets. In 1944, however, Romania switched sides and suffered more than 100,000 battle deaths fighting Germany. The shifting tide of the war also tempted leaders in Hungary to change their allegiance. Hitler, however, sent in troops to occupy the country in 1944.

Even as the war turned against Germany, the Nazis continued to implement their racist doctrines in Eastern Europe. Throughout the region, Jews were rounded up and sent to Nazi death camps. The majority of the 6 million Jews who died in the Holocaust came from Eastern Europe. In Poland alone, 2.6 million Jews were killed. In addition, the Nazis exterminated hundreds of thousands of Eastern Europe's Gypsies. Meanwhile, other non-Germanic ethnic groups were to supply the labor for building Hitler's planned empire in the east.

By the time Hitler committed suicide in May 1945, there was nothing left of his mad dream to construct a "thousand-year empire." Europe, however, had been forever changed by his ambition to rule the world. Gone was the European-centered international order that had existed for more than four centuries. A new age of international relations was on the horizon, and the United States was destined to play a more prominent role than ever before.

Part II: The Search for Security — 1945-1985

THE POST-WAR WORLD

When soldiers from the United States and the Soviet Union shook hands on the banks of the Elbe River on April 25, 1945, they were also greeting the beginnings of a new international order. World War II had crippled the old European power system. Nazi Germany was defeated and destroyed. Great Britain had bankrupted its economy in achieving victory. France and Italy faced poverty and social upheaval.

Among the leading powers, only the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the war with a strengthened position in the international arena. The United States stood unrivaled as the mightiest nation on earth. Spared from attack, the U.S. economy had soared out of the depression to produce much of the equipment needed for the Allied war effort. Moreover, the United States in 1945 possessed the world's most advanced military and the only atomic weapons. The Soviet Union, however, was a formidable force in its own right. Despite losing more than 20 million people during the war, the Soviets had built up an army of 12 million soldiers to defeat Nazi Germany.

By the time Soviet leader Josef Stalin met President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Black Sea resort of Yalta in February 1945, the Soviets were poised to play a decisive role in post-war Europe. Stalin could rightfully claim that his country had shouldered the greatest burdens in defeating the Germans. At the decisive battle of Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943, the Soviets turned the tide of the war after months of house-to-house fighting. Soviet losses at Stalingrad — about 1.25 million —were more than three times the number of American deaths during the entire war. With the Nazis on the retreat after Stalingrad, Soviet troops had swept into the countries of Eastern Europe. "Uncle Joe," as Stalin was known to many Americans during the war, had also convinced Roosevelt that the Soviets were reliable allies. At Yalta, Stalin pledged to help the United States defeat Japan once the war with Germany was over. In exchange, the Soviets were allowed a freer hand in shaping the future of Eastern Europe.

Eastern Europe's "Iron Curtain"

The alliance of World War II quickly dissolved once the fighting ended. By February 1946, Stalin predicted that the conflict between communism and capitalism would lead to a new war. Meanwhile, his troops remained firmly in place throughout much of Eastern Europe. Churchill had warned his U.S. allies of the Soviet threat even while World War II was raging. He became more convinced in 1946 that Stalin was seeking to divide Europe in two. In March, he presented his concerns to an American audience in Fulton, Missouri, that included a sympathetic President Harry Truman.

"From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent," observed Churchill, who had lost the prime minister's post in 1945 elections. "Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere."

> *The Americans could not understand that it was of little avail to win the war strategically if we lost it politically.*
>
> *—British General Bernard Montgomery*

At the time of Churchill's speech, other developments in Europe were also a cause for anxiety in Washington. Communist forces in Greece were waging a bloody civil war. In Italy, a coalition of communists and socialists captured nearly 39 percent of the vote in 1945 elections. The Communist Party in France was even more organized, with almost 1 million dues-paying members and a network of organizations that produced newspapers, plays, novels, poems, women's magazines, comics, cookbooks, and farmers' almanacs. Meanwhile, Britain was suffering a crisis of a different sort. World War II had cost the country one-quarter of its net worth and in 1947 forced the British to reduce their presence in Greece, Turkey, and other areas of conflict. Churchill feared that Stalin would move to fill the vacuum left by the retreating British empire.

Turmoil in Europe, however, represented a distant concern for most Americans at the close of World War II. President Roosevelt had acknowledged at the Yalta conference that public opinion would not permit U.S. troops to remain in Europe for more than two years after the war. Roosevelt based his assessment on the traditional American distaste for involvement in European affairs.

Containing Soviet expansion

A shift in American attitudes began within a small circle of U.S. policymakers led by George F. Kennan. A diplomat at the U.S. embassy in Moscow during World War II, Kennan sent an 8,000-word cable to the State Department in February 1946 that dismissed the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union. Kennan believed that the Soviet system was based on paranoid hostility toward the outside world and proposed that the United States seek to contain the expansion of Soviet communism. In the long run, Kennan felt, communist ideology would lose its aggressive edge and begin to soften. Kennan's memorandum was circulated widely among U.S. policymakers. In 1947, it served as the basis for an article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" that appeared in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs*. Although many Americans disagreed with Kennan's thesis, the article nonetheless lent coherence to the arguments of those who wanted to stand up to the Soviets in Europe.

> *The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations.*
>
> *—George Kennan*

Kennan's concept of "containment" gradually came to shape the policies of the Truman administration. In March 1947, President Truman announced his intent to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." Known as the Truman Doctrine, the policy statement was linked to a request to Congress for military aid to Greece and Turkey.

Although few Americans were deeply interested in the Greek civil war or Soviet territorial claims in Turkey, communist aggression was increasingly viewed as a global menace. In the late 1940s, the Truman administration converted growing anti-communist sentiment into a broad effort to strengthen free-market democracy in Western Europe.

The speaker's platform



Edwin Marcus in *The New York Times*, 1949. Used with permission.

The Marshall Plan and NATO

Truman's vision rested on two expensive U.S. commitments. In April 1948, Congress approved the European Recovery Program after lengthy debate. Better known as the Marshall Plan, the program was an economic aid package that invested $12.5 billion into the reconstruction of sixteen European states from 1948 to 1952. Although invited to participate, the Soviets refused U.S. assistance, and barred their Eastern European satellites from accepting aid.

> *It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.*
>
> *—George Marshall, secretary of state*

Militarily, the United States joined with ten countries of Western Europe and Canada in 1949 to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By 1955, NATO had expanded to incorporate thirteen European members, including West Germany. With the signing of the NATO treaty, the United States committed itself to the defense of Western Europe and pledged for the first time in history to maintain a substantial U.S. troop presence overseas.

Much of the impetus for both the Marshall Plan and NATO came from concern over Germany. Following the defeat of the Nazis, U.S., Soviet, British, and French troops remained in Germany. France, in particular, was worried that a resurgent Germany would again pose a military threat, and took the lead in arranging a British-French pact in 1947. Administratively, the Allies divided Germany into four zones of occupation. The German capital, Berlin, was similarly split, with the U.S., British, and French sectors of western Berlin completely surrounded by the Soviet zone. Differences between the Americans and Soviets, however, soon surfaced. In the Soviet zone, communists rose to power in tightly controlled elections. More ominous was the blockade the Soviets imposed on the western part of Berlin in 1948 to unify the city under communism. The United States countered the Soviet effort to cut off access to western Berlin by leading a campaign to airlift supplies into the city. The blockade lasted almost a year, but with the United States and its allies delivering 8,000 tons of goods daily by air the Soviets backed down.

> *I do not think we should play compromise any longer....I am tired of babying the Soviets.*
>
> *—Harry Truman*

The Berlin blockade forced both sides to accept the reality of a divided Germany. The United States paved the way for the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany, in 1949, while the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany, was created in the Soviet occupation zone. The prospect of a rearmed West Germany alarmed many French leaders. They supported the establishment of NATO as a means to securely link a democratic Germany to Western Europe. Germany became the front line of the Cold


WHY SHOULD WE HELP? THE LEAK IS IN HIS END OF THE BOAT!
AID
ISOLATIONISTS
EUROPE
TALBURT

Talburt in the New York World Journal Tribune.

Allied Occupation Zones in Germany


North Sea
Baltic Sea
N
EAST PRUSSIA
U.S.S.R.
NETHERLANDS
Hamburg
Bremen
Berlin
GERMANY
POLAND
BELGIUM
Bonn
Nuremberg
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
FRANCE
Munich
Vienna
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
ITALY
YUGOSLAVIA
0
180km
0
120m
American Zone
French Zone
Taken over by Poland
British Zone
Russian Zone
Under Four Power Control

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War in 1955, when the Soviet Union and seven Eastern European countries formed the Warsaw Pact as a counterweight to NATO. The forces of the two superpowers were concentrated on the West German-East German border.

Another important building block in the foundation of post-war Europe was the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Belgium and Luxembourg had been pioneers of the common market concept. In 1921, they agreed to set uniform practices on regulations that governed trade between them. The Netherlands accepted the convention on customs in 1948. A more significant step came in 1951, when France, West Germany, and Italy joined Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in creating a common market for coal and steel. Six years later, the six countries extended their economic cooperation to other products. Within the new market of the EEC, restrictions were removed on the movement of people, goods, services, and capital. The cause of European unity had taken a great leap forward.

Fred O. Seibel in the *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 1948. Used with permission.



EUROPE IN THE SHADOW OF THE COLD WAR

The United States in 1950 was in many respects at its zenith in global power. The U.S. share of the world's income was 52 percent. Americans held 49 percent of international financial reserves. The United States produced approximately half of the world's oil and steel. And yet, many Americans were deeply worried by the international political climate. In less than a decade, the United States had been thrust into the role of global policeman. Voices from an earlier era, such as Senator Robert Taft, warned that too much emphasis on foreign affairs and military strength would warp American democratic values. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace feared that Truman's policies would "divide Europe into two warring camps" and hoped to promote international cooperation through the United Nations. The opinions of Taft, Wallace, and others were aired at thousands of town-hall meetings throughout the country while the Marshall Plan was debated in Congress. By 1950, however, most Americans were prepared, perhaps reluctantly, to shoulder greater international responsibilities.

> *It is one thing to agree to go to war with Russia if it attacks Western Europe. It is another to send American ground troops to defend Norway or Denmark or Holland or Italy or even France and England.*
>
> *—Robert Taft*

The consensus that emerged around U.S. Cold War policies was shaped in large part by international events. In September 1949, the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb. The next month, communists led by Mao Zedong won control of mainland China and joined Moscow in pressing for the spread of communism worldwide. In June 1950, communist North Korean forces invaded South Korea, drawing the United States into a three-year conflict that ended in a stalemate.

In Eastern Europe as well, the "Iron Curtain" foreseen by Churchill had been tightly drawn. Before his death in 1953, Stalin installed leaders beholden to Moscow in the Soviet Union's satellites. Mass protests in East Germany were squelched by a Soviet-backed state of siege and 25,000 arrests. Under Stalin's successor, the reform-minded Nikita Khrushchev, many of Stalin's hand-picked leaders in Eastern Europe were replaced. Khrushchev, however, made sure that Moscow's satellites did not drift out of the Soviet orbit. In 1956, Khrushchev set the limits of independence when he sent Soviet tanks into Hungary. The Soviet invasion toppled Imry Nagy, who had hoped to place Hungary on a "New Course." Nagy had given his people greater political freedom and proposed that Hungary leave the Warsaw Pact.

Although news of Soviet repression in Hungary enraged millions of Americans, President Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected appeals that the United States respond militarily. By the mid-1950s, the policy of containment developed by the Truman administration had evolved into a well-defined global strategy. U.S. leaders had given up on the idea that the frontier of communism in Eastern Europe could be rolled back by force. Instead, they reluctantly accepted the Soviet sphere of influence in Hungary and elsewhere behind the "Iron Curtain." At the same time, Eisenhower and his successors believed that the United States had no choice but to maintain its role as a military superpower.

Moscow's development of nuclear weapons forced American defense planners to devise a new approach to national security. U.S. conventional, or non-nuclear, forces were built up. Without a nuclear monopoly, Truman and Eisenhower bolstered the U.S. presence in Western Europe to deter Soviet aggression. By 1955, the number of American troops in the region had reached 431,000, and over half of the U.S. military budget was earmarked for defending Europe. Meanwhile, American policymakers continued to rely on nuclear superiority as the backbone of U.S. deterrence. In 1947, Truman had ordered that 400 nuclear weapons be ready by 1953. The arsenal gave the United States a critical head start in the arms race. Under Eisenhower, the doctrine of "massive retaliation" committed the United States to use nuclear weapons to counter a Soviet attack on Western Europe.


WE GOT THE END THAT EATS
—AND BITES
ANY
GERM

Burt Thomas. Reprinted with permission of *The Detroit News*, a Gannett newspaper. © copyright 1949.

> *...we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.*
> *—Dwight Eisenhower*

Franco-German cooperation

Perhaps the most important guarantee of Western European security was the region's growing economic prosperity and political stability. The Marshall Plan and the EEC laid the foundation for a rapid rise in Western European living standards in the post-war decades. From 1950 to 1970, per capita income within the EEC skyrocketed from $477 to $2,557. During the same period, EEC exports shot up ten times. Following World War II, the United States had tallied up a huge trade surplus against the countries of Western Europe, causing many in Washington to fear that Europeans would soon be unable to pay for American products. By the mid-1950s, however, many Western European industries were competing on an equal footing with their American counterparts.

Setting the tone of post-war Western Europe was a new relationship between France and West Germany. Franco-German hostility had been at the center of Europe's three previous major wars: World War II, World War I, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. The two most important post-war leaders in France and Germany, however, also appreciated that Europe owed much of its culture to the historical interplay between their two peoples.

Konrad Adenauer, elected West Germany's first chancellor in 1949, had developed a political base around the city of Cologne on the Rhine River. He felt closer to the distinctive crossroads culture of his native region than to the strident German nationalism that reigned through the first half of the 20th century. As leader of the new West German state, Adenauer promoted European cooperation and anchored his country firmly in the democratic value system of the West.

We can no longer afford to continue this [Franco-German] feud, because we stand today before the historical necessity of bringing about a union of all those peoples, who like us are endeavoring to preserve Western values and the principles of freedom which they imply.

—Konrad Adenauer

In many respects, Adenauer found a cultural and intellectual soulmate in France's Charles de Gaulle. Like Adenauer, de Gaulle came of age before World War I and shared the German's contempt for both communism and fascism. After France's surrender to the Nazis in 1940, de Gaulle organized the Free French army in Britain and played a prominent role in the Allied liberation of his country in 1944. Convinced that destiny had called upon him, de Gaulle remarked that he "alone and almost unknown, had to assume the burden of France." De Gaulle left French politics in 1946, refusing to cooperate with the large communist faction in parliament. In 1958, he re-emerged to guide his country out of a constitutional crisis. A century earlier, de Gaulle may have very well proclaimed himself king. Instead, he took the lead in writing a new constitution that stabilized the French political system. French voters approved the constitution by a nearly four-to-one margin.

In September 1958, de Gaulle invited Adenauer to his chateau for what he termed "the historic encounter between this old Frenchman and this very old German." Over the next four years, the two elder statesmen met forty times and laid the foundations of the French-German alliance that came to dominate European politics. The success of the EEC largely depended on an economic bargain struck by the two countries. Before de Gaulle, many French feared that their economy would be overwhelmed by the might of German industry. France in the early 1950s was a country with as many workers engaged in agriculture as in industry. Under the compromise presided over by de Gaulle and Adenauer, West Germany helped finance the development of modern agriculture and the growth of new industry in France. In turn, German business received access to the French consumer market.

It is time for the Rhine to become a meeting-place and not a barrier.

—Charles de Gaulle

De Gaulle and Adenauer were also drawn together by a mutual mistrust of Britain. They resented that London still aspired to a superpower role in global politics, even as the British empire crumbled. "England," Adenauer wrote, "is like a rich man who has lost all his property but does not realize it." The French and German leaders also worried that Britain's traditionally close relationship with the United States would tilt the balance of power away from the European continent. In 1963, de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application to join the EEC. Ultimately, the British were allowed to enter the trading bloc in 1973, but by that time the British economy had fallen behind many of its European competitors.

Western Europe's new worldview

Western Europe's transformation during the quarter century after 1945 can be counted as a great success for U.S. foreign policy. Following centuries of conflict, the leading nations of the region not only enjoyed a long stretch of peace, but framed a structure of regional cooperation around the EEC and NATO. Prosperity smoothed over the divisions between workers and the wealthy within Western European societies and also lifted much of southern Europe out of desperate poverty. Of course, Cold War hostility continued to cut through the continent, but even the U.S.-Soviet struggle settled down to a relatively stable status quo. The Cold War even had its advantages. Rather than dwelling on longstanding animosities among themselves, Western Europeans were compelled to focus on the common Soviet enemy.

Western Europe's changing worldview went hand-in-hand with the final stages of European imperialism. Following World War II, the colonial empires controlled by Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal faced new demands. Independence movements gained strength among the peoples of Asia and Africa. The British empire, which at its height claimed land on six continents,

Europe during the Cold War


NORWAY
FINLAND
SWEDEN
North Sea
Baltic Sea
U.S.S.R.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTHERN IRELAND
IRELAND
DENMARK
GREAT BRITAIN
NETHER-LANDS
WEST GERMANY
EAST GERMANY
POLAND
BELGIUM
LUXEMBURG
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
FRANCE
AUSTRIA
SWITZ.
HUNGARY
RUMANIA
ITALY
YUGOSLAVIA
Black Sea
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
TURKEY
GREECE
Mediterranean Sea
MOROCCO (Fr.)
ALGERIA (Fr.)
TUNISIA (Fr.)
Crete (Gr)
Cyprus (Br)

▨ NATO countries

▨ Warsaw Pact countries

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systematically turned over power to its former colonial subjects. France, the second leading colonial power, clung desperately to its possessions and suffered a string of bloody setbacks. The greatest catastrophe occurred in Algeria, where French attempts to hold onto its nearest colony led to a bitter war of terrorism and counter-terrorism. The conflict resulted in approximately 1 million deaths before de Gaulle ended French involvement in 1961. European colonialism in Africa did not completely end until the mid-1970s, when the Portuguese were forced out of Angola and Mozambique after destructive wars.

As the age of empire drew to a close, Western European power became largely confined to the economic sphere. Moreover, the people of the region saw themselves essentially as supporting actors in the larger drama involving the two superpowers. The crisis over the Suez Canal in 1956 confirmed Europe's diminished role in the Cold War world. Built in 1869 by the French to connect the Mediterranean with the Red Sea and controlled by the British beginning in the 1870s, the Suez Canal had served as a lifeline for the great European empires. In 1956, Egypt's charismatic leader, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, seized the Suez Canal. The British and the French, joined by Israel, responded by attacking Egypt. The two waning powers, however, were forced to back down after President Eisenhower issued a stern rebuke.

Eastern Europe falls behind



While Western Europe saw its colonial empires crumble, the Soviets were reinforcing their links with their satellites in Eastern Europe. After the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, Khrushchev permitted Eastern European leaders to experiment with some of the limited reforms he was applying to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet leader bound Eastern Europe closer to Moscow through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev hoped to mold Comecon into an equal of the EEC. But whereas the EEC countries relied primarily on free-market forces to drive the economy, Comecon was run largely by communist planners in Moscow. According to Khrushchev's strategy, each of the Comecon members would contribute to a single integrated economic network. Relatively advanced countries, like Czechoslovakia and East Germany, would serve as manufacturing centers, while other areas would provide raw materials and agricultural products. Ironically, Khrushchev's goal was undermined in part by one of Eastern Europe's most backward countries: Romania. Romanian leader Gheorghe



Robert Graysmith. © *San Francisco Chronicle*, 1971. Reprinted by permission.

Gheorghiu-Dej insisted that his country develop the same heavy industries as its neighbors, regardless of their economic value. In the years that followed, Romania strove to set a course independent of Moscow.

Although Soviet leaders after Stalin permitted greater economic latitude among their satellites, they remained determined not to relinquish political control. Two events in the 1960s illustrated Soviet foreign policy priorities. In 1961, Moscow again revived its campaign to pressure the United States and its allies to abandon West Berlin. At the time, the number of East Germans emigrating to West Germany was mounting, peaking in July 1961 at nearly 1,000 people a day. In August, the Berlin Wall was erected almost overnight. Although the Soviets claimed that the wall was built to protect East Germany against Western aggression, its real purpose was to prevent skilled East Germans from abandoning the communist system. President John F. Kennedy sent 1,500 U.S. troops to West Berlin as a sign of fidelity to the city, but U.S. policymakers were unwilling to go to war over the wall.

Similarly, when the Soviets smashed a budding reform movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 the United States did not intervene. Alexander Dubcek, Czechoslovakia's liberal leader, had tried to give socialism a "human face" by creating a multi-party democracy and broadening contacts with Western Europe.

> *The meaning and the purpose of the democratization process is quite plain: to create a more perfect type of socialist democracy fitting Czechoslovak conditions.*
>
> *—Alexander Dubcek*
>
> *Don't talk to me about "Socialism." What we have, we hold.*
>
> *—Leonid Brezhnev*
> *(to Alexander Dubcek)*

What became known as the Prague Spring, however, was brief. On August 20, 1968, the Soviet Union led a Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak leadership was secretly flown to Moscow and forced to sign an agreement authorizing the entry of Soviet troops. Dubcek himself was replaced in April 1969. Khrushchev's conservative successor, Leonid Brezhnev, had made it clear that Moscow would use force to maintain the communist system in the Soviet bloc.

U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE

With the historic metamorphosis of Western Europe, the primary arena of U.S.-Soviet confrontation gradually shifted from the continent to Asia, Africa, and Latin America — the so-called Third World. Vietnam was one of the main flashpoints. The war the United States waged against communism in Southeast Asia had been inherited from France. The French were the colonial rulers of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for nearly a century before leaving the region in defeat in 1954. After a peace settlement in 1954, the United States sought to protect the anti-communist government in South Vietnam. In many respects, the conflict in Vietnam was rooted in different perspectives on international affairs. U.S. policymakers viewed the Vietnam War as part of the global battle against communist expansion. In contrast, the North Vietnamese and their allies in South Vietnam considered their effort as a fight against Western imperialism.

Pat Oliphant in *The Denver Post*. © 1967. Universal Press Syndicate. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.



> *[The United States will] pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to ensure the survival and the success of liberty.*
>
> —*John Kennedy*
>
> *We must say in Southeast Asia — as we did in Europe — in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."*
>
> —*Lyndon Johnson*

By the end of the 1960s, U.S. involvement in Vietnam had compelled many Americans to reconsider their country's role in the world. From George Kennan's original focus on Europe, the U.S. policy of containing Soviet communism had widened into a global enterprise. As opposition to the Vietnam War deepened after 1968, U.S. policymakers increasingly sought to define the limits of American interests.

At the same time, longstanding assumptions of the Cold War were being challenged by larger shifts in international relations.In the 1950s and 1960s, Western Europe and Japan had moved quickly to close the economic gap with the United States. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had nearly caught up to the United States in military power.

Nixon's initiative

Leading the reassessment of U.S. foreign policy was President Richard M. Nixon. Both in Congress and as Eisenhower's vice president, Nixon had built his political career around staunch anti-communism. In 1972, however, he visited China and the Soviet Union. The trip to Moscow paved the way for the signing that year of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), a major agreement between the two superpowers on controlling nuclear weapons. The era of "detente" (French for the relaxation of tensions) greatly altered the dynamics of the Cold War. Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, intended for detente to produce a new set of rules for superpower conduct that would prevent international crises, such as the Berlin blockade. The Soviets, for their part, saw the improvement in relations as an acknowledgment of their status as an equal of the United States.

> *...both the United States and the Soviet Union share an overriding desire to achieve a more stable peace in the world.*
>
> —*Richard Nixon*

Much of the impetus behind detente came from the tremendous buildup of Soviet nuclear forces during the 1960s. After being pressured to withdraw nuclear missiles from Cuba in 1962 by U.S. military superiority, Soviet leaders vowed to neutralize the nuclear advantage that the United States had long enjoyed. For the remainder of the decade, the Soviets invested heavily in their nuclear program. At the same time, U.S. leaders were re-evaluating the nuclear policy of "massive retaliation" that had prevailed since the early years of NATO. In 1962, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara placed "flexible response" at the center of U.S. nuclear doctrine. According to McNamara, this strategy would allow the United States to use "a fly swatter where a fly swatter is an appropriate weapon, instead of using a sledgehammer."

While most Western European leaders accepted the adjustment in the U.S. posture, France's Charles de Gaulle felt that flexible response left Europe vulnerable to a Soviet conventional invasion. France, which tested its own nuclear weapons in 1960, feared that the United States would be reluctant to defend Europe from a Soviet ground attack after Moscow developed long-range nuclear missiles capable of striking the United States. In 1966, the French dropped out of the integrated military command of NATO. French leaders continued to express reservations as detente produced additional arms control treaties in 1974 and 1976. In contrast, West Germany saw the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations as an opportunity to relax tensions along the NATO-Warsaw Pact border and improve relations with communist East Germany.


Defense Spending of the Leading Powers 1950-1970

From *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*

*billions of dollars

By the mid-1970s, detente had produced a new status quo in Europe. This transition was affirmed in 1973 when the foreign ministers of the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and all the states in Europe (except Andorra and Albania) met in Helsinki, Finland, to create a European forum that bridged the divisions of the Cold War. This gathering became known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It was agreed that conference decisions would be by consensus. Thus, the CSCE, unlike the Warsaw Pact and NATO, gave small states a voice equal to that of the superpowers.

Negotiators from thirty-five states worked from September 1973 to July 1975 to draft what was ultimately called the Helsinki Final Act. The agreement recognized the existing borders in Europe, established means for the peaceful settlement of disputes, guaranteed human rights, and called for "confidence building measures." Economic, environmental, and scientific cooperation was also furthered, as well as cultural and educational exchanges among member states.

The Helsinki accords acknowledged the division of Europe into two camps, thereby legitimizing Soviet domination over East Germany. The accords, however, failed to change government attitudes in the Soviet bloc toward human rights. Members of citizen groups that formed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to monitor the human rights provisions of the agreement were subject to arrest and deportation.

Nonetheless, human rights advocates in the Soviet bloc continued to insist that their governments live up to the principles of the Helsinki accords.

Detente crumbles

As the 1970s progressed, detente became less and less meaningful. In 1976, the Soviets raised anxiety among NATO leaders by aiming a new generation of highly accurate nuclear missiles at Western Europe. Meanwhile, Moscow resented the emphasis on human rights in the foreign policy of President Jimmy Carter. Detente collapsed altogether in December 1979, when the Soviet army invaded neighboring Afghanistan to prop up a pro-Soviet government. The Carter administration responded by imposing an embargo on trade with the Soviet Union and boycotting the 1980 summer Olympic games in Moscow. An arms control treaty, dubbed SALT II, stalled in the U.S. Senate. U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated further with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Spurning the detente of the mid-1970s, Reagan came to office attacking the USSR as the "evil empire" and calling for an increase in U.S. defense spending.



Karl Hubenthal in the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 1975.

> *It is inconceivable that the two sides [the United States and the Soviet Union] can continue indefinitely, like people face [each other] across a table with a cocked gun, and no one knowing whether someone might tighten the finger on the trigger.*
>
> *—Ronald Reagan*

Although most Western European leaders favored a strong U.S. response to the deployment of new Soviet missiles, they were also wary of an escalating arms race in Europe. When NATO proposed installing Pershing II missiles in West Germany and cruise missiles in Britain, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium, Western European leaders faced difficulty in justifying the missile buildup to the public.

Increasingly, Western Europeans viewed their security interests as distinct from those of the United States. Economic ties were gradually developing between the two halves of the continent. The French, West Germans, and Italians were actively pursuing greater trade with the USSR. In 1983, for example, a pipeline was built linking the natural gas fields of western Siberia with Western Europe. Many Europeans worried that renewed tensions would undermine the progress of the past decade. West Germans, in particular, feared jeopardizing their country's fragile connection to East Germany. Moreover, President Reagan's anti-communist efforts in Central America and his proposal for a space-based defense against long-range nuclear missiles received little Western European support.

In the Soviet Union as well, the reassertion of U.S. military power prompted the Soviet leadership to reconsider the USSR's role in the world. In the mid-1980s, Moscow found itself bogged down in a costly war against Muslim guerrillas in Afghanistan, while at home the Soviet economy had stagnated. Politically, the country was facing uncertainty too. When Leonid Brezhnev died in 1982, he was replaced by two aged members of his inner circle. After the deaths of these two men, power in the Soviet Union passed to the representative of a younger generation, Mikhail Gorbachev.

Part III: Revolutionary Changes in Europe — 1985-1993

GORBACHEV SHAKES UP SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

By the time Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to power in the Soviet Union in 1985, his country was struggling to keep up with its Cold War rival, the United States. Internationally, the Soviet system had lost much of its appeal in the Third World. Not only was the Afghanistan war perceived as a setback, but Soviet allies in Cuba, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and elsewhere were foundering economically. At home, the Soviet economy itself was beset by corruption and inefficiency. More significantly for Moscow's global ambitions, Soviet science and technology were falling further behind the West.

Gorbachev represented a marked contrast to the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev. In his mid-fifties, energetic, and open to new ideas, Gorbachev stood apart from the generation of communist officials influenced by memories of Stalin and World War II. He recognized that the Soviet Union would need to undergo serious change to maintain its superpower status. Initially, Gorbachev tried to spur greater productivity and discipline among Soviet workers. He launched a campaign against alcohol abuse by reducing the availability of vodka and other spirits. In dealing with Moscow's Eastern European satellites, Gorbachev pressed for greater diplomatic unity and more favorable terms of trade for the Soviet Union. The new Soviet leader's early efforts, however, failed to halt the Soviet Union's decline. In 1987, Gorbachev unveiled a more sweeping set of reforms to reinvigorate the Soviet Union. *Perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) opened up Soviet society to the outside world like never before.

> *We must not pretend that everything goes smoothly....If we are silent about some shortcomings, they will inevitably grow.*
>
> *—Mikhail Gorbachev*

Gorbachev hoped that greater contact with the West would bring new technology and investment into the Soviet Union. A key element of his strategy stressed improving Moscow's international image. Gorbachev proved especially bold in proposing arms control initiatives with the United States. Ironically, his partner on the U.S. side of the Cold War thaw was Ronald Reagan, a stalwart opponent of detente during his first term in office. Reagan and Gorbachev first met in 1986 in Iceland and laid the groundwork for a series of productive superpower summits. In December 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons. The treaty kicked off a new round of arms control talks, culminating in July 1991 in the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which called on both sides to eliminate roughly one-third of their nuclear arsenals.

The spirit of cooperation extended to Europe as well. At a 1986 meeting of the CSCE's Conference on Disarmament in Europe, the thirty-five members of the conference agreed to measures that called on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to officially inform each other well in advance of military maneuvers. The Soviets also removed several thousand troops and tanks from Eastern Europe in early 1987 to further reduce tensions. Negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact led to an accord on conventional forces in Europe in 1990.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989

Gorbachev's policies were equivalent to an earthquake in international relations. Many of the basic assumptions that had guided U.S. policymakers were suddenly called into question by Moscow's new outlook. Nowhere was the change more significant than in Eastern Europe. Since Soviet tanks had crushed the Hungarian uprising in 1956, Moscow's control over the region had not been challenged by the United States. Moscow's determination to use military might to maintain control over its Eastern European satellites, reaffirmed in Czechoslovakia in 1968, served as a pillar of Soviet foreign policy that came to be known as the Brezhnev Doctrine

Pat Oliphant in *The Denver Post*. © 1970. Universal Press Syndicate. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.



"Do me a favor. Help me drop it!"

Although Gorbachev had no intention of giving up the Soviet Union's Eastern European empire, his actions chipped away at the base of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Not only was he promoting reform at home, but he prodded Eastern European leaders to follow his example. Moreover, he refrained from using force to fend off growing challenges to communist authority in Poland and Hungary in 1988. As people in Eastern Europe came to appreciate the shift in Soviet policy, democratic movements emerged in countries that had been politically dormant for the better part of four decades. By 1989, the stage was set in Eastern Europe for a year that was to rival 1945 in its historical impact.

Poland and Hungary

Change came first to Poland, where the Solidarity labor union and the Catholic church had been calling for free elections and greater political freedom throughout the 1980s. Officially, the government had outlawed Solidarity in 1981 after the union organized strikes in key Polish industries. Developments in the Soviet Union, however, emboldened Solidarity activists to take their cause to the streets again. Mass strikes resumed in 1988, with crowds chanting, "There's no liberty without Solidarity." Confronted with increasing labor unrest, Poland's communist government agreed to hold free elections for one-third of the seats in the parliament. (The other two-thirds remained reserved for communists.) Communist authorities hoped to score a popular victory by giving the activists little time to prepare. When the ballots were tallied in June 1989, however, the communists were left in shock. Solidarity candidates had won 99 of the 100 seats contested in the Polish senate. In August, a Solidarity member was named prime minister, making Poland the first Soviet bloc nation in forty years with a non-communist government.

In Hungary, the communist authorities willingly opened the door to democratic reform. In 1988, a reform-minded communist leader came to power and soon announced plans for free elections. New democratic parties were allowed to form, and the communists joined them in negotiating a transition to democracy. Although the communists changed their name and renounced Marxism, they were swept from power in March 1990 elections. While still in office, the communist government had begun to seek warmer relations with its Austrian neighbors. In May 1989, the barbed wire along the Austrian-Hungarian border was removed, opening up the first breach in the infamous "Iron Curtain" since the late 1940s.

East Germany and Czechoslovakia

The crack in the "Iron Curtain" immediately caught the eye of East Germans. Many of them had long been separated from relatives in West Germany by restrictions on travel enforced by the communist regime. East Germans also had other reasons to follow events in Poland and Hungary. East German leader Erich Honecker strongly opposed Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Although East Germans enjoyed the highest standard of living in Eastern Europe, they lagged far behind their West German neighbors. Access to Western television and a steady flow of Western visitors brought home the disparity on a daily basis.

In the fall of 1989, tens of thousands of East Germans travelled to West Germany after passing through the newly opened Austrian-Hungarian border. Meanwhile, activism in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary served as an inspiration to democratic reformers. Demonstrations for democracy and political reform occurred in major East German cities. Although East German leaders ordered police to crack down on the protests, the Soviet army stationed on East German soil did not join in. In fact, Gorbachev urged Honecker to begin *perestroika*-like reforms.

By October 1989, protest rallies were attracting up to half a million people in East Germany. Honecker was replaced by a younger communist who, on November 9, 1989, made a historic decision to open the Berlin Wall and the border between East and West Germany. Germans from both sides rushed across what had been the dividing line of the Cold War. They danced atop the wall, where the day before they would have been shot by border guards. Equally dramatic political changes soon followed. By early 1990, the East German Communist Party had lost its power in multiparty elections.

As protests continued in East Germany, people in Czechoslovakia also took to the streets calling for democracy. Although the first protest of 200,000 people was smashed by the communist government, the attitude of the authorities sparked a student strike and additional rallies. Government officials were soon forced to meet with opposition leaders. Alexander Dubcek, the communist leader behind the 1968 reforms, returned to government as head of the parliament after holding a lowly position within the forestry service for more than two decades. In December 1989, dissident playwright Vaclav Havel — another victim of the crackdown against the 1968 Prague Spring — was elected interim president by the parliament. Havel had been jailed from January to May in 1989 for taking part in the Czechoslovak human rights movement. When he assumed the presidency, he brought professors, artists, and other scholars into power with him. All told, Czechoslovakia underwent the transition from communist police state to democratic republic in twenty-four days, prompting observers to label the process the "velvet revolution."

> *Everywhere in the world, people were surprised how these malleable, humiliated, cynical citizens of Czechoslovakia, who seemingly believed in nothing, found the tremendous strength within a few weeks to cast off the totalitarian system in an entirely peaceful and dignified manner.*
>
> *—Vaclav Havel*

Romania and Bulgaria

Further to the south in Romania and Bulgaria, democratic dissident movements were not as well-developed. In Bulgaria, nonetheless, November 1989 saw power pass into the hands of a more reform-minded communist leader. The only exception to the relatively peaceful trend toward change in Eastern Europe came in Romania. Romania had long been noted as one of the most oppressive states in Eastern Europe. Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu had led a lavish lifestyle while average Romanians faced chronic food shortages and were allowed little heat during the winter. To prevent discontent from boiling over, Ceausescu had built up a brutal secret police. In December 1989, inspired by the uprisings across the rest of Eastern Europe, members of Romania's Hungarian minority took to the streets to protest Ceausescu's regime. The dictator ordered his troops to open fire on the demonstrators. Hundreds were killed. The violence, however, only galvanized popular anger against Ceausescu. As protests spread to the Romanian capital, Ceausescu again called on the army to crush the demonstrations. This time, though, troops turned on the dictator and his wife. The couple was captured and executed in front of Romanian television cameras in December 1989.

> *I'm extremely popular. I have evidence of it every day. Every time I make a speech, people rise and applaud.*
>
> *—Nicolae Ceausescu*

Although Ceausescu's security forces continued to resist after the death of their leader, the Romanian government was soon taken over by the National Salvation Front. While professing support for democracy, many leaders in the National Salvation Front in fact had ties to the former communist regime. Under Ceausescu's tight-fisted rule, virtually anyone with political, military, or economic expertise was linked to the Communist Party. Thus, Romania's army, government, and industry changed little after the 1989 revolution. Although elections were held in 1990, the National Salvation Front won easily, in part because voters were easily intimidated.

GERMANY REUNIFIES

Although the revolution of each Soviet satellite in Eastern Europe left a deep impression on the political map of Europe, events in East Germany attracted the most attention from U.S. and Soviet policymakers. Since the late 1940s, East Germany had been the front line of Soviet defenses against NATO forces. East Germany had also served as a key center of industry and science in the Soviet bloc. Not surprisingly, the political developments that shook East Germany at the end of 1989 reverberated across Europe.


NATO
NOT TO WORRY... I'VE GOT HIM ON A SHORT LEASH!
Deutschland

Jim Morin. © copyright 1989 by *The Miami Herald*. Reprinted with permission.

As soon as East Germans gained democratic freedoms, the future of East Germany as a separate state fell into doubt. In early 1990, East Germans voted overwhelmingly for candidates representing the conservative party of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, an advocate of immediate unification between the two parts of Germany. The reunification question, though, could not be resolved by Germans alone. To the west of the German border, there was concern that the economic might of a reunified Germany would tilt the balance of power in Europe and fuel German ambitions to acquire more influence in the European Community (known earlier as the European Economic Community) and other international organizations. To the east, the Poles and the Soviets worried that a reunited Germany would eventually demand land from them to compensate for territories lost as a result of World War II. Countries in both regions of Europe agreed that the best way to keep a reunited Germany from striking off on its own, either militarily or economically, would be to link the state's interests to those of its neighbors by ensuring its participation in strong international organizations.

In 1990, talks were held among representatives from the two Germanys, the United States, the USSR, France, and Britain. Although Moscow initially objected to the notion of a reunited Germany settling solidly into the Western camp, in the end all sides concurred that the new Germany should be a part of the NATO alliance and a member of the European Community. The success of the talks removed the final major obstacle to German reunification.

Internally, the West German government moved ahead with plans to integrate East Germany into a single state. East Germans were allowed to exchange their practically worthless currency for the West German

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mark. Programs to clean up East Germany's environment and modernize its factories were drawn up. Finally, on October 3, 1990, East and West Germany became a single country.

> *We'll have to learn to live with our critics. If you want everybody to like you, you end up all alone.*
> *—Helmut Kohl*

DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION

The revolutions in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany were hailed throughout the world as a victory for democracy. In the Soviet Union, however, many powerful communist officials viewed these developments as a defeat.

When the Soviets consented to German reunification in March 1990, 370,000 Soviet troops were stationed in East Germany. Many Soviets, particularly those with memories of World War II, felt that control over Eastern Europe and the division of Germany provided a buffer against outside attack and affirmed the Soviet Union's status as a superpower. The loss of Moscow's Eastern European satellites damaged the reputation of the Gorbachev regime in their eyes.

Events in Eastern Europe also emboldened non-Russian peoples within the Soviet Union. Since 1988, national groups in the Soviet Union's non-Russian republics had been campaigning for greater control over their own affairs. In 1990, Lithuania was the first of the Soviet Union's fifteen republics to openly declare independence from Moscow. Although Gorbachev cut off supplies of heating oil to Lithuania and sent in troops to occupy Communist Party property, other republics continued to seek more autonomy from the central government.

Meanwhile, the troubles of the Soviet economy added to the political pressures. Under Gorbachev's program of *perestroika,* Moscow's grip on the Soviet economy was relaxed. Factory managers and farm directors were given greater decision-making power. The Soviet Union also became more open to foreign investment. But *perestroika* was still a halfway measure. Gorbachev feared that lifting price controls and taking other measures to create a free-market economy would turn people against the Soviet system and undermine the authority of the Communist Party. By 1990, the Soviet economy was in a tailspin. The country's economic output fell 8 percent that year. The next year it dropped 19 percent. Instead of sparking initiative, *perestroika* contributed to a breakdown of the chain of command that tied local enterprises to the central government, without really giving managers freedom to act.

Faced with mounting problems and conflicting demands, Gorbachev struggled to hold onto power. Politically, he walked a tightrope between reformers and hard-liners. In 1991, the Soviet leader increasingly surrounded himself with conservative officials. At the same time, Gorbachev opened negotiations with leaders from the Soviet Union's fifteen republics on establishing a new relationship with the central government. In August 1991, the tightrope snapped under Gorbachev's feet. Hard-line communists launched a coup to reassert the power of the central government. The coup organizers, though, had little active support outside the top ranks of the Communist Party. Within three days, their plot collapsed.

Following the coup, the pace of change in the Soviet Union accelerated. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who had stood up to the forces of the coup from atop a tank in front of the Russian parliament building, moved decisively to transfer power from the central government to the Russian Republic. In addition, the three Baltic republics were quickly recognized as independent states. Other republics soon followed.

The final death blow to the Soviet Union came in December 1991, when leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus announced the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Unable to hold the USSR together, Gorbachev resigned as Soviet president. On the final day of 1991, the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE

While the Soviet bloc fell apart, developments in Western Europe headed in the opposite direction. After economic growth was sidetracked during a recession in the early 1980s, the region regained its prosperity. West Germany emerged as the world's leading exporter, while an economic boom helped Spain catch up with its relatively more developed neighbors to the north.

Europe's growing prosperity encouraged the twelve countries of the European Community (EC) to consider strengthening and widening their trading bloc. From six founding countries in 1957, the EC had steadily expanded its membership and responsibilities. In 1973, Britain, Denmark, and Ireland joined the club, and in 1981 and 1986 the EC expanded to include Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Economic and political coordination progressed during the 1970s and early 1980s as well.


Before
IRELAND
BRITAIN
DENMARK
NETHERLANDS
GERMANY
BELGIUM
LUXEMBOURG
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
LIECHTENSTEIN
AUSTRIA
MONACO
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
ANDORRA
ITALY
U.S.S.R.
After
EUROPE
ESTONIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
BYELORUSSIA
RUSSIA
SIBERIA
YAKU
KAZAKHSTAN
MOLDAVIA
UKRAINE
UZBEKISTAN
KIRGHIZ
GEORGIA
ARMENIA
AZERBAIJAN
TURKMENISTAN
TAJI
BEFORE AND AFTER WHAT?
BEFORE AND AFTER YOU BLINKED.
TOLES

Tom Toles in *The Buffalo News*. © 1991. Universal Press Syndicate. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.

In 1986, the EC adopted a plan to remove the remaining barriers to free trade among the members. Under the proposal, goods, services, people, and capital would be allowed to move unrestricted within the borders of the twelve countries beginning in 1993. The plan also changed the way the EC developed new rules. Previously, legislation affecting the EC required the approval of each member state. Under the new governing system, decisions could be made for the EC without unanimous support. Increasingly, the EC was taking on some of the structure of a single federation.

A more far-reaching step toward unity was taken in December 1991, when an EC summit was held in the Dutch town of Maastricht. The agreement produced at the Maastricht meeting set 1999 as the target date for bringing the members still closer together. The Maastricht treaty would establish a single currency, known as the ECU, to replace German marks, British pounds, French francs, and other national currencies now in circulation. Monetary policy for the entire EC would be guided by an autonomous central bank. Moreover, the leaders at the Maastricht summit agreed to craft a common defense and foreign policy for the EC, and standardize regulations on health, education, and other areas. Overseeing the expanded authority of the EC would be a much enlarged bureaucracy based in Brussels, Belgium, the EC's headquarters.

The notion of a unified Europe, however, ran into public opposition. In June 1992, a slim majority of Danish voters rejected the Maastricht agreement. Many Danes expressed concern that unelected bureaucrats in Brussels would interfere in their way of life. In September, French voters narrowly approved the treaty. In the meantime, British officials had already decided against fully participating in the non-economic aspects of the treaty.

> *The voluntary alliance of twelve nations we've joined [the EC] is being gradually turned into a new political entity — a European superstate — and I doubt very much whether the people realize what is happening.*
>
> *—Margaret Thatcher, British prime minister*

To keep the Maastricht treaty alive, Denmark's EC partners agreed to exempt the Danes from many of the agreement's key provisions, including acceptance of a single currency. When a new referendum was held in May 1993, Danish voters approved the modified treaty. Denmark's ratification, however, was not enough to restore earlier enthusiasm for the agreement. Even many advocates of the Maastricht treaty conceded that plans to mold a "United States of Europe" were overly ambitious.

Another blow to the Maastricht vision occurred in the summer of 1993, when the value of the German mark jumped in relation to most of the other currencies of Western Europe. The rise in the mark resulted from German efforts to lower inflation. Leaders of other European countries, however, were upset that Germany's finance minister had placed the interests of Germany's economy above those of the EC. As the currency of the EC's largest economy, the German mark has long served as a benchmark for other EC countries. During the 1980s, German financial policies were carefully designed to maintain an economic balance within the EC. After German reunification, however, a new set of economic pressures forced German officials to put aside the goals of Maastricht and chart a more independent course.

The controversy surrounding the Maastricht agreement, however, did not stop efforts to expand the EC's boundaries. In October 1991, the EC signed an agreement with the seven-state European Free Trade Association (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) to allow association members to trade freely with the EC. Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden may enter the EC as early as 1995. Many of the former communist states of Eastern Europe also sought to join the EC. In 1991, the EC granted Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia access to the community's market by the end of the century, while stopping short of offering full membership. At the same time, EC officials discussed working out similar arrangements with other countries moving toward a free-market economic system.

ON THE ROAD TO CAPITALISM

As 1989 came to a close, optimists predicted a smooth transition to a free-market economy for Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Within communist Eastern Europe, these countries had been the most economically advanced. Polish ships, Hungarian buses, Czech machinery, and East German medicines had established a standard for quality in the old Soviet bloc. After the collapse of communism, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany were the first to set out on the path toward democracy and the free-market economic system.

Optimists imagined that investors from Western Europe, the United States, and Japan would rush in to take advantage of the region's relatively low wages and skilled labor force. According to their scenario, new high-tech industries would spring up to meet rising consumer demand at home and produce goods for export. Meanwhile, people in the region would shake off the old restraints of communism and quickly build prosperous, democratic societies.

The events did not turn out entirely as optimists had hoped. But neither were the first years of adjustment in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany as bleak as pessimists had forecast. Rather, the report card on the region's transition was mixed. On the negative side, unemployment and poverty were up. The economic security of the old system — guaranteeing jobs, housing, and health care — began unraveling. More positively, democracy stood up to the chaos of the economic transition. A free press, new political parties, independent community organizations, and other democratic institutions took root. At the same time, a new generation of entrepreneurs emerged to start private businesses.

Lech Walesa's dilemma

Poland's President Lech Walesa symbolized the trials of Eastern Europe's most developed states. Walesa was an electrician by training. Under communist rule, he was also known as a political activist among his 80,000 co-workers at the huge Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk. When workers took over the shipyard in August 1980, Walesa emerged as their leader. He founded the Solidarity labor union and coordinated a series of strikes that brought Poland's industry to a standstill. Although Walesa pressured the communist government to grant workers economic concessions, his demands for political reform provoked a crackdown by the communist authorities in December 1981.

Along with other Solidarity activists, Walesa was jailed after the government imposed martial law. Imprisonment, however, only enhanced Walesa's reputation among Polish workers. Walesa was released in November 1982 and resumed his efforts to expand Solidarity. In 1983 he won the Nobel Peace Prize. Until the dramatic changes of 1988-1989, Walesa was locked in a complicated chess match with Poland's communist ruler, General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Walesa wanted to avoid another crackdown, and yet he continued to press Jaruzelski for political reform. Walesa's strategy paid off when Jaruzelski permitted Solidarity to participate in elections in 1989. In 1990, Walesa replaced Jaruzelski as Poland's president.

With his walrus-like mustache and working class mannerisms, President Walesa stood in sharp contrast to his communist predecessors. And yet Walesa soon realized that he had inherited many of the problems of the communist era. As in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, Poland's democratic leaders were faced with serious economic challenges. Within the old Soviet bloc, Poland's trade had been more or less limited to the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe. As the trade ties unraveled, Polish industries found themselves competing in a global market. The quality of the ships and chemicals that had been accepted in the Soviet bloc often could not stand up against the exports of East Asia and Western Europe.

Walesa and his colleagues in the new Polish government believed that the communist economic system was beyond repair. Soon after taking office, they put Poland on the fast track toward free-market capitalism. Under the communist system, government subsidies kept food prices low and workers employed. Economic efficiency was not a high priority. Walesa and his colleagues sharply reduced the government's role in the economy, slashing state subsidies to curb Poland's runaway inflation. At the same time, they adopted measures to place state-run businesses in the hands of private owners.

By the time Walesa gained power, the Polish economy was already in a crisis. For the next two years, industrial production in Poland dropped by more than one-third. Wages fell as well, while more and more Poles found themselves without work. By 1992, however, the economy began to rebound. Economic growth increased, with private companies accounting for about half of the country's output.

The direction of Poland's economic revolution left Walesa in a difficult position. The hardship resulting from the new government's policies was falling most heavily on the workers who had made up the backbone of Solidarity. Moreover, the pain was expected to continue. Eventually, Walesa and his colleagues conceded that they would be forced to come to grips with the inefficiency of Poland's huge state-run factories. Many of these plants, such as the shipyard where Walesa had worked, could not compete in a global economy. Economists recommended that the government sell off big factories to private owners. In the case of the F.S.O. car factory, Polish officials were happy to enter into a partnership with General Motors. To turn a profit, however, General Motors managers planned to keep only 1,000 employees from the work force of 10,000.

Walesa recognized that many of Poland's factories were behind the times, but he also hesitated to cut off government subsidies. As in other countries of the former Soviet bloc, unemployment in Poland meant more than losing a job. Employment was also tied to housing, health care, vacations, and other benefits. To remind Poland's leaders of the concerns of workers, Solidarity organized labor strikes in 1992. For his part, Walesa urged higher tariffs to protect Polish industry from foreign competition.

> *Certain things...have to be closed down, but you cannot just close down all of Poland.*
> *—Lech Walesa*

By the middle of 1993, Poland's economic reforms had produced a paradox. On the one hand, the Polish economy was the most vibrant in the former Soviet bloc. In the first half of 1993, Poland's gross domestic product (GDP) rose 3.9 percent, while industrial production grew 9.4 percent. More than 1.5 million new businesses had been created since 1989, and nearly 60 percent of the work force was privately employed. On the other hand, unemployment jumped from virtually zero to more than 15 percent. Moreover, Paul Fell in the *Lincoln Journal*, 1991. Used with permission.



divisions between the rich and the poor stood out much more starkly than during the communist period.

Poles disgruntled with the reforms made their voices heard during parliamentary elections in September 1993. They gave former communist parties more than 35 percent of the vote and almost two-thirds of the seats in the Polish legislature. The former communist leaders of the Democratic Left Alliance, which won the biggest share of the vote, promised to slow the pace of economic change and restore some of the social programs that were cornerstones of the communist system. At the same time, alliance leaders assured voters that their government would not reverse Poland's progress toward the free market.

Economies in transition

Poland's neighbors in Eastern Europe followed the Polish economic experiment with particular interest. East Germany was a special case. After the reunification of Germany, many industries that had been favored by the communist system collapsed. Unemployment in the east soared, with the figure approaching 50 percent in heavily industrialized areas. At the same time, economic troubles fueled German resentment toward the growing number of foreigners, especially from Eastern Europe, seeking refuge in Germany. Unlike in other former communist countries, however, the government in Germany was in a position to offer substantial help. Between 1990 and 1992, the government led the way in investing nearly $100 billion into what was once East Germany, while at the same time financing generous welfare programs.

> *We have enough unemployed. We don't need any foreigners here.*
>
> *—Unemployed East German*

In charting its course toward the free market, Hungary was able to draw on earlier reforms. Beginning in the early 1980s, Hungary had moved away from a centrally managed economy. Czechoslovakia, meanwhile, could reach back even further into its past. Since the turn of the century, the Czech lands had been among Europe's leading industrial regions. Democratic leaders in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, however, were to be disappointed by the response from Western Europe to their reform efforts. From 1989 to 1992, Hungary attracted less than $5 billion in foreign investment, while in Czechoslovakia the total was only $1.6 billion. In addition, the EC raised tariffs against food, textiles, coal, and steel from the former Soviet bloc. Nonetheless, officials in Hungary and Czechoslovakia remained hopeful that manufacturers from Western Europe, the United States, and Japan would open operations in their countries.

Germany was seen as the most likely investor. Not only was Germany an industrial powerhouse, but before World War II German companies had forged strong economic bonds to Eastern Europe. In the early 1990s, the former East Germany absorbed the bulk of German investments. In considering future plans, however, German firms were already turning eastward. The automobile giant Volkswagen, for example, became the top foreign investor in Czechoslovakia by buying a 31 percent share in the huge Skoda car factory. Volkswagen executives were counting on big savings in labor costs. An average Skoda worker in 1993 received $220 a month in wages and benefits. At Volkswagen's German headquarters, monthly labor costs were more than $4,000 per worker.

> *It isn't the Germans' fault that they're making so many investments here [in Eastern Europe]. It's the fault of other countries for not coming.*
> *—Czech spokesman for Volkswagen*

In addition to economic adjustments, Czechoslovakia also faced a political crisis. More than seven decades of nationhood had not erased the dividing line between the country's two main nationalities, the Czechs and the Slovaks. The Czechs, who lived mostly in the western two-thirds of the country, had built a highly industrialized society and dominated the government. The democratic movement that toppled communist rule in 1989 was largely in the hands of Czechs. In contrast, the Slovaks often felt isolated from developments in Prague, the Czech capital. In comparison to the Czech lands, Slovakia was poorer and more dependent on agriculture.

Friction between the Czechs and Slovaks emerged soon after the new democratic government came to power. To win international support, President Vaclav Havel pledged to cut Czechoslovakia's weapons exports. In Slovakia, where the arms industry employed about 10 percent of the labor force, the decision raised alarm. Slovak leaders declared that they would set their own policy on arms sales. At the same time, Slovak nationalists pressed for independence. In June 1992, Czech and Slovak leaders agreed to break the union apart at the end of the year.

After the split, the two parts of Czechoslovakia headed in different directions. Czech leaders continued to press forward with economic reform. By 1993, the Czech economy began to show signs of recovery, with inflation dropping and unemployment rates leveling off. In Slovakia, however, unemployment rose to over 15 percent — nearly three times the Czech rate — while the economy sank. Meanwhile, the former communist officials who controlled the Slovak government resisted moving toward a free-market economy.

BALKAN CRISIS

In contrast to what was sometimes termed the "velvet divorce" of Czechoslovakia, the breakup of Yugoslavia was accompanied by Europe's worst violence since World War II. Yugoslavia's political foundations were shaky from the start. Conflict between Serbs and Croats had hobbled the government during the 1920s and 1930s. The country's civil war during World War II hardened attitudes further.

The political structure created after the war by communist guerrilla leader Marshal Tito was held together largely by Tito's iron-fisted rule and popularity as a wartime hero. Under Tito, a complex federal system distributed political power among Yugoslavia's ethnic groups. The sense of stability provided by Tito's presence, however, proved false. After Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia entered a period of economic and political crisis. Without Tito in the middle, the country's power-sharing system fell apart.

The democratic revolutions that swept across Eastern Europe in 1989 were overshadowed in Yugoslavia by the country's deepening divisions. In 1987, a hard-line Serbian nationalist, Slobodan Milosevic, won control of the Communist Party organization in Serbia. At a time when Yugoslavia's economic crisis was worsening, Milosevic promised to promote Serbian rights. Meanwhile, leaders in Croatia and Slovenia felt threatened by Milosevic's ambitions. In 1989, the Slovenian assembly declared that Slovenia had the right to secede from Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia's disintegration accelerated in 1990. On one side, the Serbian government was seeking to centralize power in Belgrade. On the other side, Croatian and Slovenian leaders were pushing for a loose confederation. In the middle were officials in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, who favored a compromise arrangement. Incidents of violence increased in early 1991, after Croatian and Slovenian leaders announced that they would secede from Yugoslavia if a new political arrangement for the country was not reached. In June, Milosevic ordered the Yugoslav army to attack Slovenia. The Slovenes, however, held up against the mostly Serbian forces and secured their independence.

> *We shall win despite the fact that Serbia's enemies outside the country are plotting against it, along with those in the country.*
> *—Slobodan Milosevic*

War flared up next in Croatia. The conflict there was much fiercer than in Slovenia. In Croatia, the fears of local Serbs, who made up 12 percent of the population, were driven by memories of the massacres their people had suffered under Croatian rule during World War II. As the civil war heated up, the Yugoslav army lent its support to local Serbian militias. By the end of 1991, Croatia had lost more than 30 percent of its territory. Croatia's Serbs proclaimed the establishment of the "Krajina Republic" and asked to become part of Serbia. In response, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman vowed that Croatia would fight to recapture the territory it had lost.

A lull prevailed in the Krajina region throughout 1992 and the first half of 1993. In the summer of 1993, however, the war flared up again. The Croatian army launched an offensive to recapture Serbian-held territory, while local Serbian forces shelled Croatian cities, including the Croatian capital, Zagreb. In September 1993, the two sides agreed to a truce, allowing UN peacekeeping troops to take positions along a buffer zone in the Krajina region.

War in Bosnia

Although the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not begin until 1992, few doubted the region's potential explosiveness. Bosnia had been Yugoslavia's most ethnically mixed republic — a "little Yugoslavia" where Bosnian Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian communities lived side by side in mountain villages. In Bosnia's capital of Sarajevo, the site of the 1984 Winter Olympics, the three groups shared one of Europe's most ethnically diverse cities.

In February 1992, Bosnian Muslim leaders organized a referendum. The results indicated that a majority of the republic's voters wanted to break away from Yugoslavia. Bosnian Serbs, who constituted roughly one-third of the population, boycotted the referendum. As the republic's largest ethnic group, Bosnian Muslims occupied the leading positions in Bosnia's new government. They also became the primary victims in a three-sided war that began soon after the country's declaration of independence.

By the fall of 1993, nearly 200,000 people had died in the struggle for Bosnia. Most of the dead were innocent civilians. Another 2 million people had become refugees. As in Croatia, the fighting in Bosnia extended far beyond military objectives. Rather, the war was fought for control of the land. Although all sides were guilty of atrocities, Serbian forces were responsible for most of the brutality against civilians. The Serbs sought to eliminate Muslims and Croats from areas under their control. The process of "ethnic cleansing" was carried out through gang rape, concentration camps, and massacre.

The international response to the crisis in Yugoslavia was slow. Initially, U.S. and Western European leaders sought to hold Yugoslavia together, fearing that a breakup of the country would trigger conflict. Later, they came to suspect Milosevic's intentions, and recognized the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia from the Yugoslav central government.

The United Nations (UN) imposed economic sanctions on what was left of Yugoslavia in May 1992 to increase the pressure on the Milosevic government. Three months later, the United States, Britain, and France supported a resolution in the UN Security Council that authorized the use of "all necessary means" to ensure that food and medicine reached the suffering in Bosnia. UN forces, however, were unable to halt the violence and the misery. At the same time, UN and EC representatives worked to negotiate a settlement to the war. The plan they proposed would have created ten self-governing provinces within Bosnia.

> *It was clear to me by the end of August 1992 that there was no will in any of the major Western nations to take up arms against Serbian expansionism.*
> *—David Owen, EC representative in Bosnia*

By the summer of 1993, international peacemakers conceded that their proposal for Bosnia had failed. Instead, they helped broker an agreement to divide

Bosnia into Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian mini-states. Under the proposed accord, the Serbs would receive 52 percent of Bosnia's territory, the Muslims 31 percent, and the Croats 17 percent. Convincing the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan was relatively easy. Militarily, Bosnian Serb forces had achieved almost all of their objectives, controlling 70 percent of Bosnia's territory. Meanwhile, they faced greater international pressure. President Bill Clinton threatened to bomb their positions, while economic sanctions against Serbia had left the economy there in ruins.

The Bosnian Croats also approved the peace plan. The Bosnian Muslims, however, hesitated to give their acceptance. In September 1993, the Bosnian parliament voted to send the peace plan back to the negotiating table. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic asserted that the agreement rewarded ethnic cleansing and lobbied for more territory and access to the Adriatic Sea. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that the Bosnians had few options. Even as Izetbegovic and his Croatian and Serbian counterparts neared a settlement, fighting between Muslim and Croatian forces raged along the proposed territorial divisions in central Bosnia.

> *The only choice left to us is the choice between a just war and an unjust peace.*
>
> *—Alija Izetbegovic*

Beyond Bosnia

The fighting in the former Yugoslavia threatened to ignite war throughout the Balkan peninsula. The most likely flashpoints were Kosovo province in Serbia and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. Ninety percent of Kosovo's population was Muslim Albanian. Under Milosevic, Kosovo's Albanians had lost their political autonomy. Milosevic emphasized the importance of Kosovo in Serbian history. The region had been the site of a decisive battle between Christian Serbs and Muslim Turkish invaders in 1389. Although the Serbs were defeated, Kosovo remained a symbol of Serbian valor. Next door to Kosovo, in Macedonia, Albanians made up about one-fifth of the population.

U.S. and European leaders feared that a Serbian attack against Albanians in Kosovo or Macedonia would draw Yugoslavia's neighbors into war. Many observers, for example, expected that Albania and Turkey would intervene to protect the Albanians from Serbian forces. In addition, Bulgaria and Greece had their own interests in Macedonia. Bulgarians claimed close ties to the Slavic people of Macedonia, while Greek leaders argued that the name "Macedonia" rightfully belonged to the area of northeastern Greece. To prevent further conflict in the Balkans, Clinton sent 300 U.S. troops to Macedonia to bolster peacekeeping forces there.

The Yugoslav crisis proved especially ill-timed for Romania and Bulgaria. As it was, Romania and Bulgaria had made little progress toward creating free-market economic systems. In Romania, the government introduced moderate land reforms to spur agricultural production. Under communism, Romanian farmers bore the brunt of Ceausescu's campaign to boost Romania's exports. Romania's new government eased the pressure, but farmers were hobbled by shortages of fuel and equipment. Bulgaria also faced serious obstacles to prosperity. Like many countries in Eastern Europe, Bulgaria built up a large foreign debt in the 1980s. The country's $13 billion debt burden limited the government's ability to make new investments. Bulgarians were particularly concerned that their financial problems would affect the maintenance of the country's aging nuclear power plants, which generated over one-third of Bulgaria's electricity. To make matters worse for both Romania and Bulgaria, the UN economic sanctions aimed at Yugoslavia impeded commerce throughout the region.

As fighting in Yugoslavia spread, Romanian and Bulgarian leaders became increasingly worried about the minority problems in their own countries. The treatment of Hungarians in Serbia's Vojvodina province was closely observed by Romania's Hungarian community, which makes up 9 percent of the country's population. In Bulgaria, where 9 percent of the people are Turks, the Turkish community shared religious and cultural ties with the Bosnian Muslims. In addition, both Romania and Bulgaria have sizeable Roma, or Gypsy, communities. Gypsies have long been at the bottom of the economic and social ladder in Eastern Europe, and have increasingly been the targets of violence.

RUSSIA AT THE CROSSROADS

As the former Soviet republics entered 1992, Russia and Boris Yeltsin were at the center of attention. Yeltsin had decided to introduce a bold plan for economic reform in Russia. Rather than repair the centralized economy that had broken down under Gorbachev, Yeltsin set out to lay the foundations for a free-market economic system. To implement his plan, Yeltsin assembled a team of young economists led by Yegor Gaidar.

The "Boys in Reeboks," as they were known, were strong believers in free-market economic theories. Mostly under age 35, the economists worked closely with experts in the United States and Western Europe to swiftly dismantle the old Soviet system. The program they implemented in the early months of 1992 was termed "shock therapy" and closely followed the economic policies pursued by Poland's democratic government. As in Poland, shock therapy was to be a short-term policy of economic adjustment. First came the removal of price controls on all but the most basic goods. Deep cuts in the military and in government subsidies to state-run industries were also part of Gaidar's plan. In addition, Gaidar emphasized the need to put Russia's factories and farms in the hands of private owners.

By the summer of 1992, shock therapy had stalled before achieving its mission. Price controls had been lifted, but Gaidar's program had failed to clear the most important hurdle — controlling government spending. Many of the strongest opponents of economic reform were members of Russia's parliament. They pushed for continued government subsidies to Russian industries. Yeltsin's government was forced to back away from many of its original goals and print money so that managers of state-run factories could pay their workers. But while the supply of money increased, production fell. The result was skyrocketing inflation.

As 1992 closed, both supporters and critics of Gaidar's plan agreed that Russia had undergone a bruising year. Production had fallen by about 20 percent. Prices on consumer goods had increased 25 times, while the buying power of workers had dropped by over 40 percent. As in Poland, big state-run factories were the principal obstacles to continued economic reform.

With public discontent growing, Yeltsin replaced Gaidar as prime minister in December 1992. Russia's new prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, favored slowing the reform process. He proposed reimposing price controls on some goods and maintaining subsidies to big industries. Russian politics, however, remained explosive. In March 1993, Yeltsin's foes in the Russian parliament failed in their efforts to impeach the Russian president. The following month, a majority of Russian voters indicated their support for Yeltsin and economic reform in a nationwide referendum. Yeltsin used the referendum results to step up his campaign for a new constitution that would widen the powers of the president. He also brought Gaidar back into the government to oversee economic matters.

In September 1993, Yeltsin moved decisively against his opponents. The Russian president dissolved the parliament and called for new elections to the legislature in December. In addition, Yeltsin put his own job on the line by scheduling presidential elections



From the U.S. Dept. of Commerce

for June 1994. Yeltsin's opponents in the parliament responded angrily to the presidential decree. They denounced Yeltsin's action as unconstitutional, barricaded themselves in the parliament building, and selected Vice President Alexander Rutskoi to replace Yeltsin as president. The legislators also directed their supporters to seize television facilities and other key institutions in Moscow. The call for an uprising, however, was taken up by only a few thousand Russians. Top Russian military officials remained loyal to Yeltsin, and ordered troops to crush the rebellion. Yeltsin's actions received support from Clinton and other world leaders.

> *Only a president chosen by the people can implement tough but necessary measures. No reform can survive without these tough measures.*
> *—Boris Yeltsin*

While all the republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU) were deeply affected by the pace of reform in Russia, there was little effort among them to coordinate economic policy. Gaidar's shock therapy was not adopted in most other republics. In Ukraine, the second most populous state of the FSU, government leaders proved reluctant to dismantle the old command economy. Nonetheless, the drop in output in Ukraine during 1992 was greater than that of Russia. Meanwhile, in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova — countries where economic reform got off to a fast start in 1992 — the transition to the free market bogged down.

The FSU powder keg

The same forces that contributed to the disintegration of the Soviet Union soured relations among the new states of the FSU. Trade within the FSU plummeted, while attempts to form new alliances foundered. Especially significant for the region was the fate of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russian officials had taken the lead in forming the CIS with the intent of creating an organization that would promote military and economic cooperation among the new states. Mistrust of Russia, however, undermined the effectiveness of the CIS in 1992.

As support for the CIS fell, new threats to peace in the region arose. Potentially, the most volatile issue was Russian-Ukrainian relations. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine butted heads over how the Soviet armed forces should be divided among the republics. Ownership of the Black Sea fleet was a particularly thorny subject. In addition, Russian nationalists pressed their leaders to wrest control of the Crimean peninsula in the Black Sea from Ukraine. The Crimea, where Russians formed a majority of the population, was officially transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954.

Further straining Russian-Ukrainian relations was the presence of roughly 32,000 nuclear warheads and the world's largest stockpile of highly enriched uranium. When the Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991, there were nuclear weapons in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Eighty-five percent of the FSU's long-range nuclear missiles were in Russia, but that still left sizeable forces in the other three republics. By early 1993, both Kazakhstan and Belarus had agreed that the nuclear weapons on their soil could be returned to Russia as part of a U.S.-Russian agreement to make the sharpest reductions ever in the number of nuclear arms. In connection with the agreement, the United States set aside $800 million to assist the FSU in dismantling nuclear weapons. Ukraine, however, did not ratify the treaty. After declaring independence, Ukrainian leaders pledged to rid their country of nuclear weapons. At the same time, they insisted that the United States or other countries guarantee Ukraine's security, and pay to dismantle the nuclear weapons on Ukraine's soil.

Ukraine's nuclear weapons were seen largely as a bargaining chip for the regime of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. Eventually, observers predicted, Kravchuk would trade away the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory for economic aid and security guarantees. Ukraine's economic crisis, however, may have forced Kravchuk's hand in dealing with Russia. In September 1993, the Ukrainian president agreed in principle to turn over to Russia nuclear warheads for dismantling in exchange for shipments of fuel for nuclear reactors. Kravchuk also pledged to give up Ukraine's half of the Black Sea fleet in return for Russian promises to cancel Ukraine's $2.5 billion debt for Russian oil and gas. Although Kravchuk later insisted that he had not made any firm agreements, he acknowledged that his country's dependence on Russian energy left him with few options.

> *A retreat from American leadership, from American involvement, would be a mistake for which future generations, indeed our own children, would pay dearly.*
>
> *—George Bush*

Russia's relations with the other countries of the FSU were complicated by the existence of 25 million Russians who lived outside Russia's borders. In Kazakhstan, ethnic Russians constituted nearly 40 percent of the population. In Moldova, they fought to carve out an independent republic in the area where they predominated. Elsewhere in the FSU, Russians complained that the new states discriminated against them. Russian nationalists called on President Yeltsin to take strong action to protect Russians living outside their homeland.

In 1993, Yeltsin sought to reassert Russia's influence in the non-Russian countries of the FSU. In addition to pressing Ukraine on the issues of the Black Sea fleet and nuclear weapons, Yeltsin sent troops to protect the government of Tajikistan against Islamic fundamentalist rebels and sternly warned both Turkey and Iran not to intervene in the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan. At the same time, Russia worked to strengthen links among CIS countries. At a meeting in September 1993, Russian officials joined their counterparts from eight other former Soviet republics in forming an economic union dominated by Moscow. According to the agreement, the nine member states would work toward eliminating trade barriers among themselves. Participants would also be expected to follow Russian economic policies, but would benefit from discounted prices for Russian oil, gas, and other products.

Within Russia, officials were concerned about the threat of fragmentation. Among Russia's 148 million people, there were 27 million non-Russians. Many of the minority groups continued to live on their native lands in twenty local republics within Russia. In the case of oil-rich Tatarstan, a republic the size of West Virginia, local officials pressed for greater control over Tatarstan's resources. Even in ethnically Russian areas, officials sought to exercise more control over their local economies. For areas with abundant reserves of oil, diamonds, gold, and other raw materials, the lure of quick wealth led some local officials to try to distance themselves from the central government. Meanwhile, officials in industrial regions feared that a breakdown of central authority would deprive them of the raw materials and investment they needed.

THE U.S. POSITION

The events surrounding the collapse of the Soviet bloc realigned the global balance of power. Not since the late 1940s had international relations changed so dramatically and so quickly. But while U.S. foreign policy was deeply affected by developments in the Soviet bloc, the United States did not play a central role in shaping them. Unlike the years following World War II, the United States watched this latest transformation of Europe largely from the sidelines.

The four decades of the Cold War left the United States in an uncertain position. On the one hand, the United States emerged from its struggle with the Soviet Union as the strongest military and economic power in the world. Fear of a nuclear attack had faded into the background for most Americans. On the other hand, the United States' superpower status was being challenged in a world where economic clout seemed to count for more than military muscle. A persistent trade deficit, especially in relation to Japan, and mounting budget deficits at home reduced Washington's flexibility in foreign affairs.

Regarding Europe, U.S. policymakers recognized that the rules of international relations had changed. When Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin appealed for economic assistance, there was little American support for initiating a new Marshall Plan. Rather, Western European countries, particularly Germany, were allowed to take the lead. The Group of Seven leading industrialized countries (the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan) was the most important vehicle for channelling aid.

In April 1992, the Group of Seven (G-7) pledged $24 billion in assistance to Russia and its neighbors in the FSU. The U.S. contribution to the aid package totaled $4 billion to $6 billion, and included earlier U.S. initiatives to help the FSU countries pay for American grain, dismantle nuclear weapons, and promote democratic and free-market reforms. Much of the aid, however, did not reach the FSU. Officials in the G-7 nations maintained that economic assistance would be wasted unless Russia and the other FSU states curbed government spending, reined in inflation, and restructured the economy. In April 1993, President Clinton spearheaded a renewed G-7 effort to support the FSU. G-7 leaders were especially eager to strengthen Boris Yeltsin as he battled conservatives in the Russian parliament. The G-7's new approach to aid featured greater investment in the long-term economic development of the FSU. Targets for government spending and other economic standards were relaxed. Likewise, Clinton reaffirmed his support for Yeltsin during the political crisis of September 1993 by urging the Senate to quickly approve a U.S. aid package for Russia.

> *It is very much in our interest to keep Russia a democracy, to keep moving toward market reforms, and to keep moving toward reducing the nuclear threat.*
>
> *—Bill Clinton*

The United States also cooperated closely with its allies in charting U.S. policy toward what was once Yugoslavia. Clinton backed down from his threat to bomb Bosnian Serb positions in the spring of 1993 after diplomats in Western Europe and Russia voiced their objections. During the summer, as negotiations toward ending the war in Bosnia progressed, Clinton pledged


WITH THE COLD WAR OVER, NATO BEGINS A TRANSITION FROM A MILITARY TO A TRADE-BASED ECONOMIC ALLIANCE...
EUROPE
EUROPE
The Miami Herald
MORIN

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that the United States would contribute half of the 50,000 NATO peacekeeping troops needed to enforce a settlement. U.S. leaders, however, insisted that the UN must clearly define the goals of a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and press other countries to pay a greater share of the costs.

> *Bosnia involves our humanitarian concerns, but it does not involve our vital interests in survival.*
> *—Warren Christopher, secretary of state*

The crisis in Bosnia also raised questions about the future of NATO. U.S. policymakers recognized that NATO's fundamental mission disappeared along with the Soviet Union. Soon after taking office, Clinton laid out plans to gradually cut the U.S. military presence in Europe to roughly 100,000 troops. The possibility of military intervention in Bosnia, however, pointed to new threats to the security of Western Europe and suggested a fresh role for NATO. Meanwhile, Europeans began to think in terms of assuming greater responsibility for their own defense. As a first step toward forging a common European defense policy, German and French leaders in 1992 announced the formation of a "Eurocorps."

The creation of a Eurocorps was greeted with a chilly reception in Washington. For much of NATO's history, U.S. leaders had urged their Western European counterparts to take on a larger share of the burden involved in defending Europe. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl presented the Eurocorps as being in line with U.S. interests. Many U.S. policymakers, however, held a different view. They saw the Eurocorps as an attempt to undermine the importance of NATO. At the heart of the matter was the U.S. position of leadership in Europe. For forty years, few leaders on either side of the Atlantic had questioned the leading role of NATO, and the leading role of the United States within NATO. The Eurocorps represented a fundamental shift in perspective.

CONCLUSION

The following pages present four distinct approaches to U.S. policy toward Europe. As you consider the options, keep in mind that each is grounded in a clearly defined interpretation of past events. You, too, will be called upon to draw on the history of the previous three chapters to evaluate the options and formulate your own ideas about the U.S. role in Europe.

Options in Brief

OPTION 1 — PROMOTE WESTERN VALUES

The collapse of communism in Europe represented not simply a great foreign policy victory for the United States and its allies, but a triumph of our country's most cherished values. The United States and its Western European allies now have a responsibility to help the former Soviet bloc countries lay the foundations of democratic prosperity. Unless there is progress in improving living standards and establishing the rule of law, defenders of the communist past will reassert their power and reckless demagogues will spread messages of hate. At this decisive juncture in history, the United States must be actively involved in shaping the future of Europe. We must develop new foreign policy tools to promote democracy and freedom.

OPTION 2 — PROTECT OUR INTERESTS

The Europe that has emerged in the wake of the Soviet Union's disintegration is a dangerous place. A level-headed, calculating — sometimes cold-blooded — perspective is required. Above all, U.S. leaders must not lose sight of our country's real interests in Europe. Too much of our country's economic and military strength is linked to Western Europe to put our special relationship with the region at risk. These ties must be protected. Since the end of the Cold War, a new set of threats to Western Europe's security has arisen. Rather than Warsaw Pact tanks rumbling out of the east, Western Europeans now worry that they will be overrun by refugees, fanatical nationalism, nuclear terrorism, and environmental catastrophe from the former Soviet bloc. A forceful U.S. presence in Europe can help our allies cope with these dangers.

OPTION 3 — BEYOND EUROPE

The end of the Cold War has given Americans a fresh chance to rethink our country's role in the world. For the first time since the end of World War II, U.S. leaders no longer need be obsessed about the fate of Europe. Rather, the situation calls for a more balanced perspective, in which Europe would receive no more attention than Latin America, Africa, or other regions of the world. Traditional foreign policy concerns can be put aside and emerging global problems — environmental pollution, economic development, AIDS — can be addressed. In the post-Cold War era, U.S. leadership in Europe is no longer necessary. Instead, the United States should play a constructive role in guiding Europe toward a new era of cooperative security. Emphasis should be placed on building a consensus for global harmony, not on acting as the world's policeman. That job is much better suited to the UN.

OPTION 4 — REDUCE OUR OBLIGATIONS

For far too long, the United States spent about half of its defense budget to protect Western Europe. The countries of this region grew rich while U.S. industries fell behind foreign competitors and problems mounted at home. The relationship was both unfair and misguided. Today, Americans have run out of patience. With little likelihood that a new Soviet Union or Nazi Germany will emerge in Europe, U.S. policymakers can no longer justify our country's costly presence there. Without further delay, the United States should begin withdrawing its forces from Europe and reducing its involvement in the military and diplomatic alliances that entangle our country in the problems of the region. We should also press for fairer trade relations with the EC. We have to concentrate on putting our own house in order.

Option
1

PROMOTE WESTERN VALUES

The collapse of communism in Europe represented not simply a great foreign policy victory for the United States and its allies, but a triumph of our country's most cherished values. Ultimately, what brought down the communist system was the appeal of democracy, human rights, and individual freedom. The millions of ordinary people who raised the cry for democracy in the capitals of the Soviet bloc were looking to the West for inspiration. Now that the Cold War is over, we cannot let them down. The United States and its Western European allies have a responsibility to help the former Soviet bloc countries lay the foundations of democratic prosperity. The next few years will be crucial in determining Europe's future course. Unless there is progress in improving living standards and establishing the rule of law, defenders of the communist past will reassert their power and reckless demagogues will spread messages of hate. A historic opportunity to unite Europe around Western values will have been lost.

The end of the Cold War means that the U.S. mission in Europe must be redirected. Our country no longer has to be on the defensive. On the contrary, the United States and its allies can now advance their values across the old dividing line of the Cold War. At this decisive juncture in history, the United States must be actively involved in shaping the future of Europe. Tanks and missiles are not enough to accomplish our goals. Rather, we must develop new foreign policy tools to promote democracy and freedom. To begin with, we must craft a new foreign aid policy and reshape our trade relations to meet the needs of former Soviet bloc countries. After spending trillions of dollars to win the Cold War, we cannot afford to squander our victory.

Policy Guidelines

Toward Western Europe

The United States should lead its Western European allies in expanding international efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and free-market economic principles in the former Soviet bloc. To achieve the goals of Option 1, the United States should pursue the following policies:

- Lead our NATO allies in responding militarily against forces — such as aggressive Serbian nationalists in Bosnia — that refuse to respect Western values.

- Close ranks with our Western European allies to promote Western values in the UN and other international organizations.

- Station roughly 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe, while maintaining bases and other military facilities that would allow the United States to respond forcefully to a European crisis.

- Encourage EC members to continue on the path toward integration through the Maastricht agreement.

Toward the former Soviet bloc

The United States should draw the countries of the former Soviet bloc into a worldview based on the Western values of democracy and freedom. To achieve the goals of Option 1, the United States should pursue the following policies:

- Build links between Western institutions, such as NATO and the EC, and countries of the former Soviet bloc.

- Use the CSCE to establish and promote European-wide standards for political freedoms and minority rights that are based on Western values.

- Expand foreign aid programs designed to promote democratic institutions, environmental clean-up, and American economic investment in the countries of the former Soviet bloc.

Lessons from history

U.S. involvement in Western Europe after World War II helped transform the region and promote international peace and prosperity. By investing in West Germany's recovery through the Marshall Plan and opening up NATO membership to West Germany, the United States laid the foundation for a new Western alliance. West German leaders have stood out as champions of Western values and have emerged as role models of responsible world citizenship. There have been other success stories as well. Spain, Portugal, and Greece — countries once hobbled by instability and dictatorial rulers — are now healthy democracies because of their membership in NATO and the EC.

PROS & CONS

SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Without a new mission to replace the confrontation with the Soviet Union, the unity of Western Europe will dissolve and conflict will result.

2. The advance of democracy and the free-market economic system across Europe is the best way to ensure long-term peace and prosperity on the continent.

3. By playing a critical role in helping revive the economies of the former Soviet bloc, the United States will be on the inside track when new trade and investment opportunities open up in the region.

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Considering that the United States and Western Europe were unable to pursue an effective, unified policy toward the crisis in Bosnia, any hopes that they could carry out a larger mission in the former Soviet bloc are clearly misplaced.

2. Trying to impose Western values on the countries of the former Soviet Union will trigger a backlash against the United States and its allies.

3. The United States cannot afford another expensive foreign aid program at a time when our own country is suffering from staggering budget deficits and a sluggish economy.

4. Using standards of democracy and freedom to measure the performance of former Soviet bloc countries will sour our country's relations with non-democratic states in the region.

Option
2

PROTECT OUR INTERESTS

The Europe that has emerged in the wake of the Soviet Union's disintegration is a dangerous place. Rather than a single enemy, the United States is now confronted with a dizzying array of forces — some friendly, some unfriendly, many unstable. In this threatening environment, the United States cannot be distracted by crusading idealists or short-sighted isolationists. A level-headed, calculating — sometimes cold-blooded — perspective is required. Above all, U.S. leaders must not lose sight of our country's real interests in Europe. Too much of our country's economic and military strength is linked to Western Europe to put our special relationship with the region at risk. These ties must be protected. Whether we like it or not, the dividing line of the Cold War will haunt us for decades. In the east, political chaos, ethnic conflict, and stubborn poverty are likely to prevail. A few countries of the former Soviet bloc — such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland — may eventually be incorporated into the political and economic system of Western Europe. For the most part, however, the countries of the former Soviet bloc represent potential threats to U.S. interests, not opportunities.

In light of the former Soviet bloc's instability, the United States must continue to safeguard our trade relations and military alliances with Western Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, a new set of threats to Western Europe's security has arisen. Rather than Warsaw Pact tanks rumbling out of the east, Western Europeans now worry that they will be overrun by refugees, fanatical nationalism, nuclear terrorism, and environmental catastrophe from the former Soviet bloc. A forceful U.S. presence in Europe can help our allies cope with these dangers. Moreover, U.S. commitment will serve to deter potential dictators in Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere from grabbing power. In the case of Germany, a strong U.S. role in Europe will ensure that Germany remains solidly anchored in the Western European alliance system. For more than four decades, the United States has stood behind the peace and prosperity of Western Europe. In this era of turmoil and uncertainty, U.S. involvement in Europe is the best insurance against international disorder.

Policy Guidelines

Toward Western Europe

The United States should maintain a strong presence in Western Europe to protect the region against outside threats. To achieve the goals of Option 2, the United States should pursue the following policies:

- Direct NATO to intervene militarily in Europe only when the vital interests of Western Europe or the United States are threatened — as would be the case if a former Soviet bloc country began selling nuclear materials.

- Persuade our allies to gradually integrate the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into NATO, the EC and other Western European institutions, while avoiding close relations for now with other former Soviet bloc countries.

- Station roughly 150,000 to 200,000 U.S. troops in Europe and equip them with the most advanced military technology.

Toward the former Soviet bloc

The United States should seek to prevent the consequences of the former Soviet bloc's political and economic crises from spilling into Western Europe. To achieve the goals of Option 2, the United States should pursue the following policies:

- Use threats of economic sanctions and promises of foreign aid to ensure that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan give up the nuclear weapons on their territory.

- Support foreign aid programs in the former Soviet bloc that focus on demilitarization, especially on projects that control the spread of nuclear materials and technology.

- Permit Russia to stamp out conflicts in the countries of the former Soviet Union — providing that Russia continues to cooperate with the United States and its allies.

Lessons from history

The United States has intervened in Europe three times this century to prevent the continent from being swallowed up by an anti-American dictatorship. In the years leading up to U.S. involvement in World War I and World War II, Americans naively believed that the balance of power in Europe was not a U.S. concern. For that miscalculation, hundreds of thousands of Americans paid with their lives. The architects of the U.S. policy to contain Soviet aggression after World War II recognized that maintaining a balance of power in Europe was essential to protecting U.S. interests. The most notable failure of the containment policy — the Vietnam War — occurred because U.S. leaders lost sight of the fact that Southeast Asia was outside our sphere of vital national interests.

PROS

SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Only a strong NATO will stop potential aggressors in the former Soviet bloc from pursuing their ambitions.

2. As in other parts of the world, American values will inevitably penetrate the former Soviet bloc if we maintain a stable, consistent foreign policy toward Europe.

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3. A substantial, ongoing U.S. presence in Western Europe would be a prudent insurance policy against the danger that Russia might take a turn toward dictatorship and again threaten the security of our allies.

CONS

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Depriving most former Soviet bloc countries of close relations with Western Europe will provoke a dangerous anti-Western backlash in the region, especially in Russia.

2. Balance-of-power politics blinded U.S. leaders to the aggressive designs of Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic and would likewise be exploited by future dictators in Europe.

3. The leading threats to Europe's security — the emergence of an aggressive anti-democratic Russia or the resurgence of nationalism in Germany — have both faded since 1991, leaving little to justify a large U.S. military presence in Europe.

4. Focusing our limited foreign policy resources on Western Europe will mean neglecting other crucial areas of the world, such as Latin America.

Option
3

BEYOND EUROPE

The end of the Cold War has given Americans a fresh chance to rethink our country's role in the world. For four decades, international relations were defined in terms of the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War's dividing line cut through the heart of Europe and forced Americans to shoulder a heavy burden to defend its allies. Today, however, the old divisions are gone. The United States now counts among its friends most states in the former Soviet bloc. For the first time since the end of World War II, U.S. leaders no longer need be obsessed about the fate of Europe. Rather, the situation calls for a more balanced perspective, in which Europe would receive no more attention than Latin America, Africa, or other regions of the world. Traditional foreign policy concerns can be put aside and emerging global problems — environmental pollution, economic development, AIDS — can be addressed. In this atmosphere, the door is open to achieve real international cooperation in promoting lasting global harmony. The hope and vision underlying the foundation of the UN can finally be realized.

In the post-Cold War era, U.S. leadership in Europe is no longer necessary. Instead, the United States should play a constructive role in guiding Europe toward a new era of cooperative security. We should focus our efforts on encouraging free trade and open societies, while keeping in mind that our values are not appropriate for every country in Europe. Such an approach will allow us to greatly reduce our military presence in Western Europe. With the money saved from cutting back U.S. forces overseas, our country will have an opportunity to shift resources homeward. Meanwhile, our country's redefined role in Europe should serve as the basis for reshaping overall U.S. foreign policy. Emphasis should be placed on building a consensus for global harmony, not on imposing our values on other countries. A peaceful Europe would serve as a model for this new spirit of international cooperation. It would also permit the United States to gradually relinquish the burden of acting as the world's policeman. That job is much better suited to the UN.

Policy Guidelines

Toward Western Europe
The United States should loosen its security ties to Western Europe and instead encourage its Western European allies to join in strengthening the role of the UN in international affairs. To achieve the goals of Option 3, the United States should pursue the following policies:

- Transform NATO into a peacekeeping force under the control of the UN.

- Urge members of the EC to bring down the trade barriers protecting Western European producers and instead work for free trade on a global scale.

- Station roughly 50,000 U.S. troops in Europe to respond to regional crises identified by the UN.

Toward the former Soviet bloc
The United States should balance the foreign aid needs of the former Soviet bloc with the needs of poor countries in other parts of the world, as well as with problems at home. To achieve the goals of Option 3, the United States should pursue the following policies:

- Make U.S. troops in Europe available to take part in UN peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia and other conflict areas.

- Offer foreign aid to former Soviet bloc countries that agree to participate in a European-wide security arrangement.

Lessons from history

During the course of the 20th century, a consensus has gradually emerged among most of the world's leading nations on fundamental elements of international relations. War and brutality have certainly not been eliminated, but no one can deny that there has been real progress in defining accepted standards for international behavior. The United States has played a key role in shaping the emerging global consensus. At the same time, the peace and harmony of Western Europe and Japan's growing commitment to foreign aid programs have likewise transformed the international arena. Most important, the end of the Cold War removed the primary obstacle to global cooperation. In the last few years, this new atmosphere has reinvigorated the UN. The results have included stopping the aggression of Iraq's Saddam Hussein and restoring peace to the war-torn countries of Cambodia, Namibia in southwest Africa, and elsewhere.

PROS

SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Cutting back U.S. defense commitments to Western Europe will free up money that can be directed toward problems that more clearly affect Americans.

2. Reducing U.S. involvement in Europe will allow U.S. leaders to adjust to important changes in international relations, such as the economic growth of the Pacific Rim and the gathering momentum toward democracy in Latin America.

3. Without the overshadowing presence of the United States, European countries will have more flexibility to develop a security arrangement that meets their own needs.

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CONS

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. By offering U.S. troops for UN peacekeeping missions, the United States will find itself enforcing policies not of its own making in far-off areas that have no connection to U.S. interests.

2. In military terms, cutting back the U.S. force in Europe to 50,000 troops means that the United States will no longer have an effective fighting force on the continent.

3. As has been tragically illustrated in Bosnia, the UN is incapable of stopping aggression.

4. Turning away from the political and military alliance between the United States and Western Europe would weaken the key pillar of stability in the international order.

Option
4

REDUCE OUR OBLIGATIONS

For far too long, the United States spent about half of its defense budget to protect Western Europe. The countries of this region grew rich while U.S. industries fell behind foreign competitors and problems mounted at home. The relationship was both unfair and misguided. During most of the Cold War, the nations of Western Europe could have easily afforded to pay a larger share of their defense, and yet the United States dutifully picked up the tab. In the meantime, the focus on Europe drew U.S. leaders away from urgent domestic issues. Today, Americans have run out of patience. With little likelihood that a new Soviet Union or Nazi Germany will emerge in Europe, U.S. policymakers can no longer justify our country's costly presence there. Moreover, our country does not have much to offer. The nuclear umbrella that shielded Western Europe during the Cold War is not needed, while the foreign aid that helped spur economic recovery after World War II is not available.

Without further delay, the United States should begin withdrawing its forces from Europe and reducing its involvement in the military and diplomatic alliances that entangle our country in the problems of the region. Severing our security links to Europe will allow U.S. leaders to take a more clear-headed approach to other issues as well. During the Cold War, for example, U.S. trade policy took a back seat to our security concerns. Western European exporters were given open access to U.S. markets while U.S. exporters faced unfair trade barriers in the EC. With the Cold War over, we should insist that the Europeans play by the rules. At the same time, the United States should seek to broaden its trade relations in Latin America and East Asia to give us greater leverage in dealing with the EC. Confronted with so many problems here at home, we cannot be burdened with naive ideals and outmoded principles. The time has come to acknowledge that we cannot save the world. On the contrary, we have to concentrate on putting our own house in order.

Policy Guidelines

Toward Western Europe

The United States should phase out its military alliance with Western Europe and press for more favorable trade relations. To achieve the goals of Option 4, the United States should pursue the following policies:

- The United States should gradually end its involvement in NATO and withdraw U.S. forces from Europe.

- The United States should retaliate against EC trade policies that limit the entry of American exports into the Western European market.

Toward the former Soviet bloc

The United States should limit its involvement in the former Soviet bloc to providing humanitarian aid. To achieve the goals of Option 4, the United States should pursue the following policies:

- The United States should inform the UN that U.S. troops are not available to serve as peacekeepers in Bosnia or elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc.

- The United States should provide emergency relief aid to alleviate the worst suffering in the former Soviet bloc, but otherwise stay out of large-scale economic development programs for the region.

Lessons from history

The 20th century has witnessed the collapse of one empire after another. Until World War II, Britain was considered a global superpower. But while the British maintained the world's leading navy and stationed troops in far-flung colonies, the economic power that had long been the basis of British strength gradually eroded. The collapse of the Soviet empire should also serve as a warning to Americans. The Soviet empire was held together by an enormous military, with the Soviet economy geared toward the demands of Soviet foreign policy. Even as Soviet leaders fought a war in Afghanistan and meddled in Africa and Central America, however, the Soviet economy fell further behind the West. Like most empires, the Soviet empire ultimately collapsed because of the rot within, not because of threats from outside.

PROS

SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Reducing the flow of foreign aid to the former Soviet bloc will force leaders there to make the hard choices necessary for real economic reform.

2. Because the importance of U.S. trade with the EC is declining in comparison to our country's growing commerce with Canada, Mexico, and the countries of East Asia, the United States would have little to fear from taking a tougher line in our trade relations with Western Europe.

3. Without the prospect of U.S. intervention in European conflicts, warring parties in Bosnia and elsewhere would more likely settle their differences among themselves.

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CONS

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Without a U.S. troop presence in Western Europe, the Western alliance will eventually break up and Germany will come to dominate the region.

2. Completely withdrawing U.S. forces from Western Europe is short-sighted and wasteful, considering that political changes in Moscow, Berlin, or elsewhere could later require a rapid U.S. military buildup in the region.

3. Taking a tough stance in our trade relations with Western Europe will poison the atmosphere of international cooperation.

4. Turning our back on the countries of the former Soviet bloc at a time when they most need U.S. help will produce anti-American attitudes in the region.

Europe's Uncertain Future

The options on pages 49-56 present a range of alternatives for U.S. policy toward Europe. Each policy option has its supporters within the American public. More common are individuals who embrace elements of more than one option.

Now that you have had an opportunity to develop your own option on U.S. policy toward Europe, you are ready to consider the practical implications of your policy recommendations. In this section, you will examine the most pressing problems and challenges of Europe's four regions, as well as the changing nature of U.S. interests across the Atlantic. Since the end of the Cold War, each of Europe's four regions has undergone momentous change. In the case of what was once the communist bloc of Eastern Europe, the region itself has been recast by the collapse of the Soviet Union. As you read, ask yourself what are the chief priorities and concerns of your option, and what are your responses to the issues below.

WESTERN EUROPE

From the close of World War II until the end of the Cold War, U.S. involvement in Europe was generally limited to the region of Western Europe. Western Europe was the home of our principal military allies and many of our chief trading partners. Protecting the region from Soviet aggression was the top priority of U.S. foreign policy for four decades.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the barbed-wire borders that divided Europe have been removed. Nonetheless, Western Europe remains a region distinct from its neighbors. Unlike people in other areas of Europe, Western Europeans live in stable democracies and enjoy the benefits of prosperous free-market economic systems.

The United States has an interest in maintaining Western Europe's stability and prosperity. In 1991, U.S. trade with Western Europe equaled $221 billion — nearly one-quarter of total U.S. trade. Moreover, the United States enjoyed a $16 billion trade surplus with Western Europe. The leading countries of Western Europe are also counted among the most important allies of the United States. During the Persian Gulf War against Iraq in 1991, the United States and Western Europe were at the center of the alliance that forced Saddam Hussein's army out of Kuwait. Many of the most important international organizations — the UN, NATO, the Group of Seven — are grounded on a foundation of cooperation between the United States and Western Europe.

In the coming months, the stability and prosperity of Western Europe will face new challenges. Two issues stand out: the fate of efforts toward greater economic and political unification, and the growing backlash against refugees, immigrants, and ethnic minorities.

Western Europe

Countries: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Cyprus, Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibralter, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta and Gozo, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Svalbard, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Vatican City

Population: 364 million

1991 economic output: $6.1 trillion

1991 exports: $1.5 trillion

European unification

Throughout much of the 1980s and early 1990s, the momentum toward a unified Europe marched steadily forward. By 1993, however, unification efforts had stalled. Western Europe's failure to halt the fighting in Bosnia and a stubborn economic recession raised fresh doubts about the region's vitality and effectiveness.

Central to the question of Western Europe's unification is the direction of the EC. Advocates of a united Europe have long viewed the EC as the most suitable vehicle to achieve their goals. When the Maastricht treaty was put forward in 1991, many hoped that the agreement would not only tighten the economic bonds among EC members, but also lead to a united foreign policy and defense system. New Western European military institutions, such as the Eurocorps proposed by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, would allow the region to chart a more independent course in foreign policy.

A contrary vision of the EC favors widening rather than deepening the trade bloc. Proponents of this view support an expansion of EC membership, not closer links among the current twelve members. The anticipated inclusion of Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden in the EC beginning in 1995 is not expected to be disruptive. Much more controversial are plans to incorporate Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Although none of the six former Soviet bloc nations is likely to be able to meet the standards for joining the EC before the year 2000, the EC has formally opened the door to their candidacy.

The decision to invite the former Soviet bloc states to eventually apply for EC membership revealed the divisions within Western Europe. The French, for example, questioned the move. They see the inclusion of countries from the east as a setback in their efforts to create a more unified and centralized EC. The French insist that the former Soviet bloc states establish a track record in building stable democratic institutions and prosperous free-market economies before they are admitted to the EC. In contrast, the British applauded the EC decision. They want to slow down the drive toward EC unification. Since countries that were once part of the Soviet bloc have goals and standards much different from their neighbors to the west, their admission into the EC will bring greater diversity to the organization. Unifying the economic, defense, and foreign policies of the member states would consequently be much harder to achieve.

Backlash against foreigners

During the Cold War, West Germany had among the most liberal laws on political asylum in the world. The laws, based on the 1949 West German constitution, were largely meant to offer refuge to East Germans who escaped communist rule. In 1972, about 5,000 people applied for political asylum in West Germany. Twenty years later, however, that figure had swelled to 438,000.

The flood of asylum-seekers prompted German lawmakers in May 1993 to impose much stricter eligibility requirements for those seeking political asylum. Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has been joined by many of its neighbors in tightening laws on asylum and immigration. The shift in policy marks a sharp break with the past. Beginning in the 1950s, West Germany invited in guest workers from Turkey and southern Europe to help rebuild the economy. In France and Britain, citizens of former French and British colonies in North Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, and other regions entered as immigrants.

The end of the Cold War and rising unemployment, however, have contributed to a change in attitude. Throughout Western Europe, foreigners have increasingly become the target of violent attacks by skinheads and neo-Nazis. Right-wing parties, such as the National Front in France and the Republican Party in Germany, have gained support by whipping up resentment toward foreigners. Refugees from the former Soviet bloc are often a focus of anger. In the case of Germany, for example, most of those seeking political asylum in 1992 arrived from Romania and Bulgaria. Many were Gypsies claiming that they had been persecuted because of their ethnic background.

Officials in Germany and other countries, however, maintain that most asylum-seekers are fleeing difficult economic conditions. In response, Germany and Austria have stationed more border guards to stop illegal entry from the east. Supporters of stricter border control worry that the Maastricht treaty's provisions to remove barriers to the movement of people within the EC may undermine measures to control illegal immigration to Western Europe.

EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

East Central Europe is a region that has gained definition in the wake of the Cold War. The region consists of the most advanced countries of the former Soviet bloc. By most estimates, these states have the best chance of successfully navigating the transition to stable democracy and free-market economic systems. Although East Central Europe's boundaries are a subject of debate, most observers agree that Poland, former East Germany, the Czech Republic, and Hungary share much in common. Slovakia, while lagging behind the Czech Republic, is also generally considered part of East Central Europe. Others would place Slovenia and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the region.

The countries of East Central Europe were among the first in the former Soviet bloc to introduce radical reform measures. Poland, for example, served as a test case on dismantling the communist economic system. Today, East Central Europe still finds itself in transition. The problems facing leaders in the region are not so overwhelming as those plaguing much of the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, but they are much more far-reaching than the concerns of Western Europeans.

At the top of nearly every agenda in East Central Europe is the issue of economic reform. Closely connected to this theme is the progress of political reform in the region and threats to the environment from the rapid industrialization of the communist era.

East Central Europe

Countries: Czech Republic, former East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia

Population: 80 million

1991 economic output: $427 billion

1991 exports:* $35 billion

*does not include former East Germany

Economic reform

In both Poland and Hungary, suicide rates have increased since the collapse of communism. Social workers report that alcoholism has also risen, along with cases of depression and other psychological problems. Why have many Poles and Hungarians fallen into despair in recent years?

The question is troubling leaders throughout East Central Europe. In economic terms, Poland and Hungary have fared relatively well in their efforts to create a free-market economic system. And yet, millions of Poles and Hungarians believe they are worse off under the new system and are pessimistic about the future. These sentiments are critical to the fate of economic reforms throughout East Central Europe.

The first steps toward economic reform in the region were greeted with enthusiasm by most people. Expectations rose that the end of communism would result in an improved standard of living. Both the initial enthusiasm and the rising expectations, however, quickly sank. In what was once East Germany, nearly one-quarter of the work force is unemployed. German corporations from the wealthy western part of the country have bought up many state-run companies in the east. But while investing in new equipment and upgrading technology, western companies have also closed factories and fired workers. Forty workers at a potash mine in eastern Germany, for example, went on a hunger strike in 1993 after the operation was shut down. The mine, which had employed 1,900 workers under communism, had been sold to one of West Germany's leading chemical firms after reunification.

Most economists maintain that conditions in eastern Germany will gradually improve over the next decade. The other countries of East Central Europe, they contend, can also look forward to better times ahead if they stay on the path of free-market reform. Holding the course, however, will require strong-willed determination. While economists foresee a general improvement in the economies of East Central Europe, they concede that the process of change will disrupt the lives of millions of people.

Leaders in East Central Europe will face enormous pressure in the coming years. On the one hand, the newly poor and unemployed are demanding that they slow the pace of economic change and restore the job security and social services that were the foundation of the communist system. On the other hand, successful entrepreneurs, as well as officials in the United States and Western Europe, are urging political leaders to continue to sell off state-run industries and cut government spending. As the success of Poland's former communist parties in September 1993 elections indicates, democratically elected politicians cannot afford to neglect the concerns of voters dissatisfied with reforms.

The outcome of economic reform in East Central Europe will have repercussions far beyond the region.

Observers elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc look toward East Central Europe as a testing ground of free-market economic theories. Many feel that if capitalism does not prove successful in East Central Europe, it is doomed to failure in other areas of the former Soviet bloc.

Building a democratic society

During the four decades of communist rule in East Central Europe, only the Communist Party was tolerated. Unlike political parties in the United States, the Communist Party controlled all aspects of life, from youth groups, to writers unions, to steel factories. The tightly knit elite at the top of the party ensured that party membership was virtually the only route available for climbing the career ladder, and increasingly sought to pass on its privileges to family and friends. Among those outside the party, the political system drew apathy and cynicism.

Communism has left behind many obstacles on the road to building a democratic society. The economic difficulties of the past few years have been accompanied by a deep-seated mistrust of government in East Central Europe. Meanwhile, the non-governmental institutions that were suppressed under the communist system — churches, community groups, labor unions, non-communist political parties — are struggling to gain a foothold in the new societies.

Among the success stories is Hungary's Alliance of Young Democrats — a political party that originally limited its membership to voters under 35 years of age. Like other new political groups in East Central Europe, the Young Democrats first made a name for themselves by boldly criticizing the communist system in the late 1980s. Since the collapse of communism, however, the Young Democrats have won respect by pledging not to make promises that cannot be kept. That has meant opposing popular measures, like a plan to compensate the former owners of property taken over by the state under communism. Young Democrats hope that their commitment to honest, responsible government will restore faith in the Hungarian political system.

Environmental pollution

In the Bitterfeld area of former East Germany, not far from the Elbe River, withered trees dot the landscape and toxic pools of industrial wastes are rimmed with dark sludge. Under communist rule, the area was home to several of East Germany's biggest chemical plants. After German reunification, however, many of the factories were unable to compete against firms in western Germany and closed down. Moreover, German corporations have been reluctant to invest in the area, fearing that the costs of cleaning up pollution would be overwhelming.

Environmental pollution is one of the most noticeable legacies of communist rule in East Central Europe. Under the communists, increased industrial output was the central focus of economic planners. Little regard was given to the environmental consequences. Today, however, pollution has not only scarred the natural beauty of many of East Central Europe's industrial regions, but has also emerged as a barrier to foreign investment.

Similarly, several Western European, American, and Japanese companies have been scared away from investing in other East Central Europe countries because of environmental problems. In addition to the high cost of environmental clean-up, foreign companies are concerned that they may be held liable for the pollution-related health problems of workers and residents.

Pollution also confronts government officials in East Central Europe with a serious dilemma. Countries of the region cannot afford to undertake extensive clean-up efforts or purchase environmentally friendly technologies. And yet, heavily polluting industries continue to harm the environment and hold back the economies of the region. Poland is in a particular bind. The country has abundant coal reserves, but burning the fuel without special pollution-control devices has left Poland with some of the dirtiest air in Europe. Poland's emissions of sulfur dioxide, a pollutant from coal, equal more than one-third of the total produced by the entire EC.

THE BALKANS

The Balkan peninsula is hampered by many of the same problems found in East Central Europe, only worse. For the moment, however, the war in what was once Yugoslavia and potential ethnic conflicts elsewhere in the region have pushed other issues into the background.

The Balkans have long been known as the powder keg of Europe. Compared to other regions of Europe, the Balkans are home to a dizzying mix of ethnic groups and the largest Muslim population on the continent. When the Ottoman Turkish Empire gradually lost its hold on the region in the 19th and early 20th centuries, it left behind an area torn by competing nationalist movements. Nationalist tensions continued to dominate Balkan history between World War I and World War II. Under communism, disputes among nationalities were controlled, but not resolved.

The collapse of communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia brought ethnic conflict to the forefront in the Balkans. In the former Yugoslavia, the result has been war. Elsewhere in the region, keeping the peace may hinge on the treatment of ethnic minorities.

The Balkans

Countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Yugoslavia

Population: 59 million

1991 economic output: $223 billion

1991 exports: $27 billion

War in the former Yugoslavia

The latest wave of ethnic conflict in the Balkans has centered on what was once the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia. Observers, however, fear that the war could spread. Serbian forces in Croatia, for example, still hold about one-quarter of Croatia's territory and fighting flared up repeatedly in 1993. The situation in Yugoslavia's Kosovo province and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia is potentially even more explosive. Serbian nationalists have declared that both areas are Serbian land.

Fighting in either Kosovo or Macedonia would likely draw in countries beyond the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia. Albania could be expected to enter the conflict in defense of the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia. In addition, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey all have strong interests in the area.

Bringing peace to the Balkans has preoccupied policymakers in Western Europe and the United States since Yugoslavia's disintegration. Much of the energy has focused on pressuring Serbia's leaders to rein in the forces of Serbian nationalism. Stiff economic sanctions against Serbia have been imposed and threats to attack the Bosnian Serb army have been issued. Meanwhile, UN peacekeeping troops, including 300 Americans, have been stationed in Macedonia.

Throughout 1992 and much of 1993, U.S. and Western European leaders sought to maintain the borders of the newly independent Bosnian state. By the summer of 1993, however, hopes for keeping Bosnia intact had all but vanished. Nonetheless, U.S. and Western European leaders stood by their commitment to preserve other existing borders in the Balkans. Their greatest fear was that redrawn borders in the Balkans would provoke other countries in Europe to raise territorial disputes.

Minority rights

At the core of the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans is the issue of minority rights. For most Americans, minority rights are an unfamiliar concept. Although affirmative action programs in the United States are aimed at specific minority groups, such as African Americans and Hispanics, our country's system of laws is principally designed to protect individual rights. Native Americans are the only minority group which has limited rights to govern itself on its own land.

In the Balkans and other regions of Europe, the treatment of minority groups has long been a central issue of government. Before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, for example, the political power and territory of each of the country's main ethnic groups was carefully defined in the Yugoslav constitution. Problems, however, have resulted when the political goals of minority groups and central governments have conflicted. The situation in Kosovo is a good illustration. Kosovo's Albanians, who make up 90 percent of the province's population, want to govern themselves and have condemned the efforts of the central government to restrict their rights. Meanwhile, the Serbian authorities who control the central government fear that Albanians in Kosovo will seek to break away from Yugoslavia and attach the province to Albania.

Questions of minority rights are often complex and controversial. There are solutions, however. In July 1993, central government officials in Romania and representatives of the country's Hungarian minority agreed to a plan for promoting the cultural autonomy of Romania's 1.6 million Hungarians. Under the agreement, more elementary school classes would be taught in Hungarian and bilingual street signs would be put up in areas with substantial Hungarian communities.

FORMER SOVIET UNION

The legacy of communism left a particularly deep imprint on the countries of the former Soviet Union. Compared to most of the countries of Eastern Europe, the central authorities in the Soviet Union imposed a heavier hand in snuffing out private initiative. Soviet citizens had even fewer opportunities than their counterparts in Poland or Yugoslavia to work outside the state-run economy or learn about the non-communist world.

Today, the Soviet experience continues to define the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Even Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova, which were not incorporated into the Soviet Union until World War II, largely share the problems and challenges of the other former Soviet states.

In addition to the economic, political, and environmental difficulties confronting all former Soviet bloc countries, the nations of the FSU must also grapple with the demands of statehood. New government institutions have been established. Flags, anthems, and other national symbols have been selected. And perhaps most critically, each state has sought to craft an appropriate foreign policy while at the same time developing a corps of competent diplomats, analysts, and other foreign policy professionals. As events since 1991 have shown, relations among the FSU countries have assumed particular importance. The future of the Soviet Union's enormous military machine has also been a sensitive issue for the FSU countries, especially for the four states with nuclear weapons on their territory.

Former Soviet Union
(European area)

Countries: Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine

Population: 224 million

1991 economic output:* $1.7 trillion

1990 exports: $78 billion

*figure based on the entire Soviet Union

Relations among FSU states

Even as its economy flounders, Russia casts an imposing shadow over its neighbors in the FSU. No country in the region can hope to challenge Russia's dominance in the international affairs of the FSU. In 1993, Russian leaders took steps to reassert their country's influence in what were once the neighboring republics of the Soviet Union. In the Central Asian republic of Tajikistan, Russian border guards battled against rebels fighting to overthrow the pro-Russian Tajik government. Russian troops and diplomats were also increasingly active in the Caucasus region, where several small wars involved Russian interests.

Russia's efforts to reassert its influence have not been welcome by many governments in the FSU. Presently, Russian-Ukrainian relations are the biggest worry. Although Russian and Ukrainian leaders have made progress in eliminating Ukraine's nuclear arsenal and dividing up the Soviet naval fleet based in the Black Sea, nationalists on both sides threaten to stand in the way of friendly relations. If tensions rise, observers fear that eastern sections of Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula could become flashpoints of conflict. Both areas have large Russian populations.

Other potential hot spots near Russia's border include the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Moldova. Like Ukraine, the four countries have sizeable Russian minorities. Russians in the Baltics have complained loudly about new citizenship laws, arguing that the measures were designed to force them out of the republics. Meanwhile, Baltic leaders have charged that Russia has dragged out the withdrawal of ex-Soviet troops from their lands.

Military cutbacks and nuclear threats

In 1992, Russia sold submarines, fighter planes, tanks, and missiles to Iran and China. Although the United States protested the sales of military equipment to the two countries, Russian officials argued that arms manufacturers in Russia had the right to export their products. Many felt that economically their country had little choice.

Under the communist system, the needs of the military were given top priority. With the best in human and material resources, the Soviet arms industry turned out weapons that were comparable to those produced in the United States and Western Europe. Today, officials in Russia and other FSU states face some difficult decisions. Most concede that military spending must be drastically cut. Without government orders to fill, defense factories will be required to either find export markets or convert to new industries. Widespread unemployment for defense workers seems inevitable.

The outlook for the soldiers of the FSU also appears bleak. The Soviet armed services had more than 3 million personnel and absorbed more than 15 percent of Soviet gross national product (compared to roughly 5 percent in the United States). As government budgets in the FSU have shrunk, pressure has increased to reduce military spending. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of soldiers have been withdrawn from bases in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. They are returning to an economy that offers them few opportunities. In Russia especially, the decline of the military has fueled popular discontent. Observers fear that unemployed defense workers and frustrated soldiers could serve as the foundation of a movement to overthrow democracy. In their bid to seize power in October 1993, opponents of President Boris Yeltsin tried to rally the military to their side.

The security of the FSU's nuclear arsenal is another ever-present concern for leaders in the region and beyond. The FSU has attracted the interest of Iran, Libya, and other countries seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. As a result, fears have risen that nuclear materials, as well as elite scientists, could leak beyond the borders of the FSU's nuclear states. (In the fall of 1993, a top Russian official said that his country's stockpile of highly enriched uranium was more than twice as large as most U.S. analysts had previously assumed.) Connected to the issue of nuclear weapons is the future of nuclear energy plants in the FSU. Although outside experts have recommended that twenty-five reactors in the former Soviet Union be shut down for safety reasons, many countries cannot afford to switch to other energy sources.

Ten-Day Lesson Plan

Homework: Before beginning the unit, students should read Part I of the background readings up to "The Soviet Union" section and answer questions 1-5 of "Study Guide — Part I."

DAY ONE

Crisis in Eastern Europe: discussion

Objective: This two-day role play activity will explore the position of the Eastern European states with respect to their more powerful neighbors during the interwar years.

1. Read or display the following statement written by James Schlesinger (secretary of defense under Presidents Nixon and Ford, and secretary of energy under President Carter) in 1991:

> *"The world order of the future will revert to that which existed before 1939, and most notably after World War I: It will be marked by power politics, national rivalries, and ethnic tensions."*

2. Ask students to consider why the end of the Cold War would lead Schlesinger to make such a prediction. What are the similarities between the international situation of today and the international situation after World War I? Ask students to identify sections in the background reading (e.g., "Minority problems," Border disputes") that resemble current events. Why were "power politics, national rivalries, and ethnic tensions" less prominent during the Cold War? What regions of Europe are most associated with the problems that concern Schlesinger? Call on students to give examples from current events that illustrate Schlesinger's prediction. Are the concerns that were raised in the Senate after World War I regarding the Versailles Treaty valid today?

3. After the discussion, divide the class into groups of three to five students. Distribute "Crisis in Eastern Europe — 1937." Each group should be assigned the task of representing one of the following Eastern European countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, or Bulgaria. Review the maps in Part I of the background reading, noting in particular the border changes that occurred after World War I. Students should use the remainder of the period to complete "Crisis in Eastern Europe — 1937." Remind students that each group should select a representative to present a summary of its assigned country's foreign policy on Day Two.

Homework: Students should read the remainder of Part I of the background readings and complete "Study Guide — Part I."

DAY TWO

Crisis in Eastern Europe: presentation and review

1. Call on the group representative to summarize the foreign policies of their respective countries. Remind them that they should act as advocates of their assigned countries.

2. After the presentations, call on students to identify the most likely areas of conflict in post-World War I Eastern Europe. Which Eastern European countries felt most aggrieved by the peace settlements? How did the rise of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union affect foreign policy in the region? Call on students to explain how national interests shaped the positions of Eastern European states in World War II.

Homework: Students should read Part II of the background readings up to the "Europe in the Shadow of the Cold War" section and answer questions 1-3 of "Study Guide — Part II."

DAY THREE

The United States as global superpower

Objective: This one-day discussion will engage students in the debate on U.S. foreign policy that occurred immediately after World War II.

1. Call on students to summarize, based on their reading, George Kennan's concept of "containment." What arguments did Kennan make to justify his position? Distribute "Charting U.S. Foreign Policy: 1945-1947." Instruct students to review the statements in the handout, explaining that they represent a variety of perspectives on the U.S. role in the world. Students should focus on how the statements differ in terms of their priorities and policy choices.

2. After students have reviewed the statements, ask them to identify alternatives to Kennan's containment policy. For example, how did George Patton's position differ from that of Kennan? How did Henry Wallace view U.S.-Soviet relations? Ask students to articulate the values underlying distinct policy positions. For example, how did Patton's conception of the U.S. role in the world differ from that of Robert Taft? What were the most prominent concerns behind each official's position? How would U.S. policy toward Western Europe and the Soviet bloc been different if the United States had not adopted Kennan's viewpoint? Finally, call on students to offer their own proposals for U.S. foreign policy in 1947.

Homework: Read the remainder of Part II of the background readings and complete "Study Guide — Part II."

DAY FOUR

Europe in the Cold War

Objective: This one-day exercise will deepen understanding of the Cold War's impact on the countries of Europe.

1. Distribute "Europe in the Cold War." Explain that each of the six statements represents the official position of a European country during the Cold War. Based on their reading, students should match each statement with a specific country.

2. After students complete "Europe in the Cold War," review the answers to the worksheet. (*Answers:* 1. Britain; 2. Czechoslovakia; 3. East Germany; 4. France; 5. West Germany; 6. Romania.) Call on students to identify the key words or phrases that determined their responses. Ask students to consider the national interests of the European states. How did the threats and concerns of the Cold War compare to those of the interwar years? What factors accounted for the different viewpoints of the Western European countries? What role did U.S. policy play in shaping attitudes in Europe? Call on students to identify political cartoons and quotations in Part II that illustrate European attitudes.

Homework: Students should read Part III of the background readings up to the "On the Road to Capitalism" section and answer questions 1-5 of "Study Guide — Part III."

DAY FIVE

Europe in transition: preparation

Objective: This two-day activity encourages students to examine the recent changes in Europe from several perspectives.

1. Divide the class into eight groups of three to four students (four groups in smaller classes). Distribute "Europe in Transition." Assign each group the task of reporting on one of the following areas: the (former) Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the United States. Instruct each group to use the remainder of the period to organize a brief presentation on its region. (See "Europe in Transition.")

Homework: Read the remainder of Part III of the background readings and complete "Study Guide — Part III."

DAY SIX

Europe in transition: presentation

1. Call on each group to make its presentation before the class. After the presentations are completed, ask students to compare attitudes in the four areas under consideration. For example, in what areas did observers seem most pessimistic about the future? Where were expressions of optimism voiced? How did attitudes about the end of the Cold War differ from area to area? According to Part III of the background readings, what developments have had the greatest impact on attitudes toward the future?

DAY SEVEN

The options before the U.S. Senate: organization and preparation

Objective: This two-day simulation will familiarize students with leading issues that frame the debate on U.S. policy toward Europe.

1. Inform students that they will participate in a simulation using the options and the background readings. Form four groups of four students. Assign an option to each group. The remainder of the class will serve as members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate. (In smaller classes, other teachers or administrators may be invited to serve as committee members. In larger classes, additional roles — such as those of newspaper reporter or lobbyist — may be assigned to students.)

2. Distribute "Presenting Your Option" to the four option groups and "The U.S. Role in Europe" to the committee members. Inform students that each option group will be called upon in Day Eight to present the case for its assigned option to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Explain that the option groups should follow the instructions in "Presenting Your Option." Note that the option groups should begin by assigning each member a role. (As an extra challenge, ask the groups to design a poster illustrating the best case for their option.) While the option groups are preparing their presentation, members of the Committee on Foreign Relations should develop cross-examination questions for Day Eight. (See "The U.S. Role in Europe.") Remind committee members that they are expected to turn in their cross-examination questions at the end of the simulation.

Homework: Students should read the four options and complete preparations for the simulation.

DAY EIGHT

The options before the U.S. Senate: debate and discussion

1. Organize the room so that the four option groups face a row of desks reserved for members of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Distribute "Evaluation Form" to the committee members. Explain that the simulation will begin with three-to-five minute presentations by the spokespersons for the option groups. Encourage the spokespersons to speak clearly and convincingly.

2. Following the presentations, invite members of the Committee on Foreign Relations to ask cross-examination questions. Make sure that each committee member has an opportunity to ask at least one question. The questions should be evenly distributed among all four option groups. If time permits, encourage members of the option groups to challenge the positions of the other groups. During cross-examination, allow any option group member to respond. (As an alternative approach, permit cross-examination following the presentation of each option.)

3. Instruct members of the Committee on Foreign Relations to fill out the first part of their "Evaluation Form" during the course of the period. The second part of the worksheet should be completed as homework.

Homework: Complete "Focusing Your Thoughts."

DAY NINE

Crafting student options

Objective: This one-day exercise will enable students to craft coherent policy recommendations based on their personal beliefs and values.

1. Call on members of the Committee on Foreign Relations to share their evaluations of the presentations. Which arguments were most convincing? Which beliefs were most appealing? Which lessons from history were most relevant to the debate? Based on the hearings, what recommendations would committee members make regarding the U.S. role in Europe?

2. Call on option group members to consider what advocates of their assigned options would have advocated for U.S. policy in past European crises, such as the 1938 Munich conference, the erection of the Berlin Wall, or the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. How would the options respond to possible current crises, such as a Serbian campaign to force Albanians out of Kosovo province or a theft of nuclear materials from Ukraine?

3. Review the beliefs in "Focusing Your Thoughts," noting the relationship between beliefs and policy options. Distribute "Your Option Five." Advise students to use their responses to "Focusing Your Thoughts" as the basis for answering the first two questions of "Your Option Five." Students should use the remainder of the class period to complete "Your Option Five." (Consider allowing students to work in pairs.)

Homework: Students should read "Europe's Uncertain Future."

DAY TEN

Putting options into practice

Objective: This one-day discussion will help students consider their policy recommendations in the context of emerging issues in Europe.

1. Distribute "Emerging Issues in Europe." Call on volunteers to share their responses to "Your Option Five" with their classmates. Ask the class to respond to the questions of "Emerging Issues in Europe" for each of the options presented. Call on the class to analyze student options in terms of current events in Europe. For example, what do the options presented recommend for U.S. policy toward political turmoil in Russia, ethnic conflict in the Balkans, or trade talks with the EC? Urge students with contrary viewpoints to present their options.

2. Instruct students to fill out "Emerging Issues in Europe" for their own option. After students complete the worksheet, tally the responses for the class as a whole. Do the responses offer an insight into the consensus of the classroom? Ask students to identify the values and beliefs that stood out most prominently in the class' response to the worksheet.

3. *Extra Challenge:* As homework, instruct students to write a letter based on their option to President Clinton, the editor of a local newspaper, or a member of Congress. Advise students to apply their options to current issues in U.S.-European relations.

Encourage students to explore the local dimension of the debate on U.S. policy toward Europe. For example, students could be asked to contact local businesses that trade with European companies. Many American cities have established sister city relationships in Europe that promote commercial and cultural exchanges. Human rights and ethnic organizations also have links to Europe. In addition, armed service personnel have a clear interest in policies affecting the U.S. military presence in Europe.

Alternative Five-Day Lesson Plan

The central purpose of this unit is to guide students through the process of considering a range of options for U.S. policy toward Europe and to ultimately articulate their own values and recommendations. An abbreviated lesson plan should be pointed toward these goals, while fitting into the time constraints of the classroom.

Teachers aiming to engage their students in the debate on U.S. policy toward Europe in the course of a five-day lesson plan should begin by selecting the sections of the background readings that are most relevant to their classroom. Several approaches are possible. Each of the first three parts of the background readings covers a distinct period in European history. Teachers concentrating on World War I and the interwar era, for example, could assign their students "Europe in Turmoil — 1914-1945" to read and lead them through the first two days of the lesson plan. As an alternative to the two-day simulation of Day Seven and Day Eight, students could explore the options through a one-day classroom discussion. Emphasis would be placed on drawing parallels between the issues addressed in the options and the history of the interwar period. Students might also be instructed to review "Revolutionary Changes in Europe — 1985-1993" to make connections between recent events and the past. The final two days of the unit should revolve around "Focusing Your Thoughts," "Your Option Five," and "Emerging Issues in Europe," as suggested in Day Nine and Day Ten. Five-day units could likewise be based on either Part II or Part III of the background readings.

In addition, teachers may choose to focus on a specific region of Europe in developing an abbreviated lesson plan. Although the unit gives special attention on what were once the communist countries of Eastern Europe, developments in the former Soviet Union and Western Europe are also thoroughly surveyed. For teachers with a regional interest, lessons could be adapted to illustrate the historical evolution of the region under consideration. In the case of "Europe in Transition" (Day Five and Day Six) in a class studying Eastern Europe, each small group could be assigned to report on a specific period in the history of the region.

Name:________________________________

Study Guide — Part I

Europe in Turmoil — 1914-1945

1. How did the diplomacy of President Wilson represent a major departure for U.S. foreign policy?

2. How did Wilson's principles conflict with the interests of Britain and France after World War I?

3. What factors contributed to the failure of democracy in Germany after World War I?

4. How did the principle of "self-determination" lead to conflict in Eastern Europe after World War I?

5. Which minority problems in Eastern Europe contributed to the most serious conflicts in the years leading up to World War II?

6. Compare and contrast the philosophies of Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler.

7. What factors led Americans to oppose U.S. involvement in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s?

8. How was the 1938 Munich Conference linked to Hitler's invasion of Poland in 1939?

9. Why did World War II contribute to ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia?

Crisis in Eastern Europe — 1937

Instructions: Your group has been called upon to represent the foreign policy views of an Eastern European country in 1937. As you know, 1937 was a time of political crisis in Eastern Europe. Your group should organize a brief presentation that reflects the concerns of your country. Your presentation should be based on the questions below. Use Part I of the background readings, "Europe in Turmoil — 1914-1945," to answer these questions.

1. What are the most important national interests of your country?

2. How would you assess the outcome of the Paris peace conference?

3. What are the major problems facing your country?

4. Describe your country's relations with...

    a. the leading fascist states (Germany and Italy):

    b. the leading Western democracies (the United States, Britain, and France):

    c. the Soviet Union:

5. What foreign policy should you pursue to protect your country's interests?

Name:________________________________

Study Guide — Part II

The Search for Security — 1945-1985

1. How did World War II reshape the international order?

2. Why are the Marshall Plan and NATO viewed as a logical outgrowth of George Kennan's "containment" policy?

3. What events in the late 1940s and 1950s prompted an increase in U.S. military spending?

4. Why was Franco-German cooperation considered the foundation of a new era in Western Europe?

5. What changes in international relations led President Nixon to initiate the policy of detente?

6. What events caused the collapse of U.S.-Soviet detente?

Charting U.S. Foreign Policy: 1947

Instructions: The year 1947 marked a watershed in the debate on U.S. foreign policy. Below are four distinct viewpoints on the U.S. role in the world that entered into the debate of 1947. Read the statements carefully, noting the priorities and concerns of each, and be prepared to discuss them with your classmates.

Excerpts from General George Patton's conversation with Secretary of the Army Robert P. Patterson, May 7, 1945:

> Send us replacements and let us start training here [in Europe], keeping our forces intact. Let's keep our boots polished, bayonets sharpened, and present a picture of force and strength to these people [the Soviets]. This is the only language they understand and respect. If you fail to do this, then I would like to say to you that we have had a victory over the Germans and have disarmed them, but have lost the war....I would have your State Department, or the people in charge, tell the people concerned [the Soviets] where their border is, and give them a limited time to get back across. Warn them that if they fail to do so, we will push them back across it....Let's not give them time to build up their supplies. If we do, then I repeat, we have had a victory over the Germans and disarmed them; we have failed in the liberation of Europe; we have lost the war!

Excerpts from a telegram sent by George Kennan from the U.S. Moscow embassy to the State Department, February 22, 1946:

> At bottom of Kremlin's [Soviet Union's] neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity....Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw — and usually does — when strong resistance is encountered at any point....World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue....We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see.

Excerpts from Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace's letter to President Truman, July 1946:

> ...Russian history for over a thousand years has been a succession of attempts, often unsuccessful, to resist invasion and conquest....It follows that to the Russians all of the defense and security measures of the Western powers seem to have aggressive intent....Our resistance to her attempts to obtain warm water ports and her own security system in the form of "friendly" neighboring states seems, from the Russian point of view, to clinch the case....[We should] allay any reasonable Russian grounds for fear....We should ascertain from a fresh point of view what Russia believes to be essential to her own security as a prerequisite to the writing of the peace and to cooperation in the construction of a world order. We should be prepared to judge her requirements against the background of what we ourselves and the British have insisted upon as essential to our respective security. We should be prepared, even at the expense of risking epithets of appeasement, to agree to reasonable Russian guarantees of security.

Excerpts from speeches by Senator Robert Taft in May 1943 and August 1943:

> [Suggestions that the United States police the world] are completely contrary to the ideals of the American people and the theory that we are fighting for liberty as well as security....It is based on the theory that we know better what is good for the world than the world itself. It assumes that we are always right and that anyone who disagrees with us is wrong....Other people simply do not like to be dominated....It may appeal to the do-gooders who regard it as the manifest destiny of America to confer the benefits of the New Deal on every Hottentot....It can only lead to vast national armaments in all parts of the world....Our fingers will be in every pie. Our military forces will work with our commercial forces to obtain as much of the world trade as we can lay our hands on. We will occupy all the strategic points in the world and try to maintain a force so preponderant that none shall dare attack us....Potential power over other nations, however benevolent its purpose, leads inevitably to imperialism....

Name:______________________________

Europe in the Cold War

Instructions: The statements below reflect the positions of six different European countries during the Cold War. The statements are written from an official, or governmental, perspective. Your assignment is to match each of the statements with a specific country. Your answers should be based on Part II of the background readings, "The Search for Security: 1945-1985."

______________ 1. Our country's foreign policy is based on a special relationship with the United States. In both world wars, our country led the Allies to victory, and we will continue to play a major role in world affairs.

______________ 2. Our country's destiny is firmly linked to that of the Soviet Union. Recently, our leaders mistakingly departed from the course of our comrades in Moscow. Fortunately, our allies came to our aid to route the enemies of communism. We have now corrected our errors.

______________ 3. Our country is on the front line of the struggle against capitalism. We are thankful that our Soviet comrades now stand shoulder-to-shoulder with us to protect our country from our enemies. We hope that one day our countrymen in the west will join us on the road toward communism.

______________ 4. Our country must not subordinate its security interests to the United States. As our country's great international influence shows, we represent the cultural heart of the West. In recent years, we have also been at the center of an economic union that has healed many of the continent's deepest wounds.

______________ 5. Our country forms the foundation of the Western alliance. Emerging from the devastation of World War II, our country has become the economic leader of Western Europe and a model of democratic stability. Eventually, we hope that we will be reunited with our countrymen in the east as well.

______________ 6. Our country must continue to make strides toward industrial development as we follow the path of communism. We will maintain fraternal relations with our communist allies, but our country cannot accept the role of agricultural backwater.

Name:______________________________

Study Guide — Part III

Revolutionary Changes in Europe — 1985-1993

1. How did Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to reform the Soviet Union affect Soviet foreign policy?

2. What factors led millions of Eastern Europeans to openly challenge communist rule in 1989?

3. Why did the reunification of Germany raise concern among Germany's neighbors?

4. How did *perestroika* contribute to the disintegration of the Soviet Union?

5. Why did the Maastricht treaty spark opposition from many Western Europeans?

6. Explain Lech Walesa's dilemma.

7. How did economic reform contribute to the division of Czechoslovakia?

8. How was the death of Marshal Tito related to the outbreak of war in Bosnia?

9. What foreign policy tools has Russia used to extend its influence in the old Soviet Union?

10. What have been the primary goals of U.S. policy toward Europe since the end of the Cold War?

Europe in Transition

Your assignment: Your group is expected to report on how your assigned area has changed since the end of the Cold War in 1989. After gathering information from Part III of the background reading, your group will be called upon to make a brief presentation to your classmates. You will be evaluated on how thoroughly you cover your assigned area.

Organizing your group: You should use a television news format to organize your presentation. Begin by selecting a reporter. The other members of your group will be interviewed by the reporter.

The presentation of your group should bring out the fears, hopes, values, and aspirations of people living in your group's assigned area. Each of the speakers in your group should represent a distinct viewpoint. For example, one member of your group might take on the character of a well-known political leader. Another group member might play the role of a student or a factory worker. Each speaker should express an identifiable set of concerns and attitudes. The presentation of your group should touch on a variety of topics, such as politics, economics, and cultural life.

Developing your presentation: Your group's reporter should develop a few questions to ask each of the group members being interviewed. Below are examples of questions that address key subjects:

What did the fall of the Berlin Wall signify in your region?

What is the attitude of people in your region toward the EC?

Are people in your region better off now than in 1985?

How have attitudes in your region changed since 1989?

What are the leading hopes and fears in your region?

Presenting Your Option

Day One — Preparing Your Presentation

Your assignment: Your group has been called up to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate to explain why your option should serve as the basis of our country's policy toward Europe. You will be judged on how well you present your option.

Organizing your group: Each member of your group will take a specific role. Below is a brief explanation of the responsibilities for each role:

1. *Spokesperson:* Your job is to explain the option of your group to the Committee on Foreign Relations in a three-to-five minute presentation. In preparing your presentation, you will receive help from the other members of your group. You should include arguments from their areas of expertise. Keep in mind, though, that you are expected to take the lead in organizing your group. Review the background readings to build a strong case for your option.

2. *Adviser — 1914-1945:* Your job is to draw from Part I of the background readings, "Europe in Turmoil — 1914-1945," to strengthen the case for your option. Carefully review Part I to find historical evidence that supports your option's position.

3. *Adviser — 1945-1985:* Your job is to draw from Part II of the background readings, "The Search for Security — 1945-1985," to strengthen the case for your option. Carefully review Part II to find historical evidence that supports your option's position.

4. *Adviser — 1985-1993:* Your job is to draw from Part III of the background readings, "Revolutionary Changes in Europe — 1985-1993," to strengthen the case for your option. Carefully review Part III to find evidence from recent events that supports your option's position.

Day Two — Making Your Case

On Day Two, your spokesperson will deliver a three-to-five minute presentation to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Notes can be used, but the spokesperson should speak clearly and convincingly. During the presentations of the other groups, you should try to identify the weak points of the competing options. After all of the groups have presented their options, members of the Committee on Foreign Relations will ask you cross-examination questions. Any member of your group may respond during the cross-examination period.

The U.S. Role in Europe

Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate

Your Role

You are a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate. Your committee oversees the foreign policy of our country. In the past few years, many of our longstanding assumptions about the world have changed. The U.S. role in Europe must keep up with those changes. In this exercise, you will hear four views on the future direction of our country's policy toward Europe.

Your Assignment

You must decide which of the four option groups presents its position most effectively. While the option groups are organizing their presentations, you should prepare two questions regarding each of the options.

Your questions should be challenging and critical. For example, a good question for Option 1 might be:

> *How would we deal with states in the former Soviet bloc that don't share our country's concern about promoting democracy?*

Examine the "opposing arguments" section under each of the four options for ideas in developing questions. You should also review the background readings to analyze the options from a historical perspective. Your teacher will collect the questions at the end of the exercise.

On Day Two, the four option groups will present their positions. After their presentations are completed, your teacher will call on you and your fellow committee members to ask questions. The "Evaluation Form" you receive is designed for you to record your impressions of the option groups. Part I should be filled out in class after the option groups make their presentations. Part II should be completed as homework. After this activity is concluded, you may be called upon to explain your evaluation of the option groups.

Name:________________________________

Evaluation Form

Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate

Part I

What was the most persuasive argument presented in favor of this option?	What was the most persuasive criticism presented against this option?
Option 1	*Option 1*
Option 2	*Option 2*
Option 3	*Option 3*
Option 4	*Option 4*

Part II

Which group presented its option most effectively? Explain your answer.

Focusing Your Thoughts

Instructions: You have had an opportunity to consider four options on U.S. policy toward Europe. Now it is your turn to look at each of the options from your own perspective. Try each one on for size. Think about how the options address your concerns and hopes. You will find that each has its own risks and trade-offs, advantages and disadvantages.

Ranking the Options

Which of the options below do you prefer? Keep in mind that the beliefs you support most strongly should guide your choice. Rank the options, with "1" being the best option for the United States to follow.

___ **Option 1: Promote Western Values**

___ **Option 2: Protect Our Interests**

___ **Option 3: Beyond Europe**

___ **Option 4: Reduce Our Obligations**

Beliefs

Considering the statements below will help you answer the first two questions of "Your Option Five." Rate each of them according to your personal beliefs:

1 = Strongly Support
2 = Support
3 = Oppose
4 = Strongly Oppose
5 = Undecided

___ Our problems here at home demand that we dramatically reduce our involvement overseas.

___ The political and economic system of the United States and Western Europe is suited to the countries of the former Soviet bloc as well.

___ The chief foreign policy interests of the United States revolve around protecting the stability of our leading trading partners and military allies.

___ Compared to other regions of the world, events in Europe carry less and less significance for the United States.

___ The United States can do little to change the desperate conditions that prevail in much of the world.

___ The UN is best equipped to address an increasing share of the world's problems.

___ Many of our Cold War allies have taken advantage of our country's willingness to shoulder the burdens of global leadership.

___ Spreading Western values around the world is the best way to promote global peace and prosperity.

Creating Your Own Option

Your assignment is to create an option that reflects your own beliefs and opinions. You may borrow heavily from one option, or you may combine ideas from two or three options. Or you may take a new approach altogether. There are, of course, no perfect solutions. And there is no right or wrong answer. Rather, you should strive to craft an option that is logical and persuasive. Be careful of contradictions. For example, we cannot take a tough stance in our trade relations with the EC and at the same time expect the countries of Western Europe to follow our lead in promoting Western values in the former Soviet bloc. The "Your Option Five" worksheet will help you organize your ideas.

Name:__________________________________

Your Option Five

1. Should Europe continue to be the focus of U.S. foreign policy? Explain your answer.

2. What issues in Europe should most concern U.S. policymakers?

3. What policies should the United States pursue with respect to Europe?

a. toward Western Europe:

b. toward the former Soviet bloc:

5. What are the two strongest arguments opposing your option?

A.

B.

6. What are the two strongest arguments supporting your option?

A.

B.

Name:________________________________

Emerging Issues in Europe

Instructions: Your responses to the questions below should reflect the values and policies of "Your Option Five."

1. Rank the regions of Europe in terms of their importance to the United States, with "1" being the most important.

___ Western Europe

___ East Central Europe

___ Balkans

___ Former Soviet Union

2. Assess the following issues in terms of their importance to the United States, ranking each as either "very important," "somewhat important," or "not important."

______________ a. Economic integration of Western Europe

______________ b. Backlash against foreigners in Western Europe

______________ c. Economic reform in East Central Europe

______________ d. Building a democratic society in East Central Europe

______________ e. Environmental pollution in East Central Europe

______________ f. War in the former Yugoslavia

______________ g. Minority rights in the Balkans

______________ h. Relations among states of the former Soviet Union

______________ i. Military cutbacks and nuclear threats in the former Soviet Union

3. Evaluate the following policy recommendation, ranking each as either "support," "oppose," or "undecided."

______________ a. The United States should withdraw its military forces from Europe, even if there is a danger that Russia may turn away from democracy.

______________ b. The United States should provide substantial foreign aid to promote democracy and economic reform in the former Soviet bloc, even if we have to make cuts in spending at home.

______________ c. The United States should encourage the EC to work toward closer integration, even if our Western European allies have fewer reasons to maintain close ties with the United States.

______________ d. The United States should maintain a strong military presence in Europe, even if this means reducing our presence in other parts of the world.

______________ e. The United States should rely chiefly on the UN to address international problems, even if some UN decisions run contrary to U.S. interests.

______________ f. The United States should take a tough stance on trade issues, even if our position causes our relationship with Western Europe to sour.

______________ g. The United States should provide foreign aid to former Soviet bloc countries only to address problems such as nuclear weapons that directly threaten U.S. security, even if progress toward reform stalls in the region.

______________ h. The United States should pledge to respond militarily against aggressive dictators in Europe, even if this might draw us into war.

Supplementary Documents for the Teacher

The Covenant of the League of Nations
(excerpted from the Versailles Treaty, submitted to the U.S. Senate in 1919)

The High Contracting Parties,

In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and

by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 1.

The original members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other members of the League.

Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

Article 2.

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

Article 3.

The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League.

The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

At meetings of the Assembly each member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.

Article 4.

The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associate Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be members of the Council.

With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.

The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

Any member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during consideration of matters specially effecting the interests of that Member of the League.

At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative.

Article 5.

Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

Article 6.

The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such Secretaries and staff as may be required.

The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex; thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly.

The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the Council.

The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.

The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

Article 7.

The Seat of the League id established at Geneva.

The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere.

All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat shall be open equally to men and women.

Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.

Article 8.

The members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.

Article 9.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally.

Article 10.

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article 11.

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting the members of the League or not, is hereby considered a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League may take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

Article 12.

The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.

In any case under this Article the award by the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

Article 13.

The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them that they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration.

Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration.

For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the Court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League that complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

Article 14.

The Council shall formulate and submit to Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

Article 15.

If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

The Council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a settlement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendations as to its settlement.

The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of the Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

Article 16.

Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League.

Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

Article 17.

In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accepted the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Article 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

Article 18.

Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

Article 19.

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

Article 20.

The Members of the League severally agree that this covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

Article 21.

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

Article 22.

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principal that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

Article 23.

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League:

(a) will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations;

(b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control;

(c) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;

(d) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;

(e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind;

(f) will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

Article 24.

There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.

In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is place under the direction of the League.

Article 25.

The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

Article 26.

Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly.

No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

ANNEX.

I. Original Members of the League of Nations Signatories of the Treaty of Peace.

United States of America.
Belgium.
Bolivia.
Brazil.
British Empire.
  Canada.
  Australia.
  South Africa.
  New Zealand.
  India.
China.
Cuba.
Equador.
France.
Greece.
Guatemala.
Haiti.
Hedjaz.
Honduras.
Italy.
Japan.
Liberia.
Nicaragua.
Panama.
Peru.
Poland.
Portugal.
Roumania.
Serb-Croat-Slovene State.
Siam.
Czecho-Slovakia.
Uruguay.

States Invited to Accede to the Covenant.

Argentine Republic.
Chili.
Colombia.
Denmark.
Netherlands.
Norway.
Paraguay.
Persia.
Salvador.
Spain.
Sweden.
Switzerland.
Venezuela.

II. First Secretary General of the League of Nations.

The Honourable Sir James Eric Drummond, K.C.M.G.,C.B.

The Sources of Soviet Conduct

By X*

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. Yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.

It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts with which the Soviet leaders came into power. Marxian ideology, in its Russian-Communist projection, has always been in process of subtle evolution. The materials on which it bases itself are extensive and complex. But the outstanding features of Communist thought as it existed in 1916 may perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of public life and the "physiognomy of society," is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged; (b) that the capitalist system of production is a nefarious one which inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class and is incapable of developing adequately the economic resources of society or of distributing fairly the material goods produced by human labor; (c) that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and must, in view of the inability of the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change, result eventually and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power to the working class; and (d) that imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution.

The rest may be outlined in Lenin's own words: "Unevenness of economic and political development is the inflexible law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of Socialism may come originally in a few capitalist countries or even in a single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and having organized Socialist production at home, would rise against the remaining capitalist world, drawing to itself in the process the oppressed classes of other countries."[1] It must be noted that there was no assumption that capitalism would perish without proletarian revolution. A final push was needed from a revolutionary proletariat movement in order to tip over the tottering structure. But it was regarded as inevitable that sooner or later that push would be given.

For 50 years prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, this pattern of thought had exercised great fascination for the members of the Russian revolutionary movement. Frustrated, discontented, hopeless of finding self-expression - or too impatient to seek it - in the confining limits of the Tsarist political system, yet lacking wide popular support for their choice of bloody revolution as a means of social betterment, these revolutionists found in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalization for their own instinctive desires. It afforded pseudo-scientific justification for their impatience, for their categoric denial of all value in the Tsarist system, for their yearning for power and revenge and for their inclination to cut corners in the pursuit of it. It is therefore no wonder that they had come to believe implicitly in the truth and soundness of the Marxian-Leninist teachings, so congenial to their own impulses and emotions. Their sincerity need not be impugned. This is a phenomenon as old as human nature itself. It has never been more aptly described than by Edward Gibbon, who wrote in "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire": "From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscious may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud." And it was with this set of conceptions that the members of the Bolshevik Party entered into power.

Now it must be noted that through all the years of preparation for revolution, the attention of these men, as indeed for Marx himself, had been centered less on the future form which Socialism[2] would take than on the necessary overthrow of rival power which, in their view, had to precede the introduction of Socialism. Their views, therefore, on the positive program to be put into effect, once power was attained, were for the most part nebulous, visionary and impractical. Beyond the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large, private capital holdings, there was no agreed program. The treatment of the peasantry, which according to the Marxist formulation was not of the proletariat, had always been a vague spot in the pattern of Communist thought; and it remained an object of controversy and

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*This article, authored by George F. Kennan, is based on the 1946 memorandum in which Kennan proposed that the United States aim to contain the expansion of Soviet communism. The article appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947.

vacillation for the first ten years of Communist power.

The circumstances of the immediate post-revolution period - the existence in Russia of civil war and foreign intervention, together with the obvious facts that the Communists represented only a tiny minority of the Russian people - made the establishment of dictatorial power a necessity. The experiment with "war Communism" and the abrupt attempt to eliminate private production and trade had unfortunate economic consequences and caused further bitterness against the new revolutionary regime. While the temporary relaxation of the effort to communize Russia, represented by the New Economic Policy, alleviated some of this economic distress and thereby served its purpose, it also made it evident that the "capitalistic sector of society" was still prepared to profit at once from any relaxation of governmental pressure, and would, if permitted to continue to exist, always constitute a powerful opposing element to the Soviet regime and a serious rival for influence in the country. Somewhat the same situation prevailed with respect to the individual peasant who, in his own small way, was also a private producer.

Lenin, had he lived, might have proved a great enough man to reconcile these conflicting forces to the ultimate benefit of Russian society, though this is questionable. But be that as it may, Stalin, and those whom he led in the struggle for succession to Lenin's position of leadership, were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted. Their sense of insecurity was too great. Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire "rightness," they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. Outside of the Communist Party, Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to be no forms of collective human activity or association which would not be dominated by the Party. No other force in Russian society was to be permitted to achieve vitality or integrity. Only the Party was to have structure. All else was to be an amorphous mass.

And within the Party the same principle was to apply. The mass of Party members might go through the motions of election, deliberation, decision and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by their own individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership and the overbrooding presence of "the word."

Let it be stressed again that subjectively these men probably did not seek absolutism for its own sake. They doubtless believed - and found it easy to believe - that they alone knew what was good for society and that they would accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallengeable. But in seeking that security of their own rule they were prepared to recognize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods. And until such time as that security might be achieved, they placed far down on their scale of operational priorities the comforts and happiness of the peoples entrusted to their care.

Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet regime is that down to the present day this process of political consolidation has never been completed and the men in the Kremlin have continued to be predominantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized in November 1917. They have endeavored to secure it primarily against forces at home, within Soviet society itself. But they have also endeavored to secure it against the outside world. For ideology, as we have seen, taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders. The powerful hands of Russian history and tradition reached up to sustain them in this feeling. Finally, their own aggressive intransigence with respect to the outside world began to find its own reaction; and they were soon forced, to use another Gibbonesque phrase, "to chastise the contumacy" which they themselves had provoked. It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right.

Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element, part of the blame for the maintenance of a dictatorial form of society. But as these remnants were liquidated, little by little, this justification fell away; and when it was indicated officially that they had been finally destroyed, it disappeared altogether. And this fact created one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad.

This began at an early date. In 1924 Stalin specifically defended the retention of the "organs of suppression," meaning, among others, the army and the secret police, on the ground that "as long as there is a capitalist encirclement there will be danger of intervention with all the consequences that flow from that danger." In accordance with that theory, and from that time on, all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power.

By the same token, tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. It is clear, from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded in reality. The real facts concerning it have been confused by the existence abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet philosophy and tactics and occasionally by the existence of great centers of military power, notably the Nazi regime in Germany and the Japanese Government of the late 1930's, which did indeed have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union. But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.

Now the maintenance of this pattern of Soviet power, namely, the pursuit of unlimited authority domestically, accompanied by the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility, has gone far to shape the actual machinery of Soviet power as we know it today. Internal organs of administration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine. Organs which did serve this purpose became vastly swollen. The security of Soviet power came to rest on the iron discipline of the Party, on the severity and ubiquity of the secret police, and on the uncompromising economic monopolism of the state. The "organs of suppression," in which the Soviet leaders had sought security from rival forces, became in large measure the master of those whom they were designed to serve. Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings who form that part of the structure of power must defend at all costs this concept of Russia's position, for without it, they are themselves superfluous.

As things stand today, the rulers can no longer dream of parting with these organs of suppression. The quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in modern times, has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own reaction. The excesses of the police apparatus have fanned the potential opposition to the regime into something far greater and more dangerous than it could have been before those excesses began.

But least of all can the rulers dispense with the fiction by which the maintenance of dictatorial power has been defended. For this fiction has been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses already committed in its name; and it is now anchored in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds far greater than those of mere ideology.

II

So much for the historical background. What does it spell in terms of the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today?

Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it.

The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet Government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical manoeuvre permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of *caveat emptor*. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such "changes." But we should not be misled by tactical manoeuvres. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.

This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing for the final *coup de grace*. Meanwhile, what is vital is that the "Socialist fatherland" - that oasis of power which has been already won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union - should be cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of premature, "adventuristic" revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even a counter-revolutionary act. The cause of Socialism is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow.

This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit.

The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously.

On the principle of infallibility there rests the iron discipline of the Communist Party. In fact, the two concepts are mutually self-supporting. Perfect discipline requires recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires the observance of discipline. And the two together go far to determine the behaviorism of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their effect cannot be understood unless a third factor be taken into account: namely, the fact that the leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of that thesis by the members of the movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, from month to month. It is nothing absolute and immutable - nothing which flows from objective reality. It is only the most recent manifestation of the wisdom of those in whom the ultimate wisdom is supposed to reside, because they represent the logic of history. The accumulative affect of these factors is to give to the whole subordinate apparatus of Soviet power an unshakable stubbornness and steadfastness in its orientation. This orientation can be changed at will by the Kremlin but by no other power. Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force. The individuals who are the components of this machine are amenable to arguments or reason which comes to them from outside sources. Their whole training has taught them to mistrust and discount the glib persuasiveness of the outside world. Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the "master's voice." And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off. Thus the foreign representative cannot hope that his words will make any impression on them. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top, who are capable of changing the party line. But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity.

But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility, and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of a superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.

These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries - policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to the considerations of prestige. Like most any other government , it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a *sine qua non* of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russia prestige.

III

In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contains by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community.

But if ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and that they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself?

The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern technique to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state.

The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up in Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, an industrial foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries.

All of this, however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers' goods production, housing and transportation.

To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is physically and spiritually tired. The mass of people are disillusion, skeptical and no longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which the people seized upon the slight respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes of the regime.

In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work longer hours than their own volition or mere economic pressure would dictate; but if people survive them at all they become old before their time and must be considered as human casualties to the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no longer available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state.

Here only the younger generation can help. The younger generation, despite all vicissitudes and sufferings, is numerous and vigorous; and the Russians are a talented people. But it still remains to be seen what will be the effects on mature performance of the abnormal emotional strains of childhood which Soviet dictatorship created and which were enormously increased by the war. Such things as normal security and placidity of home environment have practically ceased to exist in the Soviet Union outside of the most remote farms and villages. And observers are not yet sure whether that is not going to leave its mark on the over-all capacity of the generation now coming into maturity.

In addition to this, we have the fact that Soviet economic development, while it can list certain formidable achievements, has been precariously spotty and uneven. Russia Communists who speak of the "uneven development of capitalism" should blush at the contemplation of their own national economy. Here certain branches of economic life, such as the metallurgical and machine industries, have been pushed out of all proportion to other sectors of the economy. Here is a nation striving to become in a short period of time one of the great industrialized nations of the world while it still has no highway network worthy of the name and only a relatively primitive network of railways. Much has been done to increase efficiency of labor and to teach primitive peasants something about the operation of machines. But maintenance is still a crying deficiency of all Soviet economy. Construction is hasty and poor in quality. Depreciation must be enormous. And in vast sectors of economic life it has not yet been possible to instill into labor anything like that general culture of production and technical self-respect which characterizes the skilled workers of the west.

It is difficult to see how these deficiencies can be corrected at an early date by a tired and dispirited population working largely under the shadow of fear and compulsion. And as long as they are not overcome, Russia will remain economically a vulnerable, and in a certain sense an impotent, nation, capable of exporting its enthusiasms and radiating the strange charm of its primitive political vitality but unable to back up those articles of export by the real evidences of material power and prosperity.

Meanwhile, a great uncertainty hangs over the political life of the Soviet Union. That is the uncertainty involved in the transfer of power from one individual or groups of individuals to others.

This is, of course, outstandingly the problem of the personal position of Stalin. We must remember that his succession to Lenin's preeminence in the Communist movement was the only such transfer of individual authority which the Soviet Union has experienced. That transfer took 12 years to consolidate. It cost the lives of millions of people and shook the state to its foundations. The attendant tremors were felt all through the international revolutionary movement, to the disadvantage of the Kremlin itself.

It is always possible that another transfer of preeminent power may take place quietly and inconspicuously, with no repercussions anywhere. But again, it is possible that the questions involved may unleash, to use some of Lenin's words, one of those "incredibly swift transitions" from "delicate deceit" to "wild violence" which characterize Russian history, and may shake Soviet power to its foundations.

But this is not only a question of Stalin himself. There has been, since 1938, a dangerous congealment of political life in the higher circles of Soviet power. The All-

Union Congress of Soviets, in theory the supreme body of the Party, is supposed to meet not less often than once in three years. It will soon be eight full years since its last meeting. During this period membership in the Party has numerically doubled. Party mortality during the war was enormous; and today well over half of the Party members are persons who have entered since the last Party congress was held. Meanwhile, the same small group of men has carried on at the top through an amazing series of national vicissitudes. Surely there is some reason why the experiences of the war brought basic political changes to every one of the great governments of the west. Surely the causes of that phenomenon are basic enough to be present somewhere in the obscurity of Soviet political life, as well. And yet no recognition has been given to these causes in Russia.

It must be surmised from this that even within so highly disciplined an organization as the Communist Party there must be a growing divergence in an age, outlook and interest between the great mass of Party members, only so recently recruited into the movement, and the little self-perpetuating clique of men at the top, whom most of these party members have never met, with whom they have never conversed, and with whom they can have no political intimacy.

Who can say whether, in these circumstances, the eventual rejuvenation of higher spheres of authority (which can only be a matter of time) can take place smoothly and peacefully, or whether rivals in the quest for higher power will not eventually reach down into these politically immature and inexperienced masses in order to find support for their respective claims? If this were ever to happen, strange consequences could flow for the Communist Party: for membership at large has been exercised only in practices of iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation. And if disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description. For we have seen that Soviet power is only a crust concealing an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.

Thus the future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self-delusion would make it appear to the men in the Kremlin. That they can keep power themselves, they have demonstrated. That they can quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of their rule and the vicissitudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength and hopes of the great people on whom their power rests. It is curious to note that the ideological power of Soviet authority is strongest today in areas beyond the frontiers of Russia, beyond the reach of its police power. This phenomenon brings to mind a comparison used by Thomas Mann in his great novel "Buddenbrooks." Observing that human institutions often show the greatest outward brilliance at a moment when inner decay is in reality farther advanced, he compared the Buddenbrook family, in the days of its greatest glamour, to one of those stars whose light shines most brilliantly on this world when in reality it has long since ceased to exist. And who can say with assurance that the strong light still cast by the Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples of the western world is not the powerful afterglow of a constellation which is in actuality on the wane? This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved. But the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.

IV

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalistic worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.

But in actuality the possibility for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question of the modest measure of informational activity which this government can conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although that, too, is important. It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy. Even the failure of the United States to experience the early economic depression which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting with such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.

By the same token, exhibitions in indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement goes through the Communist world; a new jauntiness can be noted in the Moscow tread; new groups of foreign supporters climb on to what they can only view as the bandwagon of international politics; and Russian pressure increases all along the line in international affairs.

It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, Messianic movement - and particularly not that of the Kremlin - can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.

Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the over-all worth of the United states as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

Notes

[1] "Concerning the Slogans of the United States of Europe," August 1915. Official Soviet edition of Lenin's works.

[2] Here and elsewhere in this paper "Socialism" refers to Marxist or Leninist Communism, not to liberal Socialism of the Second International variety.

Excerpts from the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Signed in Helsinki, Finland, 1975

Introduction

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which opened at Helsinki on 3 July 1973 and continued at Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, was concluded at Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by the high Representatives of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia.

During the opening and closing stages of the Conference the participants were addressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as their guest of honour. The Director-General of UNESCO and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe addressed the Conference during its second stage.

During the meetings of the second stage of the Conference, contributions were received, and statements heard, from the following non-participating Mediterranean States on various agenda items; the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia.

Motivated by political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and co-operation as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other States of the world,

Determined, in consequence, to give full effect to the results of the Conference and to assure, among their States and throughout Europe, the benefits deriving from those results and thus to broaden, deepen, and make continuing and lasting the process of detente,

The High Representatives of the participating States have solemnly adopted the following:

Questions Relating to Security in Europe

The States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Reaffirming their objectives of promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat or attempt against their security;

Convinced of the need to exert efforts to make detente both a continuing and a increasingly viable and comprehensive process, universal in scope, and that the implementations of the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will be a major contribution to this process;

Considering that solidarity among peoples, as well as the common purpose of the participating States in achieving the aims set forth by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, should lead to the development of better and closer relations among them in all fields and thus to overcoming the confrontation stemming from the character of their past relations, and to better mutual understanding;

Mindful of their common history and recognizing that the existence of elements common to their traditions and values can assist them in developing their relations, and desiring to search, fully taking into account the individuality and diversity of their positions and views, for possibilities of joining their efforts with a view to overcoming distrust and increasing confidence, solving the problems that separate them and co-operating in the interest of mankind;

Recognizing the indivisibility of security in Europe as well as their common interest in the development of co-operation throughout Europe and among themselves and expressing their intention to pursue efforts accordingly;

Recognizing the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole and conscious for the need for each of them to make its contribution to the strengthening of world peace and security and to the promotion of fundamental rights, economic, and social progress and well-being for all peoples;

Have adopted the following:

1.

(a) Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States

The participating States,

Reaffirming their commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and co-operation;

Recognizing that this commitment, which reflects the interest and aspirations of peoples, constitutes for each participating State a present and future responsibility, heightened by experience of the past;

Reaffirming, in conformity with their membership in the United Nations and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, their full and active support for the United Nations and for the enhancement of its role and effectiveness in strengthening international peace, security and justice, and in promoting the solution of international problems, as well as the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States;

Expressing their common adherence to the principles which are set forth below and are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their common will to act, in the application of these principals, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Declare their determination to respect and put into practice, each of them in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographic location or level of economic development, the following principles, which are of primary significance, guiding their mutual relations:

I Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty

The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.

Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and duties. They will respect each other's right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.

II Refraining from the threat or use of force

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of th United Nations and with the present Declaration. N consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

Accordingly, the participating States will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating State. Likewise they will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights. Likewise they will also refrain in their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by force.

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them.

III Inviolability of frontiers

The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or a of the territory of any participating State.

IV Territorial integrity of States

The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.

Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.

The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal.

V Peaceful settlement of disputes

The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as n to endanger international peace and security, and justice.

They will endeavour in good faith and a spirit of cooperation to reach a rapid and equitable solution on the basis of international law.

For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice including any settlement procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to which they are parties.

In the event of failure to reach a solution by any of the above peaceful means, the parties to a dispute will continue to seek a mutually agreed way to settle the dispute peacefully.

Participating States, party to a dispute among them, as well as other participating States, will refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation to such a degree as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and thereby make a peaceful settlement of the dispute more difficult.

VI Non-intervention in internal affairs

The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.

They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State.

They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.

VII Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development

Within this framework the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practise, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among all States.

They will consistently respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavor jointly and separately, including in cooperation with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.

They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfil their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.

VIII Equal rights and self-determination of peoples

The participating States will respect the rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms on international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.

By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle.

IX Co-operation among States

The participating States will develop their cooperation with one another and with all States in all fields in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In developing their cooperation the participating States will place special emphasis on the fields as set forth within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with each of them making its contribution in conditions of full equality.

They will endeavour, in developing their co-operation as equals, to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice. They will endeavour, in developing their co-operation, to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the fulfilment of their aspirations through, inter alia, the benefits resulting from increased mutual knowledge and from progress and achievement in the economic, scientific, technological, social, cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps to promote conditions favourable to making these benefits available to all; they will take into account the interest of all in the narrowing of differences in the levels of economic development, and in particular the interest of developing countries throughout the world.

They confirm that governments, institutions, organizations and persons have a relevant and positive role to play in contributing toward the achievement of these aims of their co-operation.

They will strive, in increasing their co-operation as set forth above, to develop closer relations among themselves on an improved and more enduring basis for the benefit of peoples.

X Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law

The participating States will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law, both those obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and rules of international law and those obligations arising from treaties or other agreements, in conformity with international law, to which they are parties.

In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and regulations, they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due regard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.

All the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

The participating States express their determination fully to respect and apply these principles, as set forth in the present Declaration, in all aspects, to their mutual relations and co-operation in order to ensure to each participating State the benefits resulting from the respect and application of these principles by all.

The participating States, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first sentence of the tenth principle, "Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law," note that the present Declaration does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements.

The participating States express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of co-operation among them in all fields. They also express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of political contacts among them which in turn would contribute to better mutual understanding of their positions and views.

The participating States declare their intention to conduct their relations with all other States in the spirit of the principles contained in the present Declaration.

Suggested Readings

Ash, Timothy Garton. *The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague*. New York: Random House, 1990. 156 pages.

Gaddis, John L. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. 396 pages.

Hopmann, P. Terrence. *Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988. 374 pages.

Johnson, Paul. *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties*. New York: Harper Collins, 1991. 870 pages.

Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Vintage Books, 1987. 677 pages.

Lepgold, Joseph. *The Declining Hegemon: The United States and European Defense, 1960-1990*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990. 225 pages.

Paterson, Thomas G. *The Origins of the Cold War*. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974. 126 pages.

Rothschild, Joseph. *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974. 420 pages.

Smoke, Richard. *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: An Introduction to the American Experience*. New York: Random House, 1987. 323 pages.

Sontag, Raymond J. *A Broken World, 1919-1939*. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 415 pages.

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- In the Shadow of the Cold War: The Caribbean and Central America in U.S. Foreign Policy (Revised 1993, 61 pages, teacher's resource book also available)

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- The Role of the United States in a Changing World: Choices for the 21st Century (1993, 181 pages; order from The Dushkin Publishing Group, (800) 243-6532)

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